Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good Faith Under United States v. Leon by Taylor, John E.
TAYLOR FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006 9:55:58 AM 
 
155 
Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove 
Good Faith Under United States v. Leon 
John E. Taylor* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a narcotics prosecution based largely on evidence obtained 
under the authority of a search warrant.  At the suppression hearing, the 
defendant argues that the warrant is invalid under Illinois v. Gates1 
because the affidavit supporting the warrant application failed to provide 
the magistrate with even a “‘substantial basis for concluding’ that 
probable cause existed.”2  The defendant further argues that the fruits of 
the search must be suppressed despite the United States v. Leon3 good 
faith exception because the affidavit was “‘so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable.’”4  When the trial court seems inclined to accept these 
arguments, the prosecution offers to introduce testimony from the affiant 
officer about information supporting probable cause that she knew at the 
time of the warrant application but neglected to present to the magistrate.  
It is clear that if this additional information had been included in the 
warrant application, the warrant would have been supported by probable 
cause.  Does United States v. Leon allow the prosecution to use the 
affiant’s suppression hearing testimony to cure the probable-cause 
deficiencies in the affidavit and establish the officer’s good faith? 
Most courts that have explicitly addressed this question have adopted 
bright-line rules, holding either that information known to the officer but 
not communicated to the magistrate can always be used to establish good 
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 1. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 2. Id. at 238–39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). 
 3. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 4. Id. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring 
in part)). 
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faith or that it never can.5  The intuitive force of both positions is easy to 
see.  When an officer has submitted a deficient affidavit to the magistrate 
and then tries to cure its deficiencies with suppression hearing testimony, 
there seem to be two possibilities.  Either the officer was careless—
perhaps very careless—in her warrant application, or she did not yet 
know at the time of the warrant application the things she now claims she 
knew.  Allowing suppression hearing testimony to cure the affidavit’s 
deficiencies threatens (at best) to encourage sloppiness in the warrant 
application process and (at worst) to facilitate perjury.  On the other 
hand, officers who plead that they “simply forgot” to include certain 
facts in their affidavits will sometimes be telling the truth.  When the 
testimony is truthful and the officer actually had probable cause for the 
search, is there any point in deterring future carelessness in the warrant 
application process? 
Although categorical rules either allowing or prohibiting the use of 
suppression hearing testimony to prove good faith are simple and easy to 
apply, I argue that an intermediate approach is more faithful to Leon and 
to the policies that underlie the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  In my view, information known to the affiant officer but 
never presented to the magistrate can establish the officer’s good faith 
only where the omission resulted from a reasonable mistake in preparing 
the warrant application and the officer’s knowledge of the information at 
the time of the warrant application is proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.   
The argument is developed as follows.  Part II briefly explains the 
historical development and rationale of the Leon good faith exception, 
then explores some of Leon’s shortcomings by using Meir Dan-Cohen’s 
model of “acoustic separation.”6  Part III surveys the case law addressing 
the question whether an affiant officer’s suppression hearing testimony 
about information omitted from the warrant application can establish the 
officer’s good faith.  It also explains why, contrary to the reasoning of 
some courts, this question is not answered by the many cases holding 
that particularity defects in a warrant can be cured by the executing 
officer’s personal knowledge of the place to be searched. 
To answer any question, one must first frame it properly.  In Part IV, 
I show that although Leon does not directly answer the question of 
whether information not presented to the magistrate can establish an 
                                                     
 5. See infra Part III. A–B. 
 6. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
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officer’s good faith, it does show what the right question is.  The proper 
question for good-faith purposes is whether, considering the totality of 
the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the warrant 
application, the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the 
warrant was properly issued.  Once the question is posed in this way, it is 
tempting to assume that information not presented to the magistrate can 
never be relevant to the officer’s good faith because the propriety of the 
magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant rests solely on the information 
presented to the magistrate.  That conclusion is too quick, however, for it 
ignores the possibility that because of a mistake in filling out the warrant 
application, the officer was unaware of any gap between what he 
presented to the magistrate and what he actually knew.  If this kind of 
mistake can be objectively reasonable, the officer could be said to have 
had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued 
because he reasonably believed that his entire case for probable cause 
had been presented to the magistrate.  The propriety of using suppression 
hearing testimony to establish the officer’s good faith under Leon turns 
out, then, to depend primarily on the question of whether there can be 
such a thing as an “objectively reasonable mistake” in the warrant 
application process.  In light of this understanding of the inquiry, Part V 
presents a typology of cases illustrating the various kinds of mistakes 
that officers can make in the warrant application process and discusses 
several different ways to draw the line between those errors in the 
warrant application process that can be “forgiven” under Leon and those 
that cannot. 
Finally, Part VI identifies and analyzes the various possible rules that 
could govern the use of suppression hearing testimony under Leon.  I 
begin by describing the various functions of the warrant requirement, and 
explain that there are two ways in which the warrant application process 
serves to protect privacy even when magistrates fail to perform their 
constitutional roles.7  First, the costs and discipline of the warrant 
application process tend to filter out some bad searches before the officer 
ever reaches the magistrate by leading officers to impose upon 
themselves a higher probable-cause standard for warrant searches than 
for warrantless searches.  Second, warrants protect privacy by creating an 
ex ante record of the basis for the search, thus making it more difficult 
for police to commit perjury in warrant searches than in warrantless 
searches.  I then evaluate the various possible rules regarding 
                                                     
 7. Of course, the magistrate has made a significant error in every case in which the outcome 
turns on the application of Leon. 
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suppression hearing testimony in terms of their effects on these variables.  
I conclude that, on balance, the best rule would permit the use of 
suppression hearing testimony to establish the officer’s good faith only 
where the information supporting probable cause was omitted from the 
warrant application through a reasonable mistake in preparing the 
application and the officer’s knowledge of the information at the time of 
the warrant application is proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
II. LEON AND ITS CRITICS 
A. Development of the Good Faith Exception 
The path toward the Leon good faith exception8 began with the 
Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in United States v. Calandra,9 which 
described the exclusionary rule as “a judicially created remedy designed 
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved.”10  Calandra meant that violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights did not automatically warrant application of the exclusionary 
remedy.  Instead, the scope of the exclusionary rule’s application would 
be determined through balancing the rule’s deterrence benefits against 
the costs of exclusion.11  In the years following Calandra, the Court 
applied its new balancing approach to limit application of the 
exclusionary rule in a variety of contexts12 and seemed ready to adopt a 
                                                     
 8. The historical development of the good faith exception has been traced with thoroughness 
and skill by others.  See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 908–18 (1986) 
(recounting the arc of cases from Calandra to Leon); Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, On Rollercoasters, 
Submarines, and Judicial Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 941, 958–65 (1989) (discussing cases 
from Calandra to Leon); Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to 
Suppress and “Lost Cases:” The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1036–41 (1991) (providing historical survey of the Supreme Court’s case 
law regarding the exclusionary rule); Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary 
Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 94–102 (1984) (discussing 
Gates and Leon).  Accordingly, my treatment will be brief.  For background on the general pre-Leon 
debate about the merits of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see generally 1 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2 (4th ed. 2002); 
Gerald G. Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the 
Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335 (1983); William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, 
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the 
Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981). 
 9. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
 10. Id. at 348. 
 11. Id. at 348–52. 
 12. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (holding that illegally seized 
evidence may be used in the prosecution’s case in chief against persons not targeted by the search); 
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good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Illinois v. Gates.13  
Instead, the Court held that the challenged affidavit had established 
probable cause for the search.14  In the process, the Court weakened the 
probable-cause standard in important ways.  First, the Court made it 
easier for police to rely on informants’ tips by abandoning the two-
pronged test it had adopted in Aguilar v. Texas15 and Spinelli v. United 
States.16  The Aguilar-Spinelli test had required officers to establish both 
the informant’s “credibility” and his “basis of knowledge”—a failure in 
either prong meant the absence of probable cause.17  Under Gates, 
however, the two prongs of credibility and basis of knowledge became 
merely factors that the magistrate must consider in determining whether 
the “totality of circumstances” indicates a “fair probability” that evidence 
will be found in the place to be searched.18  In addition, the Court 
emphasized that reviewing courts should give significant deference to a 
magistrate’s probable-cause determination, asking only whether the 
magistrate had a “‘substantial basis for . . . [concluding]’ that probable 
cause existed.”19  As has often been pointed out, Gates’s general dilution 
of the probable-cause standard arguably made the creation of a good 
faith exception unnecessary.20  If a magistrate lacked even a “substantial 
                                                                                                                       
 
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980) (holding that illegally seized evidence can be 
used for witness impeachment in criminal trials); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule only provides protection to defendants whose Fourth Amendment 
rights have been violated); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976) (holding that illegally 
seized evidence can be used against defendants petitioning for federal habeas corpus); United States 
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (holding that illegally seized evidence can be used in civil 
proceedings). 
 13. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 14. Id. at 246. 
 15. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
 16. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
 17. For discussion of the Aguilar-Spinelli approach to informants’ tips, the transition to Gates, 
and the implications of that transition, see generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 3.3. 
 18. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 238.  The Court also emphasized the “fluid,” “practical,” and 
“nontechnical” nature of probable-cause judgments.  Id. at 231–32. 
 19. Id. at 238–39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).  While review of 
magistrate probable-cause determinations had never been de novo, this aspect of Gates marked a 
significant increase in the degree of deference applied by reviewing courts.  See Albert Alschuler, 
“Close Enough for Government Work”: The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 
322–23 & n.50 (1984). 
 20. Yale Kamisar may have been the first to make this point.  Writing before the Leon decision, 
he asked, “[h]ow could the officer have had a ‘reasonable, good faith’ belief that probable cause 
existed if it turns out that the totality of the circumstances did not add up to even a ‘substantial 
chance of criminal activity’?”  Yale Kamisar, Gates, ‘Probable Cause,’ ‘Good Faith,’ and Beyond, 
69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 588–89 (1984).  Justice Brennan made the same point in his Leon dissent, 
writing that the Gates and Leon standards overlap so completely that “it is unlikely that a warrant 
could be found invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively 
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basis” under the “totality of the circumstances” for finding a “fair 
probability” that a search would yield evidence, it is not easy to see how 
an officer could still have had a reasonable good-faith belief that the 
warrant was valid.  Nevertheless, the Court took the further step of 
creating a general good faith exception for warrant searches in United 
States v. Leon21 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard.22 
Echoing the balancing approach adopted in Calandra, Justice 
White’s opinion in Leon began by explaining that when police have 
acted in reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant, 
application of the exclusionary rule depends on weighing the costs of 
exclusion (i.e., the loss of “inherently trustworthy tangible evidence” 
from the prosecution’s case in chief) against its possible benefits in 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations.23  The Court then argued for 
Leon’s central claim: that courts weighing the benefits of exclusion 
should focus exclusively on deterrence of law enforcement officials.24  
Possible effects on the conduct of magistrates were irrelevant, the Court 
said, for three reasons.  First, the exclusionary rule was designed “to 
deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and 
magistrates.”25  Second, there was no evidence that judges and 
magistrates were “inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth 
                                                                                                                       
 
reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the mind-boggling concept of objectively 
reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant.”  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 958–59 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  For additional commentary along the same lines, see 1 
LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(f), at 93–102; Alschuler, supra note 19, at 323–24; Dripps, supra note 
8, at 912.  The claim that Leon added nothing to Gates is exaggerated in one respect, of course.  As 
Professor LaFave points out, Leon sweeps more broadly than Gates because it applies to facial 
challenges to warrant validity as well as to challenges based on probable cause.  1 LAFAVE, supra 
note 8, § 1.3(f), at 95.  But at least in the context of probable-cause challenges, the argument that 
there can be no real gap between the Gates and Leon standards is powerful.  Nevertheless, most 
courts appear to see such a gap and grant officers a measure of deference beyond that extended to 
magistrates.  See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
Leon’s “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable” standard requires “a less demanding showing than the ‘substantial basis’ threshold 
required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place”); United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 
1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the magistrate lacked a substantial basis for finding 
probable cause under Gates but admitting evidence because the affidavit contained sufficient indicia 
of probable cause to establish the officer’s good faith under Leon).  But cf. People v. Leftwich, 869 
P.2d 1260, 1271 n.12 (Colo. 1994) (stating that “in the vast majority of cases,” courts finding no 
“substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed will also refuse to apply the good faith 
exception). 
 21. 468 U.S. 897. 
 22. 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
 23. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07. 
 24. Id. at 918. 
 25. Id. at 916. 
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Amendment.”26  Third, and most crucially, the Court argued that there 
was no reason to think that exclusion would deter magistrates from 
issuing invalid warrants because magistrates are “not adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team” and “have no stake in the outcome of particular 
criminal prosecutions.”27  If exclusion had no effect on magistrates, the 
Court continued, it could only be justified by its ability to “alter the 
behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their 
departments.”28 
With this key premise in hand, the Court moved quickly toward the 
conclusion that suppressing the fruits of warrant searches will rarely 
further the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule.29  Officers can 
normally rely on a magistrate’s probable-cause determination because it 
is “the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s 
allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant 
comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”30  
Excluding evidence when the magistrate’s determination is later judged 
faulty is “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than 
his own,” and therefore “cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations.”31  The Court insisted, however, that the 
officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s judgment must be “objectively 
reasonable”32—the officer’s contention that he subjectively believed 
himself to be acting in accordance with the Fourth Amendment would 
not be enough to establish his “good faith.”33  This objective approach 
was necessary both to eliminate the waste of judicial resources on 
“expedition[s] into the minds of police officers”34 and to preserve 
incentives for police departments to equip their officers with a 
“reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.”35 
Leon’s good faith exception is broad but not boundless.  The Court 
recognized that suppression might still be ordered on a case-by-case 
basis in circumstances where “a reasonably well-trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 
                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 916–17. 
 28. Id. at 918. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 921. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 922. 
 33. Id. at 919 n.20. 
 34. Id. at 922 n.23. 
 35. Id. at 919 n.20. 
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authorization.”36  The Court listed four such circumstances, which I will 
refer to as the four exceptions to Leon’s good-faith rule.37  Evidence must 
still be excluded under Leon if: 
 (1) the magistrate was “misled by information in an affidavit that the 
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for 
his reckless disregard of the truth;”38 
 (2) the magistrate “wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner 
condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York”39 (i.e., acted as a 
mere rubber stamp for the police);40 
 (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable;”41 or 
 (4) the warrant was “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—
that the executing officers” could not reasonably have thought it 
was valid.42 
Under this framework, defendants attempt to defeat application of 
the good faith exception by proving that one or more of these exceptions 
applies.43  Leon itself concerned the third exception, which is probably 
the most frequently litigated of the four.44  The Court easily concluded 
                                                     
 36. Id. at 922 n.23. 
 37. It is unclear whether the Court meant for these exceptions to be exhaustive.  See generally 
Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1173, 1204–05 (1987); Kevin Jon Heller & John Paul Reichmuth, Lying in Wait for the Good 
Faith Exception, THE CHAMPION, Feb. 22, 1998, at 53–54; Robert C. Gleason, Note, Application 
Problems Arising from the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 28 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743, 758–60 (1987). 
 38. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
 39. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).  In Lo-Ji Sales, a magistrate judge approved a warrant for the search 
of an obscene bookstore and then accompanied officers to the scene to assist in the execution of the 
search.  Id. at 319. 
 40. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
 41. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. To be more precise, the defense defines the shape of good-faith litigation by attempting to 
bring the case within one of the exceptions to Leon.  Ultimately, however, the prosecution bears the 
burden of proving application of the good faith exception by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
United States v. Gant, 759 F.2d 484, 487–88 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that once the defendant has 
proven that the warrant was not based on probable cause, the government must prove the 
applicability of the good faith exception, but noting that often the issue of burden of proof will have 
“little significance” because “the determination of good faith will ordinarily depend on an 
examination of the affidavit by the reviewing court”); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 
1987) (stating that under Leon the government must prove that the good faith exception applies). 
 44. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(f), at 92. 
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that the probable-cause showing in the warrant application was 
sufficiently robust to make the officer’s reliance on the warrant 
objectively reasonable.45  In Leon’s companion case, Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, the Court applied the good faith exception to cure a 
particularity defect because “the officers reasonably believed that the 
search they conducted was authorized by a valid warrant.”46 
In the years since Leon, several additional Supreme Court decisions 
have both clarified and expanded the scope of the good faith exception.  
In Malley v. Briggs,47 the Court held that the “same standard of objective 
reasonableness”48 applied in Leon determined the scope of an officer’s 
qualified immunity from liability in a § 198349 claim.50  Significantly, the 
Court squarely rejected the argument that an officer’s reliance on a 
magistrate’s probable-cause determination is always objectively 
reasonable.  Although the magistrates in an ideal system would always 
disapprove inadequate warrant applications, the Court wryly noted that 
                                                     
 45. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.  This result is hardly surprising because, as Justice Stevens pointed 
out in his dissent, the affidavit likely established probable cause for the search under the Court’s 
newly adopted standard in Gates.  Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 46. 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984).  In Sheppard, the affiant officer sought a warrant to search for 
evidence in a murder case, but was unable to find the proper forms and therefore completed the 
warrant application using a form designed for drug searches.  The officer alerted the magistrate that 
changes would need to be made to the wording of the warrant, and the magistrate assured the officer 
that he would make the necessary changes.  The magistrate then made some changes to the form and 
returned it to the officer.  Unfortunately, the magistrate had not crossed out the portion of the 
warrant that authorized a search for controlled substances.  Id. at 985–86.  As a result, the warrant 
authorized a search significantly broader than the probable-cause showing in the affidavit.  
Nonetheless, the Court applied Leon because the affiant officer had executed the search in the 
objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid.  Id. at 989–90.  It was objectively 
reasonable, the Court said, for the officer to rely on the magistrate’s assurances that he had made the 
necessary alterations to the warrant.  Id. 
 As Professor LaFave points out, Sheppard did not involve the usual scenario litigated under 
the fourth Leon exception.  1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(f), at 87.  Ordinarily, officers have relied 
on a very broad description of the things to be seized by searching to the full extent of the warrant.  
The question is then whether the warrant was so obviously lacking in particularity that the officers 
should have recognized that the search was unconstitutional despite the magistrate’s authorization.  
In Sheppard, the officers restricted the scope of their search to the items listed in the affidavit 
because they mistakenly assumed that the warrant authorized the search they had requested. 
 47. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 48. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court said, unless the warrant application 
“is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.”  
Id. at 344–45 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (creating a damages remedy for violations of constitutional rights 
by government officials acting “under color of law”). 
 50. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344.  Interestingly, the Court reasoned as though the scope of immunity 
under § 1983 ought to be at least as wide, and possibly wider, than the scope of the exclusionary 
rule.  As Professor Kamisar points out, however, there are many instances where officers ought to 
enjoy qualified immunity even though exclusion would be appropriate.  Kamisar, supra note 20, at 
575–76 (urging that police officers should sometimes be permitted to act upon anonymous tips 
without losing qualified immunity even when the fruits of the search are properly suppressed). 
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“ours is not an ideal system” and that sometimes “a magistrate, working 
under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should.”51  It 
is therefore reasonable, the Court said, to require an officer to minimize 
the danger of magistrate failure by “exercising reasonable professional 
judgment” about whether his affidavit establishes probable cause for an 
arrest or search.52  Where a reasonable officer would not have requested 
the warrant, the officer “cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the 
greater incompetence of the magistrate.”53 
The Court expanded the good faith exception beyond the context of 
officer reliance on subsequently invalidated warrants in Illinois v. Krull54 
and Arizona v. Evans.55  In Krull, the Court held that the exclusionary 
rule would no longer apply when officers acted in objectively reasonable 
reliance upon a statute later declared to be unconstitutional.56  As in 
Leon, the critical premise in Krull was that the sanction of exclusion 
could not be expected to have significant deterrent effects on 
legislators.57  In Evans, police had arrested and then searched the 
defendant in reliance upon an erroneous computer record that showed an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest on misdemeanor charges.58  In fact, the 
arrest warrant had been quashed seventeen days earlier but police 
computer records had not been updated because of a clerical error by 
either court clerks or police clerks.59  The Arizona Supreme Court had 
held that the evidence should be suppressed regardless of the source of 
the error, citing the dangers that negligently maintained computer records 
could pose to innocent citizens.60  The Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded, holding that Leon supports “a categorical exception to the 
exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.”61  The Court 
                                                     
 51. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345–46. 
 52. Id. at 346. 
 53. Id. at 346 n.9. 
 54. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 55. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 56. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 353. 
 57. Id. at 349–52.  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, 
dissented both on the historical ground that “[s]tatutes authorizing unreasonable searches were the 
core concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment” and the policy ground that legislators “by 
virtue of their political role are more often subjected to political pressures that may threaten Fourth 
Amendment values than are judicial officers.”  Id. at 362, 365–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 58. 514 U.S. at 4.  Because the evidence the defendant sought to suppress was discovered 
during a search incident to his arrest, the suppression decision turned on the validity of the initial 
arrest.  Id. at 6. 
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871–74 (Ariz. 1994), rev’d, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 61. Evans, 514 U.S. at 16.  The remand, which did not produce a reported decision, was needed 
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reasoned that court employees, like magistrates, were “not adjuncts to the 
law enforcement team” and therefore were unlikely to be spurred to more 
accurate recordkeeping by the prospect of exclusion.62  The Court did not 
decide whether Leon would apply if police clerks, rather than court 
clerks, were responsible for the error.63  Several courts, however, have 
read the decision to imply that Leon should not apply to clerical errors by 
police department personnel.64 
B. The Trouble With Leon 
Leon and its progeny, then, have established that application of the 
exclusionary rule depends on whether suppression will deter Fourth 
Amendment violations enough to justify the exclusion of probative 
evidence.  In answering this question, the Court has categorically 
declared that magistrates, legislators, and court personnel are so unlikely 
to be influenced by the prospect of suppression that the exclusionary rule 
should not apply when their mistakes lead to Fourth Amendment 
violations.  In contrast, police officers (and, probably, other members of 
the law enforcement team) can be influenced by the prospect of 
exclusion.  Even so, the Court has made clear that exclusion will rarely 
be appropriate when officers rely on the judgment of a neutral and 
detached magistrate. 
                                                                                                                       
 
to resolve the factual question of whether court clerks or police clerks were responsible for the faulty 
computer record. 
 62. Id. at 15.  See also United States v. Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Evans 
despite history of repeated errors by court employees because Evans turns not “on the particular type 
or magnitude of the error, but on the identity of the individuals responsible for the error”). 
 63. Evans, 514 U.S. at 16 n.5. 
 64. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502–03 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that the 
exclusionary rule applies when a police dispatcher’s error leads to a Fourth Amendment violation); 
Hoay v. State, 71 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Ark. 2002) (stating that the exclusionary rule “should apply 
equally to defective recordkeeping by law enforcement”); People v. Willis, 46 P.3d 898, 912–13 
(Cal. 2002) (applying the exclusionary rule where a data entry clerk whose job was to assist parole 
officers in carrying out law enforcement functions made a clerical error); Shadler v. State, 761 So. 
2d 279, 284–85 (Fla. 2000) (applying the exclusionary rule where a Fourth Amendment violation 
resulted from police reliance on an error by a state driver’s license division employee because 
regular police reliance on driver’s license records makes such records “a vital part of the law 
enforcement infrastructure”); State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664, 667–68 (Fla. 1995) (applying the 
exclusionary rule because “police negligence” caused inaccuracy in computer records).  It is clear, in 
any event, that if the good faith exception applies to clerical errors made by police personnel, it must 
be for different reasons than those given in Evans.  Police clerks are, on any understanding, 
“adjuncts to the law enforcement team” and therefore should be subject to the deterrent influences of 
the exclusionary rule. 
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After two decades of experience with Leon, courts have apparently 
gotten the message.  Indeed, the Leon good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule might be more aptly termed the good-faith 
“inclusionary rule” for warrant searches.65  Though some states have 
refused to follow Leon in interpreting their own constitutions,66 courts 
applying Leon rarely exclude evidence when police take the trouble to 
obtain a warrant.67  With Leon’s blessing,68 courts often proceed directly 
to the good-faith inquiry without any consideration of the probable-cause 
question.69  Though suppression motions are still granted under Leon,70 
                                                     
 65. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2469 (1996). 
 66. See People v. Goldston, 682 N.W.2d 479, 499 n.2 (Mich. 2004) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) 
(listing cases); John E. Theuman, Annotation, State Constitutional Requirements as to Exclusion of 
Evidence Unlawfully Seized—Post-Leon Cases, 19 A.L.R. 5TH 470 (1994) (stating that perhaps as 
many as twenty-eight state courts have declined to follow Leon in interpreting their own 
constitutions). 
 67. I take this to be an uncontroversial assertion, at least as a characterization of the reported 
decisions applying Leon.  To illustrate, I am aware of only one case in which the Fourth Circuit 
refused to apply Leon to admit the fruits of a warrant search.  See United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 
116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply the good faith exception where the officer submitted a 
“bare-bones” affidavit).  What is less clear is whether Leon has significantly reduced the success rate 
of suppression motions at the trial court level.  An early effort to measure the empirical effects of 
Leon found no significant effect on either police practices regarding search warrants or the frequency 
or success rate of suppression motions.  Craig D. Uchida et al., Acting in Good Faith: The Effects of 
United States v. Leon on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 494 (1988).  The force of this 
conclusion is limited, however, because the study was conducted only shortly after Leon and 
therefore could not speak authoritatively to the lasting effects of the decision.  Id. at 474, 494.  
Strikingly, the conclusion that Leon had little initial impact on suppression motions mainly rests on 
evidence that motions to suppress in search warrant cases were overwhelmingly likely to fail both 
before and after Leon.  Id. at 492–93. 
 68. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925 (stating that reviewing courts can “exercise an informed 
discretion” in rejecting some suppression motions “by turning immediately to a consideration of the 
officers’ good faith”). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Beckett, 321 F.3d 26, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 194–95 
(4th Cir. 2002).  But cf. United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1397–98 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that under Leon the “preferred sequence” is to address Fourth Amendment issues before addressing 
good faith because a contrary course enables officers to repeat the same mistakes with impunity); 
Anzualda v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 749, 754 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (en banc) (electing to 
decide the issue of probable cause first because “if we repeatedly fail to address the threshold 
question of probable cause, we will continue to neglect our duty to adequately educate our 
magistrates and to provide them with discrete legal guidelines, concomitantly reducing their role in 
the issuance of warrants to little more than that of a rubber stamp”).  Commentators agree that courts 
commonly bypass questions of probable cause and proceed directly to the good-faith inquiry, but 
they disagree about whether this practice has had a tendency to inhibit the development of 
substantive Fourth Amendment law.  Compare Zack Bray, Comment, Appellate Review and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 113 YALE L.J. 1143, 1146 (2004) (documenting and criticizing tendency of many 
courts to proceed directly to the good-faith inquiry), and Joan Greenberg Levenson, Comment, The 
Good Faith Exception: Should It Enable Courts to Avoid Explication of Underlying Fourth 
Amendment Issues?, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 818–27 (1986) (criticizing Leon for allowing courts to 
adjudicate the good-faith issue without addressing the underlying issue of probable cause), with Sean 
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courts have sometimes construed the four exceptions to the Leon good-
faith rule in grudging fashion.71 
Leon and its rationale, of course, have been challenged on many 
levels by both dissenting Justices and their academic supporters.  Among 
the most prominent criticisms72 are the following: First, Leon is wrong to 
treat the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy meant to deter 
Fourth Amendment violations rather than a personal right grounded in 
the Constitution.73  Second, Leon fails to treat the Fourth Amendment as 
                                                                                                                       
 
R. O’Brien, Note, United States v. Leon and the Freezing of the Fourth Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1305, 1336 (1993) (arguing that even after Leon, the exclusionary rule still adequately serves 
to prompt judicial development of Fourth Amendment doctrine). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Herron, 215 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the good 
faith exception did not apply where the affidavit’s only evidence that the defendant was growing 
marijuana was two prior convictions for marijuana cultivation and observations that the defendant’s 
relatives were growing marijuana at a nearby farm); United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377–
78 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the good faith exception did not apply where the affidavit was based 
almost entirely upon hearsay and lacked particularized incriminating facts); State v. Weston, 494 
S.E.2d 801, 804 (S.C. 1997) (holding that the  good faith exception did not apply where the affidavit 
“lacked any indicia of probable cause”). 
 71. See generally Dripps, supra note 8, at 931 (criticizing State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 206 (La. 
Ct. App. 1984), as a misapplication of Leon); David Clark Esseks, Note, Errors in Good Faith: The 
Leon Exception Six Years Later, 89 MICH. L. REV. 625, 635–38 (1990) (surveying cases where Leon 
was used to admit evidence that should have been excluded).  It must be acknowledged, however, 
that one still finds cases where courts set the bar of “reasonableness” very high.  See, e.g., People v. 
Miller 75 P.3d 1108, 1115–16 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (concluding, over a strong dissent and in the 
face of much contrary authority, that Leon did not apply because any reasonable officer would have 
recognized that a one-month-old observation of methamphetamine manufacturing in a home was too 
stale to establish probable cause for search).  Courts sometimes also fail to construe warrants in the 
“common sense and realistic fashion” demanded by United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 
(1965).  See, e.g., State v. Koen, 113 P.3d 675, 680–83 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that the 
affidavit totally failed to establish a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence to be 
sought despite persuasive dissent arguing that nexus could readily be inferred from the contents of 
the affidavit). 
 72. The list that follows is not meant to be exhaustive, and its ordering is not meant to reflect 
any position on which criticisms are the most important or persuasive.  Though academic 
commentary discussing Leon has largely been critical, the decision has had its defenders.  See, e.g., 
Matthew H. Lembke, Note, The Role of Police Culpability in Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1213, 1232–35 (1990) (stating that “[o]bjective good faith is . . . a perfectly appropriate and 
desirable standard for application of the exclusionary rule,” but cautioning that “the good faith 
exception can only function as intended if a meaningful measure of police good faith is 
established”).  Donald Dripps has offered a more qualified defense of Leon’s result, if not its 
reasoning or rationale.  See Dripps, supra note 8, at 931–33 (arguing that, if properly interpreted, 
Leon would not undermine the integrity of the warrant process). 
 73. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 931–35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
“comprises a personal right to exclude all evidence secured by means of unreasonable searches and 
seizures”); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a ‘Principled Basis’ 
Rather Than an ‘Empirical Proposition’?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 569–71 (1983) (same); 
Thomas S. Shrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a 
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 289–307 (1974) (same).  But see Dripps, supra 
note 8, at 918–22 (arguing the opposing viewpoint). 
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law by recognizing a class of constitutional violations for which no 
remedy of any kind is available.74  Third, Leon’s cost-benefit analysis 
overstates the costs and understates the benefits of the exclusionary 
rule.75  Fourth, Leon is wrong to assume that the prospect of suppression 
affects only police officers and never magistrates76 (or legislators77 or 
court clerks78).  Fifth, Leon leads both magistrates and officers to take the 
warrant application process less seriously.79  Sixth, Leon ignores the 
empirical literature suggesting that magistrate review of warrant 
applications is often cursory.80  Seventh, Leon is problematic because 
(together with Gates) it gives magistrates virtually unreviewable 
discretion in the issuance of warrants but does nothing to ensure that 
magistrates are up to the task of serving as the first-line guarantors of 
Fourth Amendment rights.81 
                                                     
 74. 468 U.S. at 977 n.35 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dripps, supra note 8, at 934 n.152.  Dripps 
calls this the “jurisprudential objection” to Leon.  Id. at 934–39. 
 75. 468 U.S. at 949–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(c)–(d), at 60–
68.  Cf. James B. White, Forgotten Points in the Exclusionary Rule Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 
1282 (1983) (arguing that by adopting the rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis, the Court misconceives 
its constitutional role and masks the true basis of its decisions because inquiry into the costs and 
benefits of exclusion “can never be performed in an adequate way”). 
 76. Leon, 468 U.S. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Alschuler, supra note 19, at 351–56; 
Wasserstrom & Mertens, Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold, supra note 8, at 105–12. 
 77. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365–66 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 1 LAFAVE, supra 
note 8, § 1.3(g), at 106. 
 78. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.8(e), at 308. 
 79. 468 U.S. at 957–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See 
generally Steiker, supra note 65, at 2543–48 (discussing the concern that police will not take Fourth 
Amendment requirements seriously if those requirements are not enforced through the exclusionary 
rule). 
 80. Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1184; George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment 
and the Myth of Magisterial Discretion, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (1990).  Goldstein relies heavily 
on a study conducted in the early 1980s by the National Center for State Courts.  R. VAN DUIZEND 
ET. AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES  (1985) [hereinafter NCSC Study].  The study found, among other 
things, that proceedings before magistrates generally lasted only two to three minutes and that 
magistrates often failed to ask any questions despite the presence of “boilerplate” language in many 
warrant applications.  Id. at 51–53.  The NCSC Study remains the most comprehensive and 
authoritative empirical account of the search warrant process.  For an account of preliminary 
findings from a more recent study, see Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for 
Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 221 (2000). 
 81. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1207; Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law 
Analogy, 77 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507, 538–44 (1986).  There are, of course, some powerful 
arguments that the exclusionary rule is not a very effective mechanism for preventing Fourth 
Amendment violations in any event.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck 
the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368–400 (1999).  Professor Slobogin recommends 
that an administrative damages remedy take the place of the exclusionary rule, a suggestion that has 
much to recommend it on the merits even if its political feasibility is doubtful.  A major problem 
with the Court’s approach under Leon, in contrast, is that it restricts the scope of the exclusionary 
remedy while putting nothing in its place. 
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I am sympathetic to many, indeed most, of these criticisms.82  In 
particular, I reject Leon’s assumption that whole classes of government 
actors are beyond—perhaps “above” would be the better word83—being 
influenced by the prospect of suppression.  Even within the balancing 
framework adopted by the Court, the proper question ought to be 
whether exclusion will reduce the overall level of Fourth Amendment 
violations by the state—not by particular classes of state actors.84  Yet 
adding to the many academic criticisms of Leon is not my purpose here.  
Instead, I deal with a much more limited question about the application 
of Leon within the framework established by the Supreme Court.  
Specifically, I address an issue courts sometimes face in deciding 
whether to apply the third Leon exception, which provides that 
suppression is still appropriate when an officer’s affidavit is “‘so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable.’”85  The issue is whether courts should apply the 
good faith exception on the basis of information supporting probable 
cause that was known to the affiant officer at the time of the warrant 
application but never shared with the magistrate.86 
The troublesome nature of Leon and its implications for this issue 
can be illuminated through the use of the metaphor of “acoustic 
separation” developed by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen.87  As a heuristic 
                                                     
 82. The only criticism I find doubtful is the claim that Leon errs by not treating the exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence as a personal constitutional right of the accused.  For arguments regarding 
that issue, see sources cited supra note 73. 
 83. See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 357 (suggesting that Leon’s approach demeans police 
officers by assuming they are generally less respectful of constitutional rights than judicial officers). 
 84. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, Deregulating the Police, supra note 8, at 431 (stating that the 
proper inquiry is whether the exclusion of evidence will reduce future Fourth Amendment violations 
at an acceptable cost, not whether exclusion will deter police officers who act in good faith); see also 
Note, Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Exception for Clerical Error, 109 HARV. L. REV. 131, 135 
(1995) (arguing that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule should be to prevent all future Fourth 
Amendment violations, not just those violations that result from police disregard for constitutional 
rights”); cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that the 
spectre of computerized error in police work might eventually lead the Court to think of the 
exclusionary sanction as applying to “the government as a whole, not merely the police”). 
 85. United States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
610–11 (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
 86. In the interest of brevity, I will often describe my topic as the question whether suppression 
hearing testimony can establish an officer’s good faith under Leon.  I should acknowledge that, at 
one level, the answer to the question may seem obvious.  If one believes (as I do) that Leon was a 
mistake, one will naturally want to interpret the case as narrowly as possible.  In this context, that 
would mean holding that suppression hearing testimony should never be allowed to establish an 
officer’s good faith.  This perspective, however, offers little help to courts obligated to follow Leon 
as the law of the land.  While not turning a blind eye to the problems created by Leon, my project 
here is to work within its assumptions insofar as possible and to fashion a solution that makes sense 
for courts that (willingly or grudgingly) must follow Leon. 
 87. Dan-Cohen, supra note 6. 
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device for explicating Bentham’s distinction between “decision rules” 
(which guide officials in their efforts to apply the law) and “conduct 
rules” (which provide behavioral norms for the general public), Dan-
Cohen asks us to imagine a world consisting of two groups of people: (1) 
members of the general public who perform various actions and (2) 
officials who rule on the propriety of the public’s actions.88  Each group 
occupies a separate, acoustically sealed chamber—hence the metaphor of 
acoustic separation.  In a universe of acoustic separation, the law 
transmits separate normative messages to each group—neither group can 
hear the message intended for the other.89  The messages intended for 
and heard only by the general public are conduct rules, those heard only 
by the officials are decision rules.90  The real world, of course, is not one 
of acoustic separation: members of the general public sometimes “hear” 
the messages intended for officials and vice versa.91  This lack of 
acoustic separation can sometimes cause problems for the law’s 
normative aims.  For example, individuals who are familiar with decision 
rules may consider those rules in making choices about how to behave 
even when the law would prefer that they not do so.92 
Dan-Cohen illustrates the point via the criminal defense of duress.  
Traditional debates about the appropriateness of the defense have 
portrayed the law as facing an irreconcilable conflict between the values 
of deterrence (arguing against recognizing the duress defense) and 
compassion or fairness (arguing for its recognition).93  As Dan-Cohen 
points out, however, this clash of values would not exist in a world of 
acoustic separation.94  In such a world, the duress defense would be a 
pure decision rule that would be “heard” only by officials and would 
therefore have no side effects that might tend to undermine the force of 
the conduct rules proscribing the various criminal offenses.95  Acoustic 
separation would “permit[] the law to maintain higher degrees of both 
deterrence and leniency than could otherwise coexist.”96  Indeed, 
acoustic separation is sometimes so normatively useful that the law seeks 
to mimic its effects by relying on existing “partial acoustic separation” 
(i.e., differences in the degrees to which messages are heard by different 
                                                     
 88. Id. at 630. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 631. 
 92. Id. at 632–34. 
 93. Id. at 633. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 633–34. 
 96. Id. at 665. 
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groups) and even engaging in “strategies of selective transmission” (i.e., 
methods of segregating the law’s messages so as to “increase the 
probability that a certain normative message will reach only the 
constituency for which it is intended”).97  For example, Dan-Cohen 
argues that the notorious vagueness of the duress defense can be seen as 
a strategy of selective transmission through which the law attempts to 
partially duplicate the conditions of acoustic separation: “the 
indeterminacy of the standards makes it less likely that ordinary citizens 
will be able to rely on them with any degree of confidence.”98 
Although Dan-Cohen developed the acoustic separation model in the 
context of discussing substantive criminal law and its conduct rules 
addressing the general public, the model can be easily extended to the 
context of criminal procedure.99  Adapting the model to that context, 
Fourth Amendment norms regarding such topics as the warrant 
requirement, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion are conduct rules 
telling police officers how they should conduct criminal investigations.  
The exclusionary rule and the Leon good faith exception are decision 
rules that tell judges how they should respond to police violations of the 
conduct rules.100  The traditional exclusionary rule, though applied by 
judges, also sent a clear normative message to officers: abide by the 
conduct rules or forfeit the use of any evidence you obtain.  Indeed, the 
traditional exclusionary rule depended on a lack of acoustic separation 
for its effectiveness.  Leon, on the other hand, is a rule that would work 
best in a world of acoustic separation.  If one accepts the position that the 
exclusionary rule creates no rights in the accused and is merely a tool for 
modifying police behavior, it follows that in a world of acoustic 
separation there would never be a need to actually apply the exclusionary 
rule.  Instead, police officers would hear only the conduct rules generated 
by the Fourth Amendment and the message that exclusion was the 
                                                     
 97. Id. at 634–35.  Dan-Cohen explains that these “strategies of selective transmission” need 
not have been consciously pursued—though, of course, they can be.  Rather, they should be seen as 
the sort of “strategies without a strategist” discussed in much of Michel Foucalt’s work.  They are 
“social phenomena, patterns, and practices that look like (that is, are amenable to an illuminating 
interpretation as) tactics for promoting certain human interests or values.”  Id. at 635–36. 
 98. Id. at 640. 
 99. Dan-Cohen noted that the model could be used in other contexts.  Id. at 635 n.21.  His 
suggestion has been heeded at least twice in discussions of criminal procedure.  See Marsh, supra 
note 8, at 946–58 (using the acoustic separation model to analyze the good faith exception); Steiker, 
supra note 65, at 2548–51 (discussing problems caused by acoustic separation between the two 
audiences for the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence: law enforcement officials and the 
general public).  Marsh’s general concerns about Leon are similar to my own, though she does not 
discuss the question of whether Leon should allow information not communicated to the magistrate 
to establish the officer’s good faith. 
 100. See Steiker, supra note 65, at 2470, 2534. 
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sanction for any violation.  Accordingly, they would go on behaving as 
though Leon did not exist and the law could both have its cake (effective 
promotion of compliance with the Fourth Amendment) and eat it too (no 
windfalls to the guilty from the loss of probative evidence).101 
The trouble is that although Leon would make perfect sense in the 
world described by the acoustic separation model, the assumptions of 
that model are especially inapt as a description of the world actually 
governed by Leon.  This is so because police officers are highly attuned 
to the judicial rules governing their behavior.102  Indeed, some empirical 
work on police culture indicates that officers are likely to regard Fourth 
Amendment conduct rules as meaningless unless they believe that 
violations of those rules will be sanctioned.103  To the extent that officers 
do “overhear” the normative message of Leon, that message functions to 
undermine the seriousness of their adherence to the relevant conduct 
rules.  This is evident even in the way the third Leon exception is 
formulated.  Where officers about to submit a warrant application once 
asked themselves, “does the information in my affidavit establish 
probable cause for this search?,” those who have heard and understood 
the message of Leon might ask, “could a well-trained officer reasonably 
believe that the information in my affidavit provides the magistrate with 
at least a substantial basis for finding probable cause?”  The shift from 
 
                                                     
 101. The text’s portrait of Leon in a world of acoustic separation is misleading in one respect, as 
it does not do justice to the ways in which Leon is meant to encourage use of warrants by offering 
the “safe harbor” of deferential review once a warrant is obtained.  See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-
Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1247–48 (2002) 
(explaining how Leon can be viewed as a “pro-warrant” decision rather than simply as an “anti-
exclusionary rule” decision).  There must be less than complete acoustic separation for this part of 
Leon’s message to influence police officers. 
 102. Steiker, supra note 65, at 2534–37 (arguing that the relationship between Supreme Court 
decisions and the police is one of “very low acoustic separation”). 
 103. According to Steiker, “[w]here the police ‘hear’ the Court’s decision rules and thus are able 
to predict the likely legal consequences of their unconstitutional behavior, they may see little reason 
to continue to obey conduct rules that consistently are unenforced in criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at 
2543.  She also expresses concern that as Leon and similar doctrines adopted by the Rehnquist Court 
increase the gap between conduct rules and decision rules, some police officers will come to view 
the decision rules rather than the conduct rules as “the ‘real’ law.”  Id. at 2545.  In support of these 
claims, Steiker points to a study based on police officer interviews by Professor Milton Loewenthal.  
Id. (citing Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 
UMKC L. REV. 24, 29 (1980)).  Professor Lowenthal found, for example, that most police officers 
interpreted Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which declined to extend the federal Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states, “as not having imposed any legal obligation on the 
police since, under that decision, the evidence would still be admissible no matter how it was 
obtained.”  Steiker, supra note 65, at 2545 (quoting Loewenthal, supra, at 29).  For a similar 
perspective, see JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 277 (3d. ed. 1994) (criticizing the Leon good faith exception partly on the ground that 
“[w]ithout an exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment has little meaning to police”). 
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the first question to the second does not bode well for Fourth 
Amendment compliance.104 
The possible “conduct side effects” of the Leon decisional rule in a 
world without acoustic separation have always been at the core of 
objections to Leon, starting with the dissents of Justices Brennan and 
Stevens.105  This way of describing the trouble with Leon also suggests a 
strategy for interpreting it.  If Leon presupposes that officers acting in 
objective good faith cannot be deterred, Leon ought, insofar as possible, 
to be interpreted so it does not change the way police officers operate.  In 
other words, it ought to be interpreted so as to utilize strategies of 
selective transmission to the greatest possible extent.106  To put things 
somewhat paradoxically, courts should apply Leon only in cases where 
police officials appear to have acted in just the way they would have 
acted without Leon.  Where the officer appears to have relied on Leon in 
his approach to the warrant application process, Leon should not be 
available to save him.107  I develop these ideas more fully in Part VI.  For 
now, I turn to a survey of the relevant case law. 
                                                     
 104. Of course, the possible drop in the level of police self-scrutiny before submitting a warrant 
does not matter if the magistrate conducts a rigorous review.  The problem is that magistrates do not 
always conduct this kind of review, and Leon does nothing to ensure that they will do so. 
 105. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 955 & n.14, 957–58 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Leon would reduce incentives for police training, would remove incentives 
for officers “to err on the side of constitutional behavior,” and would result in magistrate shopping); 
id. at 975–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s approach—which, in effect, encourages the 
police to seek a warrant even if they know the existence of probable cause is doubtful—can only 
lead to an increased number of constitutional violations.”).  Indeed, Justice Brennan’s dissent also 
calls attention to the ways in which the good-faith “decision rule” will have unintended conduct side 
effects on magistrate behavior.  See id. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Leon tells 
magistrates they need not bother conducting a searching review of warrant applications “since their 
mistakes will from now on have virtually no consequence”).  But see Dripps, supra note 8, at 929 
(suggesting that any possible decrease that Leon might cause in magisterial scrutiny of warrant 
applications may be offset by “the possibility that other magistrates, knowing the likely 
unreviewability of their decisions, will scrutinize applications more carefully”). 
 106. Of course, a self-conscious strategy of selective transmission can be seen as a kind of 
governmental deception and therefore raises moral questions, especially in light of the ideal that 
political processes should be transparent.  Larger questions about the morality of this kind of 
deception are beyond the scope of this article.  For Dan-Cohen’s discussion, see Dan-Cohen, supra 
note 6, at 665–77.  See also Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 
U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1994) (arguing that a degree of governmental deception is inevitable if 
society is to enjoy the many social benefits gained through the promulgation of “serious rules,” rules 
that “dictate[] the course of action to be taken in all cases that fall within [their] terms”). 
 107. Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 6, at 671 (noting that defenses such as duress “melt away as 
soon as one relies upon them.  An individual who would not have committed an offense but for his 
knowledge of the existence of such a defense cannot, in most cases, avail himself of the defense”). 
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III. LEON AND SUPPRESSION HEARING TESTIMONY IN THE COURTS 
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Leon, only a relatively 
small number of federal and state courts have explicitly addressed the 
question of whether information known to the affiant but not 
communicated to the magistrate can establish the officer’s good faith.108  
Nearly all these courts have answered the question by taking a bright-line 
position.  One line of authority, begun by the Eighth Circuit, appears to 
hold that evidence known to an officer but never submitted to a 
magistrate can always be used to establish the officer’s good faith 
because the good-faith inquiry requires looking to the “totality of 
circumstances” known to the officer.109  The opposing line of cases, 
begun by the Ninth Circuit, takes the view that Leon never permits 
consideration of information known to the officer but not shared with the 
magistrate.110  Other federal circuits, federal district courts, and state 
courts have split between the Eighth and Ninth circuit views.  A few 
opinions have hinted—correctly, in my view—that the Eighth and Ninth 
circuit views may be too extreme, but have failed to develop a 
comprehensive middle position. 
A. The Eighth Circuit View 
The Eighth Circuit’s 1987 decision in United States v. Martin111 was 
the first to say that Leon allows courts to look beyond the face of the 
affidavit in assessing the officer’s good faith.  The majority opinion 
actually held that the affidavit’s probable-cause showing was good 
enough to satisfy Leon,112 but then gratuitously observed that courts 
assessing an officer’s good faith “can and must look to the totality of the 
circumstances including what [the officer] knew but did not include in 
                                                     
 108. See infra Part III. A–B.  Academic commentary prior to this Article has been very limited, 
consisting mainly of two student notes discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Martin, 297 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002).  See infra note 119.  In the latest edition of his search and 
seizure treatise, Professor LaFave suggests that the good-faith inquiry should not be extended to 
include information never presented to the magistrate at the time of the warrant application.  1 
LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(f), at 91–92. 
 109. United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 755–56 (8th Cir. 1987).  To be fair, I should observe 
that courts following the Eighth Circuit view have not explicitly said “always.”  Their 
pronouncements on the question, however, do not seem to include any exceptions. 
 110. United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 111. 833 F.2d 752. 
 112. Id. at 755.  For a more detailed discussion of the facts in Martin, see infra notes 269–82 and 
accompanying text. 
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his affidavit.”113  A concurring opinion argued that the affidavit’s 
probable-cause showing was too scanty to be saved by Leon, but agreed 
with the majority that “[d]eciding whether an officer acted in good faith 
requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances beyond the 
four corners of the affidavit.”114  The concurring judge was willing to 
apply the good faith exception because “[t]he facts known to [the officer] 
but omitted from the affidavit clearly were sufficient to justify a 
reasonable belief that probable cause existed.”115  Neither the majority 
opinion nor the concurrence offered sustained arguments for its position; 
instead, the opinions simply cited proof texts116 from Leon and Anderson 
v. Creighton.117 
Though Martin’s decree that courts applying Leon “can and should” 
look to information never presented to the magistrate was dictum, the 
Eighth Circuit has consistently followed that dictum without engaging in 
any further analysis.118  The Eighth Circuit decisions following Martin 
typically bypass both the probable-cause determination and the question 
of whether the affidavit considered by itself would have been enough to 
establish the officer’s good faith.  Instead, they move directly to the 
conclusion that, considering the totality of the circumstances (including 
information known to the officer but never communicated to the 
magistrate), the officer acted in good faith.  As a result, it is sometimes 
unclear whether resorting to materials outside the scope of the affidavit is 
genuinely necessary to the decisions. 
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s position in another 
case called United States v. Martin,119 holding that “a reviewing court 
may look outside the four corners of the affidavit in determining whether 
an officer acted in good faith when relying upon an invalid warrant.”120  
                                                     
 113. Id. at 756. 
 114. Id. at 757 (Lay, C.J., concurring). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 756 (majority opinion), 757 (Lay, C.J., concurring).  For critical analysis of these 
textual arguments, see infra notes 168–73 and accompanying text 
 117. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 118. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Weeks, 160 F.3d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Simpkins, 914 
F.2d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 119. 297 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002).  For discussions of the Eleventh Circuit’s Martin decision, 
see Pamela L. Coleman, Note, Beyond the Four Corners: Objective Good Faith Analysis or 
Subjective Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections?, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1719 (2003); Recent 
Case, United States v. Martin: Eleventh Circuit Holds that Courts May Look Beyond the Text of a 
Warrant when Determining Whether an Officer Reasonably Relied Upon the Warrant, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1185 (2003). 
 120. Martin, 297 F.3d at 1309.  Though the quoted language seems clear enough, the Martin 
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As with the Eighth Circuit’s 1987 Martin decision, the court offered little 
argument in support of its position.  Instead, it simply relied on the 
implications of its earlier decision in United States v. Taxacher121 and on 
the unfounded claim that “a majority of [the] circuits have taken into 
consideration facts outside the affidavit when determining whether the 
Leon good faith exception applies.”122 
                                                                                                                       
 
opinion is puzzling in several respects.  At one point in the opinion, the court concluded 
(implausibly, in my view) that “it was not entirely unreasonable for [the officer] to believe that what 
he wrote in the affidavit would be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.”  Id. at 1315 
(emphasis added).  In fact, the court explicitly said that none of the four listed exceptions to the 
good-faith rule applied.  Id. at 1318.  The court could (and should) have stopped at this point; 
instead, it went on to consider “whether a reasonably well-trained officer would [have] know[n] that 
the warrant was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”  Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 
n.23).  This seems misguided.  If we assume the four Leon exceptions are not meant to be 
exhaustive, a court might appropriately fall back on the quoted language if the defendant argued that 
the officer’s reliance on the warrant was unreasonable in some way not captured by one of the four 
listed exceptions.  But no such argument was offered in Martin, and thus the “extra stage” of the 
good-faith inquiry was unnecessary.  Cf. United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 599–600 (6th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (Gilman, J., concurring) (voicing similar criticisms of the Martin opinion), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 851 (2004).  Because the Martin court only relied on information outside the 
affidavit in this final, redundant part of its opinion, one might even argue that the opinion’s asserted 
holding was merely dictum.  It has not, of course, been treated that way by the Eleventh Circuit.  See 
United States v. Robinson, 336 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating “Martin held that the court 
‘can look beyond the four corners of the affidavit’” in assessing the officer’s good faith). 
 Another odd feature of the Martin opinion is that it did not explicitly reject United States v. 
Hove, 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988), the leading case supporting the proposition that courts should 
not look beyond the face of the affidavit in the good-faith inquiry.  Instead, the Martin court 
distinguished Hove by claiming that the Hove affidavit, unlike the one in Martin, had lacked “any 
indicia of probable cause.”  Martin, 297 F.3d at 1319 n.11.  This might be read to suggest that 
Eleventh Circuit courts should consider suppression hearing testimony only after initially deciding 
that the face of the affidavit is not “wholly lacking” in indicia of probable cause.  In other words, the 
court could be suggesting that suppression hearing testimony can cure small deficiencies in the 
affidavit but not large ones—a suggestion that points (if vaguely) toward the position advocated in 
this Article.  On the other hand, the language in the text of the opinion suggests no such limitation on 
the use of suppression hearing testimony to prove good faith.  The matter is simply unclear, and so 
far the Eleventh Circuit cases citing Martin have provided no clarification. 
 121. 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 122. Martin, 297 F.3d at 1319.  In support of this claim, Martin cites United States v. Marion, 
238 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002 (10th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Word, No. 1P 99-
106-CR H/F, 2000 WL 724041 (S.D. Ind. May 31, 2000), aff’d, 1 F. App’x 491 (7th Cir. 2001).  
This listing of cases significantly overstates the authority supporting the court’s position.  Marion is 
an Eighth Circuit case, and Procopio arguably offers indirect support for the Martin result by 
implicitly suggesting that information not contained in the affidavit can sometimes be relevant to the 
good-faith inquiry.  See infra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.  The court’s reliance on the 
other cases is misplaced.  Danhauer’s finding of good faith did not rest on appeals to information 
known to the officer but not shared with the magistrate.  Gahagan and Owens are both cases in 
which courts ruled that a warrant’s description of the place to be searched was sufficiently particular 
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment by relying in part on the executing officer’s knowledge of the place 
to be searched.  As I explain below, see infra notes 155–67 and accompanying text, these cases raise 
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In addition to the Eighth and Eleventh circuits, federal district courts 
in Texas123 and Indiana,124 and state courts in Arkansas,125 Nebraska,126 
and Kentucky127 have held that suppression hearing testimony can cure 
probable-cause deficiencies in the affidavit.  Just as the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Martin relied uncritically on citations to Anderson and Leon, 
these cases rely uncritically on citations to Martin. 
B. The Ninth Circuit View 
The Ninth Circuit’s 1988 decision in United States v. Hove128 was 
the first to hold that Leon does not allow suppression hearing testimony 
                                                                                                                       
 
questions quite different from those raised by claims that Leon allows suppression hearing testimony 
to cure probable-cause defects in the affidavit.  The Seventh Circuit’s position is also far less clear 
than the Martin court suggests.  Though the district court decision in Word did adopt the Eighth 
Circuit view, it did so as an alternative holding.  The Seventh Circuit’s per curiam, unpublished 
affirmance of the district court decision is brief and contains no discussion of this aspect of the 
district court’s reasoning.  Further, the affirmance of Word lacks precedential authority as an 
unpublished decision, and the Seventh Circuit more recently has rejected (albeit in dicta) the Eighth 
Circuit view in United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 869, 871 (7th Cir. 2002).  See infra notes 
144–46 and accompanying text (discussing Koerth). 
 123. United States v. Dodd, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1050–51 (W.D. Tex. 2004).  As in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Martin opinion, the court looked beyond the four corners of the affidavit only 
after concluding that the affidavit was substantial enough to support reasonable reliance.  As a result, 
the court’s adoption of the Eighth Circuit view was unnecessary to the result in the case and could 
arguably be treated as dictum.. 
 124. Word, 2000 WL 724041.  As explained above, this case has little or no weight as a 
precedent for the Eighth Circuit view.  See supra note 122. 
 125. Moya v. State, 981 S.W.2d 521 (Ark. 1998). 
 126. State v. Edmonson, 598 N.W.2d 450, 461 (Neb. 1999).  The Nebraska Supreme Court 
initially rejected the Eighth Circuit view in State v. Parmar, 437 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1989), but 
changed course ten years later in Edmonson.  There, the officers initially presented the magistrate 
with an affidavit that relied heavily on a confidential informant’s tip but provided no basis for the 
conclusory characterization of the informant as “reliable.”  The magistrate approved the initial 
warrant application, but before executing the warrant the officers returned to the same judge with a 
supplemental affidavit providing reasons why the informant should be regarded as reliable.  
Unfortunately, the magistrate erred by failing to rescind the original warrant and issue a new warrant 
that would have been based upon both the original and supplementary affidavits.  Edmonson 
understandably concluded that the officers acted in good faith because they could not be expected to 
know that the supplementary affidavit would not cure the problems with the original affidavit.  As 
Professor LaFave points out, the facts of Edmonson made it unnecessary for the court to overrule 
Parmar and adopt the Eighth Circuit view.  1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(f), at 91–92 nn.111–12.  
Unlike the decisions in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit’s Martin cases, the crucial fact in Edmonson 
is that the officers did present all their evidence to the magistrate before they executed the search 
warrant. 
 127. Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Ky. 2005).  As in some of the other cases, 
Moore appears to treat its agreement with the Eighth and Eleventh circuits as a holding, yet this part 
of the decision seems unnecessary because the court had already said that the affidavit contained 
enough indicia of probable cause to support reasonable reliance.  Id. 
 128. 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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to cure probable-cause deficiencies in an affidavit.  In Hove, the 
affidavit’s probable-cause showing was too weak to support reasonable 
reliance because it contained nothing to establish the required nexus 
between criminal activity and the place to be searched.129  The affiant 
testified at the suppression hearing that he had recited the relevant facts 
to a stenographer in the course of preparing his affidavit but that the 
stenographer had failed to include them.130  The Ninth Circuit refused to 
apply the good faith exception on the basis of this testimony, holding that 
“Leon does not extend . . . to allow the consideration of facts known only 
to an officer and not presented to a magistrate.”131  This followed, the 
court said, from Leon’s insistence that the test for good faith must be an 
objective one.132  The court further observed that officers who present “a 
colorable showing of probable cause” to a magistrate should be able to 
rely on the magistrate’s decision, but that “[t]o permit the total deficiency 
of the warrant and affidavit to be remedied by subsequent testimony 
concerning the subjective knowledge of the officer who sought the 
warrant would . . . unduly erode the protections of the fourth 
amendment.”133 
The Sixth Circuit recently joined the Ninth Circuit camp, holding in 
United States v. Laughton134 that “a determination of good-faith reliance, 
like a determination of probable cause, must be bound by the four 
corners of the affidavit.”135  The circuit’s path to this position did not 
follow a straight line.  A 2003 panel opinion in United States v. 
Carpenter136 found the affidavit “insufficient” to support good-faith 
reliance, but applied Leon anyway on the basis of information known to 
the officers but omitted from the warrant application.137  The Sixth 
Circuit vacated the panel opinion and granted an en banc rehearing to 
                                                     
 129. Id. at 139–40. 
 130. Id. at 139. 
 131. Id. at 140. 
 132. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). 
 133. Id.  The Hove decision has been justifiably criticized for stating that the test of good faith is 
whether “reasonable jurists could disagree” about whether the affidavit established probable cause.  
See United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 871–72 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the test used in 
Hove).  Although the language relied upon in Hove comes from the Leon opinion, 468 U.S. at 926, 
the Supreme Court clearly did not intend for that language to be used as an all-purpose “test” for 
good faith.  This error, however, has no bearing on the correctness of the Hove court’s position that 
information known to an officer but not presented to the magistrate is irrelevant to the Leon good-
faith inquiry. 
 134. 409 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 135. Id. at 751. 
 136. 317 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2003), vacated, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 
543 U.S. 851 (2004). 
 137. Id. at 624. 
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consider whether good faith could be established through facts not 
presented to the magistrate, but the en banc Carpenter opinion never 
resolved the issue because it held that the affidavit in the case was (after 
all) sufficiently substantial to support good-faith reliance.138  Though he 
agreed with this conclusion, Judge Gilman’s concurring opinion 
vigorously championed the Ninth Circuit view by arguing that 
“[i]nformation tending to show the existence of probable cause that was 
not disclosed to the issuing magistrate cannot logically have any bearing 
on the reasonableness of the presenting officer’s belief that the warrant 
was properly issued, as opposed to the officer’s reasonable belief that 
probable cause existed for the search.”139  In dissent, Judge Moore 
endorsed Judge Gilman’s arguments and concluded that “[k]nowledge 
withheld, either by accident or through purposeful omission or 
misrepresentation, cannot resuscitate otherwise suppressible 
evidence.”140  With the decision in Laughton, the views advanced by 
Judges Gilman141 and Moore have now carried the day in the Sixth 
Circuit142—at least for the present.143 
The Seventh Circuit also has voiced agreement with the Ninth 
Circuit view, stating in United States v. Koerth144 that in conducting the 
good-faith inquiry it would “limit [its] inquiry to whether the officer 
could have reasonably believed that the materials presented to the 
magistrate judge (either in an affidavit or in some other respect such as 
testimony from the police officers) were sufficient to establish probable 
cause.”145  This language appears to be dictum, however, because the 
court admitted the contested evidence without reference to information 
withheld from the magistrate and therefore had no need to reach the 
                                                     
 138. Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 597. 
 139. Id. at 598 (Gilman, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 601 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 141. Interestingly, Judge Gilman dissented in Laughton.  Though he presumably agreed with the 
majority that the good-faith inquiry should be limited to the contents of the affidavit, he thought the 
majority should have held (just as in Carpenter) that the affidavit contained enough facts supporting 
probable cause to be saved by Leon.  United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 752–53 (6th Cir. 
2005) (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 142. In addition to Judge Gilman’s Carpenter concurrence, the Laughton majority also appealed 
to the implications of the circuit’s decision in United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372 (6th Cir. 1996), 
and cautioned that looking beyond the four corners of the affidavit would “lead to the very kind of 
subjectivity that the Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected [in its Leon 
jurisprudence].”  Laughton, 409 F.3d at 752. 
 143. In light of the history just recounted, it would not be surprising if the Sixth Circuit decided 
to rehear Laughton en banc. 
 144. 312 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 145. Id. at 869. 
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question presented in Hove.146  The Hove view has also been followed by 
federal district courts in Tennessee147 and Vermont148 and by state courts 
in Colorado,149 Virginia,150 Ohio,151 and Alabama.152  For the most part, 
these opinions follow Hove with little independent analysis.153 
Summing up, the courts that have addressed whether information not 
presented to the magistrate can be used to prove good faith have split, 
with perhaps a slight majority leaning toward the Ninth Circuit view.  
Most of these courts have seen little need to mount sustained arguments 
for their positions.154  Indeed, one gets the impression from reading the 
                                                     
 146. Id. at 872. 
 147. See United States v. Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. 567, 569–70 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that an officer simply forgot to include in his affidavit any information about 
the date when he received information that was intended to establish probable cause for the issuance 
of a warrant). 
 148. See United States v. Turner, 713 F. Supp. 714, 724–25 (D. Vt. 1989) (stating that additional 
information known to an officer concerning reliability of informants was irrelevant to good faith 
under Leon where the officer declined to include the additional information in his affidavit because 
of fears that inclusion would jeopardize another investigation). 
 149. See People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1116–17 (Colo. 2003) (refusing to allow information 
not presented to magistrate to cure staleness defect in the affidavit). 
 150. See Janis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653–55 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (following Hove 
on similar facts where affidavit supporting warrant failed to establish nexus between criminal 
activity and the place to be searched). 
 151. See State v. Klosterman, 683 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (“Information 
supporting probable cause that is known to the affiant, but not included in the affidavit or revealed to 
the issuing magistrate prior to issuance of the warrant, is not pertinent to the determination of 
whether an objectively reasonable officer should have known that the warrant was not based on 
probable cause.”). 
 152. See Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384, 388–89 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Hove and 
holding that affiant’s subsequent oral testimony could not cure affidavit’s failure to indicate when 
informant had observed narcotics at the defendant’s residence). 
 153. The Klosterman opinion is an exception, as it provides a thoughtful discussion regarding 
the merits of the Hove approach.  See Klosterman, 683 N.E.2d at 103–04. 
 154. Many of the most extensive discussions of the issue occur in cases that failed to resolve it.  
Judge Gilman’s Carpenter concurrence is one example.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
Another is the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002).  (In 
the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I worked on this case while clerking for Judge 
Michael, who dissented.)  In Bynum, the majority applied the good faith exception solely on the 
basis of materials presented to the magistrate and therefore declined to rule on the government’s 
contention that the officer’s good faith could be proven through consideration of information known 
to the officer but inadvertently omitted from the warrant application.  Id. at 199.  In dissent, Judge 
Michael argued that the government’s position rested on the mistaken assumption that “objective 
good faith is determined by the reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the existence of probable 
cause.”  Id. at 211 (Michael, J., dissenting).  According to Judge Michael, Leon and Malley instead 
teach that the officer must have “an objectively reasonable belief that his affidavit gave the 
magistrate a substantial basis for finding probable cause . . . .  Whether that belief is reasonable can 
depend only on the facts presented to the magistrate.”  Id. at 211–12.  The majority saw considerable 
force in this line of argument, but observed that its acceptance would lead to an “anomaly” in the 
law of the good faith exception: 
Even though Leon itself renders admissible evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant 
supported by an affidavit that lacks probable cause, Judge Michael’s interpretation of 
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cases just surveyed that many courts believe the answer to the question is 
obvious, even though they know that others have reached a different 
“obvious” answer.  To my mind, the question is both close and complex.  
But before turning to my own analysis, I need to address a possible 
objection to my survey of the case law thus far.  Some might feel that I 
have vastly understated the degree of support in the case law for seeking 
proof of the officer’s good faith by looking “beyond the four corners of 
the affidavit.”  It might be thought that courts do this all the time in the 
context of what I will term “wrong address” cases. 
C. “Wrong Address” Cases 
In “wrong address” cases, many courts have relied on the executing 
officer’s knowledge of the place to be searched to cure particularity 
defects in the warrant.  A leading case in the genre is the Eighth Circuit’s 
1979 decision in United States v. Gitcho.155  There, agents obtained a 
warrant to search an apartment described as “4144 Geraldine, Apt. # 7, 
Parc Chalet Apartments,”156 but the apartment the officers had surveilled, 
intended to search, and did search was actually 4146 Parc Chalet, 
Apartment No. 7.157  In upholding the validity of the warrant, the Eighth 
Circuit explained that “[t]he test for determining the sufficiency of the 
description of the place to be searched is whether the place to be 
searched is described with sufficient particularity as to enable the 
                                                                                                                       
 
Leon would bar admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant supported by the 
affidavit of an officer, who, in fact, possesses probable cause, but inadvertently omits 
some information from his affidavit. 
Id. at 199 (majority opinion). 
 In People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1985), the Colorado Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed the defendant’s conviction but did not agree on a rationale.  The four 
concurring opinions in the case all discussed whether suppression hearing testimony should be 
allowed to cure probable-cause deficiencies in the affidavit supporting a warrant request, though 
much of the discussion treated Colorado statutory and constitutional provisions instead of the federal 
Fourth Amendment.  In a concurrence that partially anticipates the position taken in this Article, 
Justice Dubofsky argued that Colorado should adopt a limited good faith exception where evidence 
would be admitted despite an invalid warrant only in cases where “objective circumstances” prove 
that the officer had probable cause when he applied for the warrant and that he inadvertently omitted 
some of the information establishing probable cause from the warrant application.  See id. at 1157 
(Dubofsky, J., concurring).  Eighteen years later, Colorado finally resolved the debate in Deitchman 
by adopting the Ninth Circuit view.  See Miller, 75 P.3d at 1116–17. 
 155. 601 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 156. Id. at 371. 
 157. Id.  Though the decision is not explicit on the point, it appears that the officers were not 
aware of the address discrepancy at the time they executed the search.  The court explained that the 
officers’ mistake was entirely understandable under the circumstances because, among other things, 
“Parc Chalet Drive” was “an unmarked street which [was] actually a parking lot.”  Id. 
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executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable 
effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another 
premise might be mistakenly searched.”158  On these facts, the court said, 
the description satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement primarily because “the agents executing the warrant 
personally knew which premises were intended to be searched, and those 
premises were under constant surveillance while the warrant was 
obtained.”159  Numerous federal and state courts have handed down 
similar decisions with similar reasoning.160 
Because these wrong address cases appeal to the officer’s knowledge 
to cure defects in the warrant, it is understandable that a few courts161 and 
commentators162 have treated them as authority for the proposition that 
an affiant’s knowledge of information supporting probable cause but 
never communicated to the magistrate can establish the affiant’s good 
faith.  Yet the issues are quite different, as most courts seem (at some 
level) to recognize.163  As an initial matter, Gitcho and many of the other 
cases use the executing officer’s knowledge of the place to be searched 
to uphold the validity of the warrant, not to apply the good faith 
exception.164  This is no accident because, in contrast to the typical Leon 
                                                     
 158. Id.  This formulation is a gloss on the Supreme Court’s statement in Steele v. United States, 
267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925), that the description of the place to be searched satisfies the particularity 
requirement if “the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the 
place intended.” 
 159. Gitcho, 601 F.2d at 372.  The court also noted that the address in the warrant was 
“reasonable for the location intended” because of the difficulty in determining the correct address, 
that the address stated in the warrant did not exist (thus making a search of the wrong residence 
unlikely), and that the officers actually searched the premises they intended to search.  Id. 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 1997); People v. 
Amador, 9 P.3d 993, 998–99 (Cal. 2000); State v. Alonzo, 675 So. 2d 266, 267–68 (La. 1996).  
Additional citations are collected in 2 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.5(a), at 567 & nn.18–19. 
 161. United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Word, No. 
1P 99-106-CR H/F, 2000 WL 724041 (S.D. Ind. May 31, 2000), aff’d 1 F. App’x 491 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
 162. Coleman, supra note 119, at 1725–31; Recent Case, supra note 119, at 1189–91. 
 163. Courts that have allowed the executing officer’s knowledge of the place to be searched to 
cure mistakes in the warrant description have not treated those decisions as requiring them to allow 
an affiant’s uncommunicated knowledge of probable cause to cure probable-cause deficiencies in the 
affidavit.  Compare Gitcho, 601 F.2d at 372 (using executing officer’s knowledge of premises to be 
searched to cure particularity defect in the warrant) with United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 755–
56 (8th Cir. 1987) (treating the question of whether affiant’s knowledge of facts not communicated 
to the magistrate can cure probable-cause deficiency in affidavit as a matter of first impression 
without mention of its earlier decision in Gitcho); United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 
(6th Cir. 1989) (following Gitcho) with United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 596–97 (6th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (declining to decide whether suppression hearing testimony can be used to cure 
probable-cause deficiencies in an affidavit without mention of Gahagan or related cases), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 851 (2004). 
 164. See, e.g., Gahagan, 865 F.2d at 1499 (holding that executing officer’s knowledge of place 
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case, the wrong address cases do not turn on whether the officer has 
reasonably relied on the magistrate’s mistaken decision to issue the 
warrant.  Instead, the problem in a wrong address case is that an officer’s 
factual mistake (either reasonable or unreasonable) regarding the proper 
address of a place she intends to search gets incorporated into the 
warrant, which is then approved by the magistrate.  The warrants at issue 
in these cases are not “facially deficient” in the sense of the fourth 
exception to the Leon good-faith rule, for a magistrate reading the 
warrant application would not be aware of any problem so long as the 
warrant description appears to single out a particular place.165  Because 
the particularity problem is not one that a magistrate could identify or 
correct, suppressing the evidence obtained under the warrant would in no 
sense be “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error.”166  
Consequently, the reasons why courts admit evidence in the wrong 
address cases are different from those given in Leon.  The real issue in 
these cases is whether the description in the warrant was particular 
enough to eliminate the risk of a mistaken search.  Most courts have 
understandably concluded that this risk is negligible when the affiant is 
involved in the execution of the search and knows which premises were 
intended in the warrant application.  The opposing argument is that 
evidence should be suppressed because the warrant’s incorrect 
description creates a significant possibility—in some cases, a virtual 
certainty—of a mistaken search if the warrant is executed by an officer 
not involved in the investigation that preceded the warrant application.  
In other words, the decisive question in the wrong address cases is 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires that the description be 
particular enough to prevent a mistaken search by the officers who 
                                                                                                                       
 
to be searched cured warrant’s particularity defect, rendering it unnecessary to invoke the good faith 
exception); Amador, 9 P.3d at 1000 (same); Smith v. State, 962 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1998) (allowing consideration of evidence outside the warrant when determining if the description 
was sufficient).  Gitcho itself was, of course, decided five years before Leon.  This underscores the 
point that the wrong address cases turn on considerations that predate and are logically distinct from 
the considerations that drive the Leon good faith exception. 
 165. In other words, the magistrate can ensure that the description is not so facially vague that it 
risks a general search, but she cannot ensure that the address given for a specific place is accurate 
enough to prevent the possibility of a mistaken search.  Whether the latter risk is present will 
generally become apparent only when officers try to execute the warrant.  See Smith, 962 S.W.2d at 
185 (explaining that the crucial moment in deciding whether a warrant particularly describes the 
place to be searched is the moment of the warrant’s execution).  In typical wrong address cases like 
Gitcho and the cases cited supra note 160, the officers had made a reasonable effort to identify the 
correct address and did not recognize the mistake in the address until after the warrant had been 
executed. 
 166. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984). 
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actually execute the warrant or particular enough to prevent a mistaken 
search by any officer who might execute the warrant.167  Whatever the 
proper resolution of this question, it is quite distinct from that posed and 
answered by Martin, Hove, and their progeny.  As a result, the wrong 
address cases have little bearing on whether Leon allows the use of 
suppression hearing testimony to prove an officer’s good faith.   
IV. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION: DID THE OFFICER HAVE AN 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE WARRANT WAS 
PROPERLY ISSUED? 
We have, then, a situation in which most of the courts and judges to 
address the issue have seemed to say categorically either (1) that courts 
may always look “beyond the four corners of the affidavit” to consider 
the “totality of the circumstances” bearing on the officer’s good faith, or 
(2) that they are strictly limited to the materials considered by the 
magistrate because only these materials are sufficiently objective to 
count in the Leon inquiry.  Further, many of the opinions argue for their 
categorical rules by simply citing Leon and other Supreme Court 
decisions.  Such simple arguments are unconvincing, for they seek to 
find in Leon an answer to a question the Court did not ask.  What Leon 
does provide is the proper way to approach the question.  The proper 
approach, I shall argue, requires courts to focus on whether, taking all the 
circumstances known to the officer into account, the officer had an 
objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued.  Once 
this question is framed properly, the difficulties with both the Eighth and 
Ninth circuit views become clear, and we reach the critical issue behind 
these cases: when (if ever) an officer can make an objectively reasonable 
mistake about what he has put in front of the magistrate. 
A. Textual Arguments Do Not Answer the Question, But They Do Show 
How to Ask It 
I begin with a quick review of the textual arguments offered by 
courts adopting the Eighth and Ninth circuit positions.  The Eighth 
                                                     
 167. Compare Smith, 962 S.W.2d at 181–85 (discussing conflicting lines of authority as to 
whether the warrant’s description of the place to be searched must be sufficiently particular to 
eliminate the risk of a mistaken search by the actual executing officer or by any executing officer, 
and opting for the former view) with Amador, 9 P.3d at 1001 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
search warrant’s description is sufficiently accurate only if it would permit any officer to identify the 
premises to be searched with reasonable accuracy and that the executing officer’s personal 
knowledge of the place to be searched is irrelevant). 
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Circuit’s Martin decision and the cases following it have most often 
justified their position by appealing to language in Leon and Anderson v. 
Creighton,168 but neither case shows that courts may look to information 
not shared with the magistrate in assessing good faith.  Anderson does 
say that courts should “examin[e] . . . the information possessed by the 
searching officials,” but the Court was making the unsurprising point that 
everything an officer knew bears on the reasonableness of the officer’s 
belief that a warrantless search was supported by probable cause.169  
Nothing in Anderson suggests that a court should consider information 
known to the officer but never presented to the magistrate in deciding 
whether the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that a warrant 
was properly issued.170 
The argument from Leon, though more plausible, is also 
unconvincing.  Courts adopting the Martin view have relied on a Leon 
footnote stating that “all of the circumstances—including whether the 
warrant had previously been rejected by a different magistrate—may be 
considered” in deciding whether a reasonably well-trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 
authorization.171  It makes perfect sense, of course, to say evidence that 
an officer has engaged in magistrate shopping should be considered in 
evaluating the officer’s good faith, even though that information will 
certainly not be included within the four corners of the affidavit.  Yet the 
passage is assuming, as Leon does generally,172 the normal case where 
the officer has included all the relevant information supporting probable 
cause in her affidavit.  This makes sense because the primary worry Leon 
sought to address was that officers might be unfairly penalized for 
mistaken legal judgments (i.e., that a certain set of facts amounts to 
probable cause) when they had acted properly by seeking guidance from 
a judge who could be trusted to have a greater command of the relevant 
law.173  There is no reason to read the passage as addressing whether 
information known to the officer but never communicated to the 
magistrate can establish the officer’s good faith. 
                                                     
 168. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 169. See id. at 641. 
 170. See United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 600 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gilman, J., 
concurring) (explaining why Anderson is not relevant to the issue of whether information supporting 
probable cause but not shared with magistrate can be used to establish the officer’s good faith), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 851 (2004). 
 171. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
 172. See id. at 918–19. 
 173. Id. 
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The simple textual arguments in favor of the Ninth Circuit view are 
somewhat more powerful, but far from dispositive.  I begin with the 
weaker, if more common, argument that allowing any appeal to 
information never shared with the magistrate would substitute a 
subjective good-faith standard for the objective good faith required by 
Leon.174  Leon did, of course, insist that the good-faith standard was 
objective rather than subjective.175  But the distinction between objective 
and subjective standards is subject to considerable ambiguity, both here 
and elsewhere.176  Courts accepting the argument that “objective” equals 
“presented to the magistrate rather than stored in the recesses of the 
officer’s mind” are simply overreading Leon.177  In fact, the Court’s 
adoption of an objective standard meant only that no affidavit could be 
saved simply by the officer’s subjective belief (however ill founded) in 
                                                     
 174. This argument was first made in Hove, and has been echoed in nearly every opinion 
adopting the Ninth Circuit view.  See United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that because the test of good faith under Leon is “clearly an objective one,” a deficient 
affidavit “cannot be cured by an officer’s later testimony on his subjective intentions or 
knowledge”); see also United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hove, 
848 F.2d at 140), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1020 (2003); United States v. Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. 567, 
570 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (stating that under Leon a police officer’s reliance on a warrant must be 
“objective, not based on his own personal knowledge of the circumstances”); People v. Deitchman, 
695 P.2d 1146, 1166 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Quinn, J., concurring) (“Utilization of the good faith 
exception to uphold the search and seizure in this case is to convert what I perceive to be nothing 
more than subjective good faith into an objective standard of reasonable reliance . . . .”). 
 175. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.  Commentators have noted some lingering uncertainty about 
whether the Court really meant for the standard to be totally objective in the sense that an officer 
who subjectively believed that a search was unsupported by probable cause could nonetheless enjoy 
the protection of the good faith exception solely because he might reasonably have thought 
otherwise.  Professor LaFave suggests the standard is purely objective in this way.  See 1 LAFAVE, 
supra note 8, § 1.3(e), at 71.  Others have claimed that courts usually treat subjective good faith as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for application of the good faith exception.  See Heller & 
Reichmuth, supra note 37, at 19 (stating that with one exception, “lower federal and state courts 
have consistently treated subjective good faith as a threshold question when deciding whether to 
apply Leon’s good faith exception, and have refused to apply the exception when the evidence in the 
case indicates that the officers acted in subjective bad faith”).  Professors Wasserstrom and Mertens 
plausibly suggest that the issue of “subjective bad faith plus objective reasonableness” would rarely 
arise because “it is hard to see how a defendant could ever prove that the officer actually knew the 
affidavit did not establish probable cause” if the affidavit was substantial enough to support 
reasonable reliance.  Wasserstrom & Mertens, Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold, supra note 8, at 
119. 
 176. See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 327 n.72 (stating that when the Leon Court declared that it 
was adopting an objective standard rather than a subjective one, it “said very little” because “[a]n 
‘objective’ test becomes nearly indistinguishable from a ‘subjective’ test when a wide enough range 
of case-specific circumstances and personal characteristics are considered in judging 
reasonableness”). 
 177. See United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 757 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, C.J., concurring) 
(stating that his “totality of the circumstances” approach is not a subjective test because it requires 
addressing “the objective reasonableness of the belief of an officer in [the affiant’s] position—
meaning an officer with knowledge of the facts that [the affiant] possessed”). 
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the existence of probable cause.  Ruling out this kind of “pure heart, 
empty head” subjectivity was necessary, as the Court saw, to preserve 
incentives for police departments to train their officers in the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.178  The Court neither asked nor 
answered the question of whether information known to the officer but 
never shared with the magistrate could demonstrate the officer’s 
objective good faith. 
A more powerful argument is that Leon’s and Malley’s language 
suggests the Court’s focus was on the adequacy of the probable-cause 
showing in the affidavit, not on what the officer knew at the time of the 
warrant application.  To take but one example from Leon, the language 
of the third Leon exception states that an officer would not “manifest 
objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence unreasonable.’”179  Similarly, the Court explained in Malley 
that courts should ask “whether a reasonably well-trained 
officer . . .would have known that his affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.”180  
These passages certainly appear to support the Ninth Circuit view. 
Similar support can be found in Leon’s claim that the exclusionary 
rule should apply only when “a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 
authorization.”181  A search conducted pursuant to a warrant is illegal 
under Gates, of course, if the magistrate did not have at least a 
“substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”182  It 
follows that an officer can form beliefs about the legality or illegality of 
a warrant search only by looking at things from the magistrate’s point of 
view.183  Because the reasonableness of the magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination is solely a function of the information presented to the 
                                                     
 178. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20.  The exclusionary rule’s role in encouraging police departments 
to train their officers to comply with the Fourth Amendment is often referred to as “systemic 
deterrence.”  See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, Deregulating the Police, supra note 8, at 399. 
 179. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
 180. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (emphasis added).  The Court also observed that its 
rule would have the desirable consequence of encouraging each officer to “reflect, before submitting 
a request for a warrant, upon whether he has a reasonable basis for believing that his affidavit 
establishes probable cause.”  Id. at 343 (emphasis added). 
 181. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
 182. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and 
citation omitted). 
 183. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23 (“[T]he officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination . . . must be objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some circumstances the 
officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.”). 
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magistrate,184 it seems that information not presented to the magistrate 
could have no bearing on whether the officer could have reasonably 
believed that the search was legal.185 
At minimum, these points make the textual arguments supporting the 
Eighth Circuit view look very weak.186  In the end, however, it would be 
misleading to say that the language of Leon and Malley settles the debate 
between the Eighth and Ninth circuit views.  None of the language 
discussed above shows that the Supreme Court contemplated the possible 
use of suppression hearing testimony to cure probable-cause deficiencies 
in the affidavit.  Instead, the Court’s language simply reflects the natural 
assumption that the affidavit will contain the officer’s entire basis for 
thinking that there is probable cause for the proposed search.  While 
Leon and Malley do not settle the question of whether information not 
contained in the affidavit can establish good faith, they do show the 
proper way to ask the question. 
1. Two Ways of Posing the Question 
Implicit in the Eighth and Ninth circuit lines of authority are two 
different formulations of the question courts should ask in deciding 
whether an affiant’s suppression hearing testimony justifies application 
of the good faith exception.  The formulation favored by prosecutors and 
accepted (with varying degrees of explicitness) by courts holding the 
Eighth Circuit view asks whether the affiant officer had an objectively 
reasonable belief that he had probable cause for the search.  The proper 
formulation, as some judges have recognized, asks whether the affiant 
officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was properly 
                                                     
 184. See Whiteley v. Warden of Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) 
(explaining that information known to the affiant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the warrant was issued on the basis of probable cause). 
 185. See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 211–12 (4th Cir. 2002) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 186. One passage in Leon does support the Eighth Circuit view, though the decisions following 
Martin have not mentioned it.  Leon dismissed as “speculative” the argument that evidence should 
always be excluded when the police fail to demonstrate probable cause because this would “deter[] 
future inadequate presentations [and] magistrate shopping.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 918.  The Court also 
dismissed the argument that suppressing evidence because of particularity defects “might encourage 
officers to scrutinize more closely the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial errors.”  
Id.  Taken together, these statements might suggest that encouraging greater care in the warrant 
process is not one of the purposes of the exclusionary rule.  Yet the statements are dicta that do not 
address the specific question treated in Martin and Hove, and in any event they have been partially 
undermined by the Court’s 2004 decision in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).  There, the 
Court ruled that forfeiture of an officer’s qualified immunity was an appropriate penalty for the 
officer’s failure to detect a “glaring deficiency” in the form of a warrant.  Id. at 564 (explaining that 
even a “cursory reading” should have revealed a particularity defect in the warrant). 
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issued.187  The superiority of the second formulation is confirmed by both 
the structure of the four Leon exceptions and the implications of the 
Court’s position that reliance on a “bare-bones” affidavit is always 
unreasonable. 
2. The Structure of the Four Leon Exceptions 
Leon and Malley teach that an officer is not entitled to rest blindly on 
the magistrate’s approval of the affidavit.  Instead, the officer must 
exercise some independent judgment about whether the magistrate has 
properly performed his role.  As Judge Gilman helpfully put it, the 
crucial issue in Leon is “the reasonableness of the presenting officer’s 
belief that the warrant was properly issued.”188 
Though the Supreme Court said in Leon that magistrates will 
perform their proper function without regard to the sanction of exclusion, 
it has acknowledged—although perhaps not frankly enough189—that the 
reality of the warrant process is not always perfect.190  Each of the four 
Leon exceptions allows exclusion of evidence to encourage officers to 
play some role in monitoring the integrity of the warrant process and to 
refrain from manipulating it to their advantage.191 
The first two Leon exceptions speak directly to the integrity of the 
warrant process.  Exclusion is still appropriate under Leon if “the 
magistrate . . . was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant 
knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless 
disregard of the truth” or if the magistrate “wholly abandoned his judicial 
                                                     
 187. See United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gilman, J., 
concurring) (“Leon and Agnello make clear that the relevant question is whether the officer 
reasonably believed that the warrant was properly issued, not whether probable cause existed in 
fact.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 851 (2004); Bynum, 293 F.3d at 212 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Leon 
requires that the officer be able to entertain a reasonable belief that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for finding probable cause.”); State v. Klosterman, 683 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) 
(“The officer’s reliance on the warrant can be objectively reasonable only if his belief that the 
affidavit contains facts sufficient to create probable cause is itself objectively reasonable.”). 
 188. Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 598 (Gilman, J., concurring). 
 189. For arguments that Leon rests in part on a naively optimistic view of the warrant process, 
see generally Goldstein, supra note 37; Nock, supra note 80. 
 190. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345–46 (1986) (noting that “it is possible that a 
magistrate, working under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should”). 
 191. Again, Malley is quite explicit on this point, suggesting that officers have a duty to 
minimize the dangers of magistrate failure “by exercising reasonable professional judgment.”  Id. at 
346.  See also Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1201 (stating that Leon contemplates a “credible pre-
warrant review” by a magistrate and a post-warrant review to “assure that the magistrate’s review 
was indeed credible,” and that the objectively reasonable officer “is expected always to know 
whether the magistrate has done what he should have done”). 
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role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York.”192  The 
outcome of the warrant process only merits reliance if the input of the 
process was reliable.193  Thus, if the affiant knows (or at least strongly 
suspects) that some of the information provided to the magistrate was 
false, he cannot reasonably rely on the magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination because the Fourth Amendment presupposes that the 
showing of probable cause made to the magistrate will be “‘truthful’ in 
the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately 
accepted by the affiant as true.”194  Similarly, the officer cannot 
reasonably rely on a warrant if he knows that the magistrate has 
abandoned his judicial role, e.g., by becoming a member of the search 
party as in Lo-Ji Sales or by failing to read the warrant application.195  
Again, the point is that even if an officer has an objectively reasonable 
belief that probable cause exists, he cannot reasonably rely on the 
warrant unless he can reasonably believe that the magistrate has properly 
performed his role as a neutral and detached arbiter of probable cause. 
The third and fourth Leon exceptions recognize that even when the 
officer has been truthful with the magistrate and the magistrate has 
complied “in good faith” with the demands of his role, significant error is 
still possible.  When a magistrate makes a glaring error by signing a 
warrant application obviously lacking in probable cause or wholly failing 
to describe with particularity the places to be searched or things to be 
seized, the officer has a responsibility to serve as a back-up system to 
ensure that Fourth Amendment rights are protected.  Again, these 
exceptions require the officer to focus not on whether she has probable 
cause, but on whether the magistrate has properly performed his role.196 
3. “Bare-Bones” Affidavits 
A “bare-bones” affidavit is one that contains “wholly conclusory 
statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a 
                                                     
 192. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
 193. See id. at 922–23 (emphasizing that the focus is on the warrant process by noting that 
suppression is still appropriate where the officer had “no reasonable grounds for believing that the 
warrant was properly issued”) (emphasis added). 
 194. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978). 
 195. See United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the magistrate 
had abandoned his judicial role by signing the search warrant without reading the application). 
 196. In addition to providing some check on magistrate incompetence, the third and fourth 
exceptions also have the effect of limiting “magistrate shopping.”  While some commentators have 
justly criticized Leon for its potential to promote magistrate shopping, see, e.g., Wasserstrom and 
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold, supra note 8, at 109–10, the problem would 
undoubtedly be worse if the third and fourth Leon exceptions did not exist. 
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magistrate can independently determine probable cause.”197  It is well 
established that Leon does not suspend the exclusionary rule when an 
officer has relied on a bare-bones affidavit.198  For example, Leon would 
not save an affidavit saying only that “a reliable informant has told the 
affiant that he has recently obtained personal knowledge” that certain 
persons are selling heroin from a particular location.  Leon would not 
apply in this example because an officer who presented such an affidavit 
could not reasonably believe that the magistrate had fulfilled her 
constitutional role by making an independent determination of probable 
cause rather than merely ratifying the bare conclusions of others.199  This 
explanation is, of course, consistent with my claim that the proper 
question under Leon is whether the officer had an objectively reasonable 
belief that the warrant was properly issued.  In contrast, asking whether 
the officer reasonably believed that he had probable cause for the search 
leads to absurd results.  If it were really true that there is good faith 
whenever the officer got a warrant and knew enough facts to support 
probable cause, then a bare-bones affidavit would not offend Leon as 
                                                     
 197. United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Laury, 
985 F.2d 1293, 1311 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993)).  Though the definition quoted in the text is 
representative, courts actually use the phrase “bare-bones affidavit” in subtly different ways.  Usage 
varies both across and within jurisdictions, and seems to depend on the context and the result the 
court seeks to justify.  Courts sometimes say that a bare-bones affidavit contains only conclusory 
statements.  See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 465 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that a bare-
bones affidavit “‘states only the affiant’s belief that probable cause existed’” (quoting United States 
v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2000))).  On this usage, almost any affidavit more detailed 
than those in Nathanson v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas will qualify as more than bare-boned.  
See Nathanson, 290 U.S. 41, 44, 47 (1933) (rejecting as inadequate affiant’s statement that “he ha[d] 
cause to suspect and [did] believe that” illegally imported liquor would be found on the premises to 
be searched); Aguilar, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 115–16 (1964) (rejecting as inadequate affiants’ statement 
that they “ha[d] received reliable information from a credible person and believe[d]” that heroin 
would be found on the premises to be searched).  At other times, courts say that an affidavit is bare-
bones if a single critical element in its case for probable cause depends on a conclusory assertion, 
even if the affidavit contains far more information than a bare list of the affiant’s conclusions.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 816, 824–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (refusing to apply Leon to 
save a twenty-seven-page affidavit because the affidavit’s case for probable cause depended 
critically on an uncorroborated anonymous tip).  A dissenting judge in Helton argued that the court 
should have applied Leon because the affidavit was not bare-bones.  Id. at 826 (Siler, J., dissenting).  
Finally, courts occasionally say that the phrase “bare-bones affidavit” describes any affidavit that 
falls within the third Leon exception, i.e., that is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no 
reasonable officer could rely on it.  See, e.g., United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“Affidavits that are ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause’ have come be known as ‘bare 
bones’ affidavits.”). 
 198. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24 (stating that an officer could not “obtain a warrant on the basis 
of a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under 
which the warrant was obtained”). 
 199. See United States v. Barrington, 806 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that an officer 
could not reasonably rely on a bare-bones affidavit because “he had no good faith reason to believe 
the magistrate had made a probable cause determination”). 
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long as the officer could flesh out his bare-bones affidavit with testimony 
at the suppression hearing about the basis for his conclusions.  Such a 
result would be totally inconsistent with the cases on bare-bones 
affidavits.200  As Judge Michael put it in Bynum, “[t]he first problem with 
a bare-bones affidavit is not that the affiant’s claims of probable cause 
might be unfounded, but that the conclusory character of those claims 
prevents the magistrate from performing her constitutional role.”201  
Accordingly, it must be wrong to approach the question of good faith by 
simply asking whether the officer had probable cause for the search.  
Instead, courts should ask whether a reasonable officer could have 
believed that the warrant was properly issued.202 
B. The Implications of Asking the Right Question 
Once the question has been properly formulated, it becomes easier to 
identify the shortcomings in the arguments courts have offered for the 
Eighth and Ninth circuit views. 
As stated by Chief Judge Lay, the Eighth Circuit view is that 
(apparently in every case) “[d]eciding whether an officer acted in good 
faith requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances beyond 
the four corners of the affidavit.”203  By itself, the admonition to consider 
all the circumstances and to look beyond the four corners of the affidavit 
is not necessarily problematic.  As I will explain, there are times when 
circumstances outside the affidavit do bear on whether the officer could 
reasonably have thought that the warrant was properly issued.  The real 
question is not about whether courts should look “beyond the four 
corners of the affidavit,” but about what they should be trying to see.  
Because good faith under Leon requires an objectively reasonable belief 
that the warrant was properly issued, the Eighth Circuit view clearly goes 
too far to the extent it implies that information establishing probable 
cause but not presented to the magistrate may always be used to establish 
the officer’s good faith.  To take the clearest counterexamples, an officer 
who deliberately omits certain information from his affidavit204 or 
                                                     
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Leon 
does not apply to bare-bones affidavits); United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249, 252–53 (5th Cir. 
1991) (same); Crittenden v. State, 476 So. 2d 632, 635 (Ala. 1985) (same). 
 201. United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 212 (4th Cir. 2002) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 202. As noted above, Leon’s language is entirely consistent with this point.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
922–23 (stating that suppression is appropriate in those circumstances where “the officer will have 
no reasonable ground for believing that the warrant was properly issued”). 
 203. United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 757 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, C.J., concurring). 
 204. Cases of “deliberate omission” are probably rare.  One example is United States v. Turner, 
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submits an unequivocally bare-bones affidavit of the sort condemned in 
Aguilar and Nathanson should not be allowed to establish his good faith 
by testifying at a suppression hearing that he had additional information 
supporting probable cause at the time of the warrant application.  Such 
testimony would not show that the officer had a reasonable belief that the 
warrant was properly issued.  Instead, it would at most show that the 
officer had a reasonable belief that he had probable cause for the search. 
To say that the Eighth Circuit view, if applied literally, would lead to 
results clearly at variance with some Supreme Court cases may not say 
very much, for cases of deliberate omission or purely bare-bones 
affidavits are likely to be rare.  If confronted with such a case, courts 
adopting the Eighth Circuit view might recognize some limitations on the 
use of suppression hearing testimony to prove good faith.  Nevertheless, 
the Eighth Circuit approach causes serious problems.  As actually 
applied by the courts, it leads to some mistaken applications of the good 
faith exception.  More fundamentally, it undermines Fourth Amendment 
protections by encouraging officers to view the warrant process as a 
mere formality. 
Courts adopting the Eighth Circuit view tend to accept (at least 
implicitly) the prosecution’s claim that the good-faith inquiry turns on 
whether the officer had probable cause for the search, not on whether the 
officer reasonably believed the warrant was properly issued.  For 
example, Chief Judge Lay ultimately justified his application of the good 
faith exception by remarking that the facts the officer knew but omitted 
from his affidavit “clearly were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief 
that probable cause existed.”205  In the Eleventh Circuit’s Martin opinion, 
the court explained that an officer had acted in good faith under Leon 
because “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, taking into account 
the facts known to [the officer] at the time he applied for the search 
warrant, we find that [the officer] reasonably believed that probable 
cause existed to execute a search warrant.”206  By treating the officer’s 
possession of probable cause as dispositive on the good-faith issue, 
courts send a clear message that evidence will be admitted under the 
good faith exception so long as officers have (1) a reasonable belief that 
                                                                                                                       
 
713 F.Supp. 714, 723–25 (D. Vt. 1989), where the court refused to apply Leon when the affiant 
intentionally withheld information supporting an informant’s credibility and reliability out of 
concern that sharing this information with the magistrate would have jeopardized another 
investigation.  For further discussion of Turner, see infra notes 260–64 and accompanying text. 
 205. Martin, 833 F.2d at 757 (Lay, C.J., concurring). 
 206. United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002). 
TAYLOR FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:58 AM 
194 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
there was probable cause for the search, and (2) a signed piece of paper 
with “Warrant” written across the top.  That message contradicts 
Malley’s emphasis on the need for officers to take some role in policing 
the integrity of the warrant process and thereby eliminates disincentives 
to magistrate shopping.  Further, it tells officers that the task of putting 
together a proper warrant application has no real consequences, and thus 
dilutes one of the most important benefits of the warrant process: the 
discipline of having to articulate one’s case for probable cause in writing 
to a neutral party.207 
Formulating the question properly also shows the weakness of 
another argument sometimes offered in support of the Eighth Circuit 
view.  Many law enforcement agencies require their officers to use pre-
screening procedures as a part of the warrant application process, often 
requiring the signature of a prosecutor certifying that the warrant 
application meets constitutional standards.208  It is widely agreed that this 
sort of pre-screening is desirable, as it generally increases the quality of 
warrant applications and conserves judicial resources by eliminating the 
weakest applications before they reach the magistrate.209  Unsurprisingly, 
courts uniformly treat an officer’s use of pre-screening procedures as 
indicative (though not dispositive) of the officer’s good faith.210  Because 
                                                     
 207. See Craig M. Bradley, The Good Faith Exception: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. 
L.J. 287, 292 (1985) (stating that the “most important” aspect of the warrant requirement is “that it 
forces the police to stop, think, write down their evidence, and submit it to someone else for 
approval”).  The message that the warrant requirement is a mere formality is especially strong when 
courts move directly to the question of whether the officer had probable cause for the search without 
pausing to decide whether the affidavit established probable cause or whether the officer could 
reasonably have relied on the affidavit.  See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 968–69 
(8th Cir. 2001) (admitting evidence by moving directly to the question of whether the officer had 
probable cause for the search under the totality of the circumstances); United States v. Weeks, 160 
F.3d 1210, 1212–13 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).  If courts ask only whether the officer had probable 
cause for the search, the warrant appears to be nothing more than a piece of paper.  In addition, 
courts’ refusals to ask whether the officer could reasonably have relied on the affidavit make it 
unclear whether there was any need to rely on suppression hearing testimony in the first place. 
 208. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(d), at 67–68. 
 209. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 8, at 932–33. 
 210. See, e.g., Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 264 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that officer’s use of 
“in-house” review procedures tended to show good faith); United States v. Frangenburg, 15 F.3d 
100, 103 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).  An officer’s use of pre-screening procedures obviously tends to 
show subjective good faith, i.e., a well-intentioned effort to comply with appropriate procedures.  As 
stated below in the text, pre-screening also tends to show objective good faith in the very limited 
sense that it becomes more reasonable to think the magistrate was right to sign a warrant when 
others agreed with him.  Courts, however, sometimes display a tendency to give inordinate weight to 
the use of pre-screening procedures.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 
1991) (stating that an officer’s consultation with a government attorney before submitting a warrant 
is of “significant importance” in the good-faith inquiry).  Courts should resist that tendency.  Malley 
explicitly says that if an affidavit is woefully lacking in probable cause, the officer cannot establish 
his good faith by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate who approved the warrant.  
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critics claimed that Leon would discourage, or at least reduce incentives 
to use, pre-screening procedures,211 it seems especially appropriate that 
continued use of such procedures in Leon’s wake should count as some 
evidence of good faith.  All this is uncontroversial.  Some courts, 
however, have suggested that if use of pre-screening can help to establish 
good faith, then evidence “beyond the four corners of the affidavit” is 
relevant and the Eighth Circuit’s “totality of the circumstances” test must 
be correct.212  Evidence of pre-screening, of course, will sometimes be 
“within the four corners” in the form of a prosecutorial signature on the 
warrant application, but courts give credit for pre-screening whether or 
not this is true.  In addition, evidence of previous rejections of the same 
warrant application by other magistrates counts against a finding of good 
faith, even though this information will rarely be included within the four 
corners of the affidavit.213  If the totality of the circumstances can be 
relevant to show bad-faith magistrate shopping, must it not also be 
relevant to show good faith? 
This line of argument is correct in showing that facts not recited in 
the warrant application can be relevant to the good-faith inquiry.  It does 
not show, however, that information supporting probable cause that was 
known to the officer but never shared with the magistrate may be used to 
prove the officer’s good faith.  Again, the relevant contrast is not 
between the four corners of the warrant application and the totality of the 
circumstances.  Instead, the contrast is between information that could 
bear on the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that a warrant was 
properly issued and information that could not.  Information outside the 
four corners of the affidavit may fall on either side of this contrast.214  
                                                                                                                       
 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 346 n.9 (1986).  The same point should apply when pre-screening 
procedures fail to identify an affidavit too flimsy to support reasonable reliance. 
 211. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(d), at 68 (stating that “under Leon, there is no reason to go 
through [pre-screeing] procedures and every reason not to”).  In explanation of his point, Professor 
LaFave cites People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1265 (Colo. 1994), where the court refused to apply 
Leon after noting, among other things, that prosecutorial pre-screening had raised doubts about 
whether the warrant application passed muster. 
 212. United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 213. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984). 
 214. The points in the text explain why it is wrong to frame the debate as one about acceptance 
or rejection of a “four-corners rule.”  Though “four-corners” language is probably harmless 
shorthand in most cases, courts are sometimes misled by it.  For example, the Sixth Circuit recently 
held in United States v. Laughton that “a determination of good-faith reliance, like a determination 
of probable cause, must be bound by the four corners of the affidavit.”  409 F.3d 744, 751 (6th Cir. 
2005).  Within a month of the Laughton decision, a district court in the Sixth Circuit relied on its 
four-corners language in refusing to consider unsworn testimony to the magistrate as part of the 
good-faith inquiry.  United States v. Kemper, 375 F.Supp.2d 551, 554 & n.1 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (stating 
that under Laughton the good faith exception did not permit consideration of the unsworn testimony 
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Though the point will not bear too much weight, there is a rather obvious 
sense in which having one or more prosecutors sign off on a warrant 
application would increase the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that 
the magistrate acted properly in issuing a warrant on the basis of that 
same application.215  Conversely, rejection of a warrant application at the 
pre-screening level would lessen the reasonableness of an officer’s 
reliance if the same application were later approved by a magistrate.  
These facts, then, have a legitimate place in deciding whether an officer 
had an objectively reasonable belief that a warrant was properly issued.  
In contrast, information supporting probable cause that was not part of 
the warrant application (in either oral or written form) generally—a 
qualification follows—has no relevance to whether the officer could 
reasonably have believed that the warrant was properly issued.  Such 
information may be part of the totality of the circumstances and certainly 
bears on whether the officer could reasonably have believed he had 
probable cause for a search, but that is the wrong question.  It follows 
that the universal practice of considering pre-screening as evidence of 
good faith is wholly consistent with my criticisms of the Eighth Circuit 
view. 
The Ninth Circuit view, at least in its most persuasive articulations, 
begins by correctly identifying the proper question as whether the officer 
had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued.  
Once the question is posed in this way, it may seem that the Ninth 
Circuit view must be correct.  Whether a magistrate acted properly in 
                                                                                                                       
 
“[s]ince this information was not included in the affidavit”).  The decision not to consider unsworn 
testimony might or might not be correct.  Compare State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 479 (Wis. 2001) 
(refusing to apply Leon on the basis of a statement “that totally lacks an oath or affirmation”) with 
United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying good faith exception because the 
“lack of an oath or affirmation by the presenting officer did not destroy the warrant’s facial 
validity”) and State v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Leon to save 
telephone warrant issued on the basis of unsworn testimony).  My point here is simply that the 
Kemper court was wrong to think that the four-corners language in Laughton dictated its answer.  A 
later Sixth Circuit decision handled Laughton’s language more skillfully.  In United States v. 
Frazier, the defendant argued on the basis of Laughton that information outside the four corners of 
the affidavit could never be relevant to the good-faith inquiry.  423 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2005).  
The court properly distinguished Laughton because the relevant information (the fact that a 
confidential informant had taped two controlled buys of narcotics involving the defendant) had 
actually been presented to the issuing magistrate.  Id. at 535–36.  This aspect of Frazier is 
completely consistent with the position I take in this Article.  At the magistrate’s prompting, the 
officer in Frazier had added information about the taping of the controlled buys to five related 
affidavits but failed to add this information to the Frazier affidavit.  Id. at 530.  Under these 
circumstances, the officer had a reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued. 
 215. It is the same sense in which, other things being equal, one has more confidence in the 
correctness of a 9-0 Supreme Court decision than in the correctness of a 5-4 decision. 
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issuing the warrant depends only on the facts known to the magistrate, 
and thus it would seem that information not presented to the magistrate 
could never have any bearing on the officer’s good faith.216  The 
argument is a strong one, but it does not prove that information is 
irrelevant to the good-faith inquiry unless actually presented to the 
magistrate.  Instead, it proves only that information is irrelevant to that 
inquiry unless the officer believes that the information was presented to 
the magistrate.  Recall, for example, the facts of United States v. Hove.217  
If the officer’s suppression hearing testimony is believed, he dictated the 
facts supporting a nexus between criminal activity and the place to be 
searched to a stenographer who failed to include those facts in the 
affidavit.218  As a result, the officer believed that the facts had been 
presented to the magistrate, and presumably also believed that the 
magistrate acted properly in issuing the warrant on the basis of those 
facts.  In short, Hove shows how an officer might believe that a warrant 
was properly issued because he made a mistake about which facts he had 
presented to the magistrate.  If this kind of mistake about the contents of 
the warrant application can be seen as objectively reasonable, the 
officer’s belief that the warrant was properly issued would also be 
objectively reasonable.  It would follow that facts not presented to the 
magistrate could sometimes be used to establish the officer’s good faith. 
Asking the right question, then, does not lead inexorably to the Ninth 
Circuit view.  It leaves open the possibility that Leon can be read to 
forgive reasonable mistakes in the warrant application process and that 
suppression hearing testimony about information inadvertently omitted 
from the warrant application may sometimes be used to prove the 
officer’s good faith.  The correctness of this reading largely depends on 
whether the law of the good faith exception should recognize a category 
 
                                                     
 216. See United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gilman, J., 
concurring) (concluding that “information tending to show the existence of probable cause that was 
not disclosed to the issuing magistrate cannot logically have any bearing” on the good-faith inquiry 
because it cannot show “the reasonableness of the . . . officer’s belief that the warrant was properly 
issued”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 851 (2004); United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 212 (4th Cir. 
2002) (Michael, J., dissenting) (concluding that information not presented to the magistrate can 
never establish good faith because Leon requires “that the officer be able to entertain a reasonable 
belief that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause” and “[w]hether that 
belief is reasonable can depend only upon the facts presented to the magistrate”); State v. 
Klosterman, 683 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that because an officer’s 
reliance on a warrant can be objectively reasonable “only if his belief that the affidavit contains facts 
sufficient to create probable cause is itself objectively reasonable,” information known to the affiant 
but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate is irrelevant to the good-faith inquiry). 
 217. 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 218. Id. at 139. 
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of “objectively reasonable mistakes” in the warrant application process.  
That question cannot be answered by simple appeals to Leon’s text. 
Courts and judges embracing the Ninth Circuit view have paid little 
attention to the possibility of “objectively reasonable mistakes” in the 
warrant application process.  Indeed, the entire notion can seem 
oxymoronic.219  Yet the case law shows that in some situations courts 
applying the good faith exception do recognize the existence of 
reasonable mistakes.  One example is a line of cases that I describe as 
“implicit reliance” cases.  Another is the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision 
in Groh v. Ramirez.220 
The “implicit reliance” cases discuss affidavits with a common 
defect.  The affidavits asserted that the place to be searched was the 
defendant’s residence, but failed to tell the magistrate how the affiant 
knew that the defendant lived at that address.  Because an affidavit must 
offer the magistrate more than bare conclusions,221 some courts222 have 
held that such affidavits fail to provide the magistrate with a “‘substantial 
basis for . . . [concluding]’ that probable cause existed.”223  Other courts 
have said only that the failure to justify the affiant’s conclusion that a 
                                                     
 219. Probable cause doctrine, of course, recognizes the idea of a “reasonable mistake” in 
judgment.  And in garden-variety cases applying the good faith exception, the officer has made a 
reasonable mistake in thinking that an insufficient affidavit established probable cause.  Yet, as my 
colleague Vivian Hamilton pointed out to me, neither of these kinds of reasonable mistake is quite 
the same as a reasonable mistake in filling out a warrant application.  To say that an officer had 
probable cause for a search that proved fruitless is to say that the officer made a reasonable judgment 
under conditions of factual uncertainty that turned out to be mistaken.  To say that an officer made a 
reasonable mistake in thinking her warrant application established probable cause is to say that the 
officer made a reasonable judgment under conditions of legal uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about 
whether a particular set of facts adds up to probable cause) that turned out to be mistaken.  Because 
it is much harder to see anything “reasonable” about forgetting to include an important fact in a 
warrant application, the term “reasonable mistake” in this context falls uneasily on the ear.  Perhaps 
the term “excusable mistake” would be more felicitous.  Nevertheless, I have chosen the terms 
“objectively reasonable mistake” and “reasonable mistake” in order to emphasize continuity with 
Leon’s emphasis on the reasonable officer as the benchmark of objective good faith.  Cf. Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 568 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing a clerical error in a warrant 
form as a “reasonable mistake”).  Readers disturbed by the terminology might find it helpful to think 
of reasonable mistakes in the warrant application process as mistakes that even reasonable officers 
well trained in Fourth Amendment law will make from time to time. 
 220. 540 U.S. 551.  As I explain below, Justice Kennedy’s and, to a lesser extent, Justice 
Thomas’s dissenting opinions argue vigorously and explicitly for the recognition of reasonable 
mistakes in the warrant application process.  Even the majority opinion, however, implicitly employs 
the notion of reasonable mistake. 
 221. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (“Sufficient information must be presented to 
the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere 
ratification of the bare conclusions of others.”). 
 222. United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 994 (7th Cir. 1987); Braxton v. State, 720 A.2d 27, 
42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
 223. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)) 
(internal punctuation and alterations omitted). 
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certain address was the defendant’s residence might render the warrant 
invalid.224  Regardless of differences on the probable-cause issue, 
however, the First,225 Sixth,226 and Seventh227 circuits as well as state 
courts in Colorado,228 Maryland,229 California,230 and Louisiana231 have 
all applied Leon when confronted with this scenario.  Significantly, many 
of these decisions rely (with varying degrees of explicitness) on 
suppression hearing testimony showing that the affiant actually had a 
sound basis for concluding that the defendant lived at the place to be 
searched but forgot to include this information in the affidavit.232 
The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Procopio233 is 
representative.  There, officers initially obtained a warrant for the wrong 
apartment, but discovered their error at the scene and then telephoned an 
officer who prepared a new warrant application with the correct address.  
The affidavit, however, failed to explain how the police knew that the 
new address was the defendant’s.234  The First Circuit had no difficulty 
                                                     
 224. See, e.g., United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that Leon 
applied “whether or not this is a defect in the application”); People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 151 (Co. 
2001) (admitting evidence while stating that the affidavit “arguably failed to provide a substantial 
basis for the issuing magistrate’s action”).  At least one court has concluded that an affidavit failing 
to explain how an officer discovered the location of the defendant’s residence satisfied the probable-
cause standard under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.  United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 
1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993).  This result seems doubtful, as it seems to contradict the long-standing 
principle that a magistrate should not simply ratify the affiant’s bare conclusions.  See Gates, 462 
U.S. at 239. 
 225. United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 666 (1st Cir. 2000); Procopio, 88 F.3d at 28. 
 226. United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 337–38 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 227. Brown, 832 F.2d at 994–96. 
 228. Gall, 30 P.3d at 152. 
 229. Braxton v. State, 720 A.2d 27, 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
 230. People v. Bell, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), partially abrogated on other 
grounds as recognized in People v. Athar, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 231. State v. Varnado, 675 So. 2d 268, 270–71 (La. 1996). 
 232. See, e.g., Braxton, 720 A.2d at 48 (justifying application of the good faith exception in part 
by noting that the officer had obtained the defendant’s address from an arrest record, a fact which 
apparently emerged during the suppression hearing); Bell, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (excusing officer’s 
omission of basis for conclusion that suspects lived at place to be searched after noting that the 
prosecution offered to put on proof that the officer had confirmed the suspects’ residence through a 
check of utility records).  In United States v. Van Shutters, the affidavit failed to indicate why the 
officer believed the defendant had any connection with the place to be searched.  163 F.3d 331, 336 
(6th Cir. 1998).  Nevertheless, the court applied Leon on the questionable ground that the detailed 
description of the premises in the affidavit supported “a common sense inference . . . that the affiant 
visited the premises himself and presumably either observed [the suspect] in the residence, or 
determined through investigation that [the suspect] frequented the premises.”  Id. at 337.  The court 
may have found this inference to be plausible because of the officer’s suppression hearing testimony 
that he had “personally verified” the link between the defendant and the place to be searched, even 
though the court stated that this information was not relevant.  Id. at 337 n.4. 
 233. 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 234. Id. at 28. 
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applying the good faith exception.  According to the court, the officers 
who had directed the preparation of the new warrant application had 
“ample basis” to conclude that the defendant lived at the new address 
because they knew from surveillance that he lived in the building and 
because moments before he had answered from that apartment when they 
called his name.235  The court explained, 
The focus in a warrant application is usually on whether the suspect 
committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime is to be found at 
his home or business.  That hardly makes the address unimportant: to 
invade the wrong location is a serious matter.  But so long as the 
affidavit itself asserts a link between the suspect and the address, it is 
easy to understand how both the officer applying for the warrant and 
the magistrate might overlook a lack of detail on a point often 
established by the telephone book or the name on a mailbox.236 
To relate the court’s point to my earlier claims, we could say that the 
officers in Procopio believed that the warrant was properly issued 
because under the circumstances they thought they had conveyed their 
entire case to the magistrate.  From their point of view, the circumstances 
made it obvious how they knew where the defendant lived and they 
apparently thought this was clear to the magistrate as well.  Was their 
mistake about the contents of the warrant application a reasonable one?  
The court clearly thought so.  The quoted passage suggests that this sort 
of mistake might be made by even the most conscientious officer. 
It is also significant that the court implicitly relied on suppression 
hearing testimony in concluding that the omission in the warrant 
application was the result of a reasonable mistake.  The defect in the 
application appears minor, and the mistake reasonable, only in light of 
the court’s knowledge of what the officers knew but failed to tell the 
magistrate.  If the court had not been sure that the officers had reasonable 
grounds for their conclusion that the defendant lived at the new address, 
it might have treated the case differently.237  It appears, then, that the 
                                                     
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  Other courts have made similar statements.  See, e.g., People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 152 
(Colo. 2001) (explaining that an officer’s failure to explain how he knew the suspect resided at the 
targeted address was understandable because “the suspect was not unidentified, a fugitive from 
justice, or a transient without regular living quarters”); Bell, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (observing that 
in most instances identifying a suspect’s residence is a “routine matter” and that “the most obvious 
and routine things are the easiest to forget and their absence least noticeable”). 
 237. See Procopio, 88 F.3d at 28 (stating that “to invade the wrong location is a serious matter”).  
The good-faith analysis would look quite different if, for example, the officers’ only reason for 
thinking the suspect lived at the address to be searched was an uncorroborated anonymous tip.  Cf. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983) (stating that an uncorroborated anonymous tip would not 
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Procopio court did look to information known to the officers but not 
shared with the magistrate in reaching the conclusion that the officers 
acted in good faith and that it did so precisely because the mistake in the 
warrant application was a reasonable one.238 
Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinions in Groh 
v. Ramirez,239 a qualified immunity case,240 offer further support for the 
propositions that courts sometimes recognize the existence of reasonable 
mistakes in the warrant application process and that such mistakes are 
relevant to the good-faith analysis.  In Groh, the defendant, Officer Groh, 
received a tip from a citizen informant indicating that the Ramirez family 
might have a large cache of weapons on their Montana ranch.  Groh 
completed a warrant application and an affidavit listing various types of 
weaponry as the things to be seized.241  Unfortunately, when Groh 
prepared the actual search warrant for the magistrate’s signature, he 
                                                                                                                       
 
provide a magistrate with a substantial basis for finding probable cause).  Indeed, in such 
circumstances it would be misleading for an officer to assert without explanation that the suspect 
lived at the address to be searched, for in the absence of explanation a court would likely assume that 
the officer had connected the suspect to the address through some more reliable means. 
 238. On my reading, Procopio regards the officers as making a reasonable factual mistake about 
the contents of the affidavit—they were reasonably unaware of the gap between what they knew and 
what they told the magistrate.  Although the passage quoted in the text supports my interpretation, it 
might be possible to read Procopio as simply saying that the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause that no reasonable officer would have submitted it to a magistrate.  One might, in 
other words, think of the officers as making not an excusable factual mistake about the contents of 
the affidavit, but an excusable legal mistake about whether an affidavit must provide the magistrate 
with an independent basis for the officers’ conclusions about where the defendant lived.  Cf. Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 569 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion 
wrongly treated an officer’s clerical error as a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact).  If this 
alternative reading is correct, Procopio and related cases offer little support for my position.  But is 
it correct?  And how might one decide? 
 I suggest that if the courts regard an officer’s error as legal, they will at some point expect 
officers to stop repeating the error.  See United States v. Johns, 948 F.2d 599, 604–06 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(applying Leon to save the fruits of a “sneak and peek” warrant search but warning that future sneak 
and peek searches conducted without adequate notice to the search target would not receive the 
protection of the good faith exception).  Just as the sphere of qualified immunity shrinks as the law 
becomes more “clearly established” in its details, reasonable officers can be expected to learn that 
they must include in the affidavit information explaining how they know where defendants live.  I 
doubt, however, that courts would ever announce that they have forgiven a Procopio-style omission 
for the last time.  See Oesby v. State, 788 A.2d 662, 667–68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (applying the 
good faith exception where the officer failed to explain how he knew where the defendant lived 
despite an earlier Maryland precedent clearly stating that an affidavit would not establish probable 
cause without this information).  If I am right, the point suggests that courts are treating the sorts of 
omissions in Procopio as reasonable factual errors regarding the contents of the affidavit. 
 239. 540 U.S. at 566–71 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 571–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 240. Although Groh is a qualified immunity case, it has relevance for the good faith exception 
because under Malley the standards for application of the good faith exception and for qualified 
immunity are the same.  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). 
 241. Groh, 540 U.S. at 554. 
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listed as the property to be seized “a single dwelling residence two story 
in height which is blue in color and has two additions attached to the 
east.”242  Apparently, Groh made a clerical error by substituting his 
description of the place to be searched for his description of the property 
to be seized.  The magistrate failed to catch the error and signed the 
warrant.243  Groh then led a team of officers in executing the search, 
keeping the search at all times within the scope described in the affidavit 
and the warrant application.244 
No incriminating items were found, but the Ramirez family filed a § 
1983 suit against Groh and his fellow officers.245  The Ninth Circuit 
threw out all the claims except that against Groh,246 and the Supreme 
Court affirmed.247  The Court first held that the warrant was invalid and 
the search unconstitutional because the actual warrant totally failed to 
particularly describe the things to be seized.248  The Court then held that 
Groh was not entitled to qualified immunity because the error in the 
warrant was so glaring that even a casual glance ought to have brought 
the error to the officer’s attention.249  In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued 
that Groh ought to have been granted qualified immunity because “an 
officer’s failure to recognize his clerical error on a warrant form can be a 
reasonable mistake.”250  Justice Kennedy further argued that the mistake 
was factual, not legal—the officer acted on the basis of a mistaken belief 
that the warrant contained a proper description of the things to be 
seized.251  A separate dissent by Justice Thomas argued that “it is 
inevitable that officers acting reasonably and entirely in good faith will 
occasionally make . . . errors” like Officer Groh’s.252  Although only the 
dissenters explicitly invoked the idea of a reasonable mistake in 
preparing the warrant application, the majority opinion showed some 
receptiveness to their arguments by emphasizing that even “a simple 
                                                     
 242. Id. at 554–55 n.2. 
 243. Id. at 555. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002) aff’d sub nom. 
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 
 247. Groh, 540 U.S. at 566. 
 248. Id. at 557–58.  Although Groh involves a particularity defect rather than a probable-cause 
deficiency, its treatment of mistakes in the warrant application process should apply quite generally. 
 249. Id. at 564–65 (“[E]ven a cursory reading of the warrant in this case—perhaps just a simple 
glance—would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have 
known was constitutionally fatal.”). 
 250. Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 251. Id. at 567–69. 
 252. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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glance” at the warrant would have been enough to alert Officer Groh to 
his error.253  This aspect of the majority opinion could be read to imply 
that a more reasonable failure to detect a clerical error in the warrant 
application might merit different treatment under Leon.  The majority 
may simply have thought that Officer Groh’s error was unreasonable 
because of the glaring deficiency in the affidavit.254 
Both the Procopio-style implicit reliance cases and Groh, then, 
suggest that there can be such a thing as a reasonable mistake in the 
warrant application process.  Indeed, the implications of a contrary view 
seem inconsistent with the spirit of Leon.  The challenge is to come up 
with an approach that draws reasoned lines in this area without 
collapsing into the views of either the Eighth or the Ninth circuits.  To do 
that, we first need to get a sense of the spectrum of possible cases in 
which officers fill out deficient warrant applications and later try to 
bolster those applications with suppression hearing testimony. 
V. THE FORMS OF THE SHADOW: REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE 
MISTAKES IN THE WARRANT APPLICATION PROCESS 
 Commendably, there is a high resolve in many policemen to ferret 
out the last shred of probable cause; regrettably, there is a concomitant 
inertia in those policemen toward putting it down on paper.  That gap 
between the latent and the kinetic (with its Fourth Amendment 
consequences) echoes T.S. Eliot in The Hollow Men, “Between the idea 
and the reality, between the motion and the act, falls the Shadow.”  In 
the case at bar, the shadow fell between what the police worked up and 
what the police wrote down.255 
Cases in which officers claim to have omitted information supporting 
probable cause from their warrant applications can take many forms.  At 
the risk of being crude, I will group the cases into four categories.  I will 
usually refer to these categories as Type I cases, Type II cases, etc.  But 
they can also be labeled (somewhat tendentiously) as “knowing 
omission” cases, “major omission” cases, “minor omission” cases, and 
“pure transmission error” cases.256 
                                                     
 253. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). 
 254. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(f), at 86.  Professor LaFave endorses the dissenters’ position 
that Officer Groh made a reasonable mistake in preparing the warrant and concludes that the 
majority opinion is “flat-out wrong” as an application of Leon.  Id. at 85. 
 255. Hignut v. State, 303 A.2d 173, 175 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973). 
 256. The usual disclaimers about typologies apply.  Obviously, my categories are not self-
applying, their boundary lines may be fuzzy, and the application of a label is no substitute for 
analysis.  Drawing lines between Type II and III cases, in particular, ultimately requires context-
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A. Type I “Knowing Omission” Cases 
In a knowing omission case, the affiant officer omits information 
supporting probable cause from his affidavit either because of a 
conscious decision to withhold information from the magistrate or (more 
likely) a culpable failure to understand the legal requirements for 
establishing probable cause.  In either case, the key point is that the 
officer has no remotely reasonable basis for believing that he has shared 
his entire case for probable cause with the magistrate. 
It may seem that an officer would never knowingly fail to include in 
his affidavit information that would support probable cause,257 but there 
are actually many reasons why he might do so: simple laziness, a desire 
to save time, a (possibly mistaken) judgment that the affidavit already 
contained enough information to establish probable cause and that more 
information was unnecessary, a desire to protect the identity of 
informants,258 or a belief that the magistrate would rubber stamp 
anything put in front of her.  What is truly rare is for an affiant to admit 
during the suppression hearing that the omission was self-conscious and 
intentional.  In that context, the most officers are likely to admit is that 
they forgot to include the relevant information.259  So far as I am aware, 
the only reported case involving self-conscious, deliberate omission of 
information supporting probable cause is United States v. Turner.260  In 
that case, the affidavit’s probable-cause showing depended crucially on a 
tip from an informant whose information was characterized only as 
“reliable and substantiated by independent investigation in the past.”261  
                                                                                                                       
 
sensitive judgments about what counts as a reasonable mistake in the warrant application process.  
All that being said, the categories are still useful in getting the lay of the land. 
 257. In contrast, officers have an obvious motive to omit from their warrant applications 
information that would undercut their efforts to show probable cause.  Courts have properly refused 
to apply the good faith exception in such cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565, 
573–74 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 258. See NCSC Study, supra note 80, at 53 (reporting that in three study cities affidavits were 
self-consciously drafted to include the minimum information necessary to establish probable cause 
“to limit the avenues of attack by the defense and to protect the identity of informants”). 
 259. A good example is State v. Parmar, in which officers obtained a warrant to search for a BB 
gun (among other things) but the affidavit provided no information explaining why the BB gun was 
relevant to the investigation.  437 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Neb. 1989), overruled by State v. Edmonson, 
598 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. 1999).  During the suppression hearing, the affiant stated that his failure to 
include information linking the BB gun to criminal activity was “an oversight.”  Id.  See also People 
v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1116 n.9 (Colo. 2003) (prosecution argued that officer “simply overlooked 
stating an important detail when composing his affidavit”), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1082 (2004). 
 260. 713 F. Supp. 714 (D. Vt. 1989). 
 261. Id. at 715. 
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The affiant declined to provide any further information in the affidavit 
about the informant’s reliability because he feared doing so would 
jeopardize another police investigation.262  In suppressing the evidence, 
the Turner court properly refused to consider any information about the 
informant’s reliability that had not been presented to the magistrate.263  
Though the court’s reasoning was flawed,264 its decision to disregard this 
information was correct because such information could not support an 
objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued. 
More common than deliberate omission cases like Turner are those 
in which the officer omits information from the affidavit because of a 
culpable failure to appreciate the legal requirements for establishing 
probable cause.  A good example of such a case is State v. Klosterman.265  
There, police obtained a warrant based almost entirely on information 
from what the affidavit characterized as “reliable and credible” 
confidential sources.266  Although the affiant testified at the suppression 
hearing about his reasons for trusting his informants, the court refused to 
apply the good faith exception because “[t]he officer’s reliance on the 
warrant can be objectively reasonable only if his belief that the affidavit 
contains facts sufficient to create probable cause is itself objectively 
reasonable.”267  In Klosterman, there was no reasonable basis for such a 
                                                     
 262. Id. at 723. 
 263. Id. at 723 n.8.  Elsewhere, the court noted its approval of the officer’s decision to withhold 
information to protect another investigation, but said that the defendant should not be penalized by 
the existence of the other investigation and that the police could have and should have done more to 
demonstrate the informant’s reliability through corroboration.  Id. at 725. 
 264. The court justified its decision by saying that Leon “does not focus on the officer’s motive.”  
Id. at 723 n.8.  This appears to be an awkward way of saying that the consideration of information 
not presented to the magistrate would make the good-faith standard subjective rather than objective. 
 265. 683 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 266. The relevant sections of the affidavit read as follows: 
2. Affiant states that on March 10, 1993, acting on information received [from] a 
reliable and credible confidential source, [he] began surveillance of [Klosterman’s 
residence]. 
3. The reason for the surveillance is that a confidential informant within the last 72 
hours, purchased illegal narcotics from [Klosterman at his residence]. 
4. This Affiant has received intelligence information from numerous confidential 
informants that [Klosterman] is involved in trafficking in large quantities of 
marihuana and psilocybin mushrooms.  The Defendant has a previous conviction for 
Trafficking in Marijuana, Greene County Common Pleas Court in 1978. 
5. As a result of the purchase of the illegal narcotics from the residence of 
[Klosterman] and reliable intelligence information gathered over a period of several 
years, there is probable cause to believe that [Klosterman] is involved in the 
distribution and sale of illegal narcotics. 
Id. at 102.  With the exception of the fifteen-year-old conviction, the affidavit’s entire case for 
probable cause turned on whether the information from the confidential sources was trustworthy. 
 267. Id. at 104. 
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belief because the officer could not have entertained any illusion that the 
magistrate knew the facts supporting his judgment that the informants 
named in the affidavit were reliable.  If the officer had simply claimed 
that he forgot to explain why he judged his informants “reliable and 
credible,” it would have been a sufficient answer to say that forgetting of 
this sort cannot be objectively reasonable because it results from a failure 
to appreciate the relevant legal standards268 or from gross negligence in 
putting together the warrant application.  Suppressing evidence in this 
kind of situation is necessary to provide incentives for police 
departments to continue training their officers to comply with Fourth 
Amendment requirements. 
In Type I cases, then, the information omitted from the warrant 
application appears irrelevant to whether the officer had an objectively 
reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued because the officer 
either was aware or clearly should have been aware of the gap between 
what he knew and what he told the magistrate.  Other scenarios, 
however, are more difficult to evaluate. 
B. Type II “Major Omission” Cases 
In the major omission category of cases, the information omitted 
from the officer’s affidavit is highly significant to the overall probable-
cause showing.  While the presence of such holes in the affidavit need 
not show a complete failure to appreciate basic Fourth Amendment 
principles, it does suggest a significant lack of care in the warrant 
application process.  The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Martin and the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Carpenter are representative Type II cases. 
The Martin case involved an undercover investigation regarding 
some fur coats stolen from a Minnesota store.269  Walter Powers, a 
Hennepin County detective acting undercover, arranged three coat 
purchases from a man named Mastrian, who was an associate of the 
defendant Martin.270  During one of the coat buys, Powers observed 
                                                     
 268. Courts have consistently held that a reasonably well-trained officer knows at least the 
basics of Fourth Amendment law.  See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984) 
(stating that Leon’s objective standard “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the 
law prohibits”); Klosterman, 683 N.E.2d at 104 (“Courts objectively evaluating an officer’s claim of 
good faith reliance must charge the officer with a certain minimum level of knowledge of the law’s 
requirements.”).  It follows that any officer will be charged with knowledge that conclusory 
assertions of an informant’s reliability and credibility do not establish probable cause in the absence 
of significant corroboration of the tip. 
 269. United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 753–54 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 270. Id. at 753. 
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Mastrian unloading coats from a large, tan duffel bag and assisted 
Mastrian in loading the coats back into the bag.271  On another occasion, 
other officers observing Mastrian’s residence had seen Martin remove a 
large, tan duffel bag from the trunk of his car, carry it into Mastrian’s 
house, and return it to the car a few minutes later.272  The officers then 
saw Mastrian and Martin leave Mastrian’s residence together and drive 
in Martin’s car to the previously arranged location of the coat buy.273  
When Mastrian and Martin arrived together to complete a final 
transaction involving a trade of cocaine for fur coats, Powers arrested 
them both.274  After the arrest, Powers submitted a two-and-one-half 
page, typed affidavit in support of five different search warrants, 
including one warrant authorizing a search of Martin’s car for evidence 
of participation in the stolen coat operation.275  The state court magistrate 
approved the warrant requests, which were promptly executed.276  The 
search of Martin’s car uncovered none of the items sought, but did yield 
two firearms which ultimately led to Martin’s arrest on federal firearms 
charges.277 
Martin moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the 
affidavit was so deficient that it neither established probable cause nor 
provided a reasonable basis for reliance under Leon.278  The district court 
agreed, and understandably so.279  The references to Martin in the 
affidavit stated only (1) that “Martin was seen loading a tan duffel bag 
into his car on January 6, 1986, at Mastrian’s residence,” (2) that Powers 
had seen the same bag while purchasing a coat on January 30, (3) that 
Martin was seen on many occasions going to and from the same address 
where Powers bought the coat on January 30, and (4) that “Powers spoke 
with a man who identified himself as Terry” (Martin’s first name) while 
calling a number Mastrian had provided to Powers.280  Although the 
majority opinion in Martin held that the officers reasonably relied on the 
affidavit in their search of Martin’s car,281 the district court and Chief 
                                                     
 271. Id. at 754. 
 272. Id. at 753.  Powers obviously (and plausibly) assumed that he and the other officers were 
observing the same duffel bag. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 754. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 754–55. 
 279. Id. at 754. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 756. 
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Judge Lay correctly concluded that the affidavit fell far short of 
establishing probable cause to believe that Martin’s car would contain 
evidence regarding the stolen furs.  Specifically, the affidavit omitted 
most of Officer Powell’s reasons for concluding that Martin was a key 
player in the storage and sale of the stolen coats and that his car and the 
tan duffel bag were used with some regularity in transporting the coats.282 
Although the Martin opinion does not recount Detective Powers’s 
explanation for the omissions in his affidavit, it is easy to imagine what 
the detective would have said if questioned at the suppression hearing.  
No doubt he would have claimed that in the process of preparing an 
affidavit to support five separate warrants, he simply forgot to include all 
the details relating to Martin and his car.  The prosecution could then 
have claimed that because of the detective’s carelessness, he failed to 
notice the gap between what he knew and what he told the magistrate 
and therefore believed that the warrant was properly issued.  Could that 
belief be considered objectively reasonable?  Though the omission in 
Martin was significant, it differs from that in Klosterman because it did 
not rest on any failure to grasp the legal rudiments of probable cause.  
The problem seems rather to be that the officer did not think carefully 
enough about the need to establish probable cause for all the prongs of a 
multi-faceted search warrant request. 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Carpenter is another example of a 
Type II case.  There, an officer conducting helicopter surveillance saw 
marijuana patches in fields roughly 900 feet from the defendants’ 
house.283  The officer also saw beaten paths running between the 
marijuana patches and the back door of the house and observed two men 
(later determined to be the defendant Lonnie Carpenter and his son) 
walking from the patches toward the house.284  Unfortunately, much of 
this information was omitted by the ground officer who applied for the 
warrant.285  The affidavit stated only that marijuana was seen growing 
“near the residence” and that there was “a road”286 connecting the 
                                                     
 282. Chief Judge Lay ultimately concluded that Leon should apply because the information 
known to Detective Powers but omitted from the affidavit was “sufficient to justify a reasonable 
belief that probable cause existed.”  See id. at 757 & n.3 (Lay, C.J., concurring). 
 283. United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 851 (2004). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id.  According to Judge Moore’s dissent, this “road” was actually a “dirt path leading from 
the Carpenters’ trailer to a separate tractor path that may have served as the connection between the 
city road and a homestead behind the Carpenters’ trailer that had burned down several years before.”  
Id. at 604 (Moore, J., dissenting).  Apparently this “road” was not the same path as the “beaten 
paths” running between the marijuana patches and the residence. 
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residence to the marijuana patches.287  The Sixth Circuit ultimately held 
that the affidavit’s probable-cause showing was sufficiently robust to 
support reasonable reliance,288 a conclusion that seems forced for the 
reasons given in the dissenting opinion.289 
As in Martin, the affiant here would no doubt have claimed that he 
inadvertently omitted some of the information relayed from the 
helicopter pilot because of carelessness and the haste with which he 
prepared the affidavit.  Yet, even more strongly than in Martin, the 
affidavit here reveals a failure to think carefully about Fourth 
Amendment requirements in preparing the warrant application.  Perhaps 
careful reflection on the requirement of a “nexus between the place to be 
searched and the evidence sought”290 would have led the officer to 
question whether proximity to marijuana patches and a connecting 
“road” were enough to establish probable cause for the search of a home.  
Surely scrutiny of such a simple affidavit ought to have revealed the 
absence of some of the information relayed by the helicopter pilot, and 
thus it seems doubtful that the affiant was reasonably unaware of the gap 
between what he knew and what he told the magistrate. 
In Type II cases, then, the affiant’s omission is inadvertent yet 
reflects both a lack of attention to probable-cause requirements in 
preparing the application and a failure to carefully review the application 
before submitting it to a magistrate.  While the officer might have 
subjectively believed that he had given the magistrate everything he had, 
it is far from obvious that such a belief should count as objectively 
reasonable. 
                                                     
 287. The affidavit was apparently drafted in a great hurry.  As reprinted (“in exactly the syntax 
shown”) in the opinion, the full text of the affidavit purportedly establishing probable cause for a 
search of the Carpenters’ house read: 
  On June 23, 1999 at approx 12:30 pm, Helicopter Pilot Lt Bob Crumley was 
conducting an aerial search of Hawkins Co when he was flying over the above described 
property he saw numerous Marijuana Plants growing.  Near the residence. 
  Upon information I received from Lt Crumley, there is a road connecting the above 
described residence to the Marijuana Plants.  Having personal knowledge that Lt. 
Crumley is certified in the identification of Marijuana I feel there is probable cause to 
search the said residence and property and seize any illegal contraband found. 
Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
 288. Id. at 596. 
 289. Id. at 601–04 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 290. Id. at 594 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336–37 
(6th Cir. 1998)). 
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C. Type III “Minor Omission” Cases 
Type III cases involve omissions that are not only inadvertent but 
also so minor that the omission seems entirely understandable and 
(perhaps) nonculpable.  Procopio291 and the other implicit reliance cases 
are the paradigmatic examples here.  In these cases, the affidavit asserts 
that the defendant lives at the residence to be searched but fails to 
explain the affiant’s basis for the assertion.  Although this failing may 
violate the rule that the warrant application cannot rest on bare 
conclusions, courts have regularly applied the good faith exception on 
the ground that “it is easy to understand how both the officer applying 
for the warrant and the magistrate might overlook a lack of detail on a 
point often established by the telephone book or the name on a 
mailbox.”292 
D. Type IV “Pure Transmission Error” Cases 
In cases of “pure transmission error,” the officer conducts an 
appropriate investigation and also properly evaluates the evidence in the 
light of Fourth Amendment requirements to assure herself that she can 
establish probable cause for the proposed search.  The officer’s only 
error is that she fails to properly record this process in the affidavit.  A 
striking example is United States v. Corrigan.293  In Corrigan, the officer 
secretly taped a conversation with the defendant in which the defendant 
stated that he had a pipe bomb in the barn behind his house and offered 
to pay the officer to collect a gambling debt by roughing up another 
man.294  On the basis of this information, the officer applied for and 
obtained a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.  In the course of executing 
the arrest warrant, the officer asked the defendant’s permission to search 
the premises, but the defendant refused.  The officer then sought a search 
warrant from a different magistrate.295  Unfortunately, the officer’s 
application for the search warrant neglected to mention the time when 
the incriminating conversation took place.  As a result, the district court 
ruled that the search warrant was invalid because it did not provide any 
indication that the information establishing probable cause was not 
                                                     
 291. United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996).  For further discussion of this case, 
see supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. 
 292. Procopio, 88 F.3d at 28. 
 293. 809 F. Supp. 567 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). 
 294. Id. at 568. 
 295. Id. at 569 n.5. 
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stale.296  At the suppression hearing, the state argued that the evidence 
seized pursuant to the warrant should be admitted under Leon because 
the officer simply forgot to include the date of the conversation in his 
warrant application.297  Further, the state offered convincing proof that 
the information on which the warrant was based was not stale.298  
Apparently, the officer had included the time of the incriminating 
conversation in his earlier application for the arrest warrant.  
Nonetheless, the Corrigan court granted the defendant’s suppression 
motion on the ground that the officer’s negligence had caused the 
warrant to be faulty: “Leon does not excuse a police officer’s reliance on 
a warrant which he himself, however unintentionally, caused to be 
faulty.”299  No doubt the officer could have been more careful in filling 
out the second warrant application, yet the error was purely clerical and 
was completely understandable under the circumstances.300  Further, 
admitting the evidence would not have facilitated perjury because there 
was clear and convincing proof that the officer’s testimony at the 
suppression hearing was not perjured.301 
                                                     
 296. Id. at 568. 
 297. Id. at 569.  The officer testified that he was under time pressure because it was late in the 
evening and the magistrate to whom the search warrant was submitted had a previous engagement.  
Further, the officer noted that unlike the arrest warrant form, the search warrant form contained no 
blank space for recording the date on which the officer received the information establishing 
probable cause.  Id. at 569 n.5. 
 298. Corrigan never provided the date of the incriminating conversation, but the court indicated 
that the officer had provided the date to the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant and apparently 
regarded that date as establishing the relative freshness of the evidence. 
 299. Id. at 572. 
 300. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988), is 
another case involving pure transmission error, see supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text 
(summarizing the facts and reasoning of Hove), but it is a less attractive candidate for application of 
the good faith exception than Corrigan because the Hove facts suggest a greater risk of perjury than 
was present in Corrigan.  Unlike Corrigan, the only proof of the transmission error in Hove was the 
officer’s post hoc testimony. 
 301. As will be discussed below, see infra notes 331–42 and accompanying text, one of the 
reasons for barring the use of suppression hearing testimony to rehabilitate defective warrants is 
concern that such testimony will be perjured.  In Corrigan, however, this concern seems misplaced 
for two reasons.  First, the officer was “on the record” about the missing information before 
executing the search warrant because he had given the date of the incriminating conversation to the 
magistrate who issued the arrest warrant.  Further, the warrant process could not provide any 
meaningful check on perjury regarding the staleness issue in any event.  To the extent warrants serve 
as a check on perjury, they do so because the police must commit themselves to an account of their 
basis for the search before they actually see what evidence is there to be found.  When police testify 
about their basis for finding probable cause after the search has taken place, they can more easily 
tailor their accounts of what was known beforehand to match the evidence actually discovered.  In 
the case of staleness, however, the question is simply when the officers learned what they say they 
knew before the search.  Officers can lie about this, of course—for all we know, the officer in 
Corrigan could have been lying about the time of the taped conversation about the pipe bomb.  The 
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E. Drawing Lines: Preliminary Considerations 
The preceding typology suggests a spectrum of cases where allowing 
omitted information to cure the affidavit’s deficiencies ranges from less 
to more appealing.  The first distinction to draw among these cases 
separates the knowing or grossly negligent omissions in Type I cases 
from the various inadvertent omissions302 in Type II, Type III, and Type 
IV cases. 
It should be clear from the preceding discussions that Leon should 
not apply in Type I cases.  Information knowingly omitted from a 
warrant application cannot affect the reasonableness of the officer’s 
belief that the warrant was properly issued.  Similarly, a bare-bones 
affidavit like that in Klosterman cannot be rehabilitated under Leon even 
if the officer claims after the fact that he “just forgot” to explain the basis 
for his conclusions.  Whether characterized as fundamental legal errors 
about the requirements of probable cause or as grossly negligent 
mistakes in the warrant application process, the errors in Type I cases 
cannot qualify as objectively reasonable.  This conclusion is of limited 
importance, however, because Type I cases are fairly rare.  Indeed, even 
courts purporting to follow the Eighth Circuit view might well refuse to 
apply Leon if confronted with a true Type I case. 
How, then, should we draw the line dividing those inadvertent 
omissions that can be cured with suppression hearing testimony from 
those that cannot?  Plausible arguments can be made for drawing this line 
at each point along the spectrum running from Type II to Type IV 
cases.303  All of the possible line-drawing approaches are compatible 
with the point I have insisted upon: that the proper question is whether 
the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was 
properly issued.  They differ in their positions on when (if ever) an 
officer can make an objectively reasonable mistake about what 
information she has put in front of the magistrate. 
                                                                                                                       
 
point, however, is that this kind of perjury is just as easy ex ante as it is ex post.  Accordingly, the 
warrant process can do little to check perjury in this kind of case. 
 302. The phrase “inadvertent omissions” is something of a term of art.  An officer might claim 
inadvertence even in cases involving bare-bones affidavits.  Yet if such a claim is accepted, the 
officer’s failure to recognize the deficiencies in the affidavit would be grossly negligent.  
“Inadvertent omission” cases in my usage encompass mistakes in the warrant application process 
that are, at worst, ordinary instances of negligence. 
 303. In other words, one can plausibly argue that suppression hearing testimony may be used to 
establish the officer’s good faith in (1) Type II, III, and IV cases, (2) Type III and IV cases, (3) Type 
IV cases only, or (4) never. 
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VI. ANSWERING THE QUESTION: A MIDDLE PATH ALLOWING LIMITED 
USE OF SUPPRESSION HEARING TESTIMONY TO PROVE GOOD FAITH 
A. Moving Beyond the Magistrate-Versus-Officer “Blame Game” 
Once the issue is framed as one of whether there can be objectively 
reasonable mistakes in the warrant application process, the next step is to 
decide how Leon would have us answer the question.  One approach that 
immediately suggests itself is to ask whether inadvertent omissions from 
the warrant application are better seen as “magistrate error” or “officer 
error.”  This approach is often used by courts,304 and has doubtlessly 
been encouraged by Leon’s statement that suppressing evidence obtained 
in good-faith reliance on a warrant would be “[p]enalizing the officer for 
the magistrate’s error, rather than his own.”305  Yet the tendency of courts 
to resolve cases by classifying mistakes in warrant searches as either 
“magistrate error” or “police error” seems misguided.  First, the question 
of whether the failure to identify shortcomings in an affidavit is the fault 
of the magistrate or the officer has proven manipulable.306  Second, the 
reality is that the magistrate is at fault in every case where a warrant is 
issued without probable cause, and often egregiously at fault when a 
warrant is issued in the absence of even a substantial basis for finding 
probable cause.  Similarly, the officer is at fault in nearly every case.307 
If both magistrate and officer have erred in Leon cases, perhaps 
courts are really asking whether the magistrate or the officer is more to 
blame for the warrant’s deficiency.  Although more promising, this 
approach is also inadequate.  Consider the ordinary case for application 
                                                     
 304. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the 
staleness problem in the affidavit was “primarily” a result of mistakes made by the issuing judge and 
that Leon should apply because “the officer need not pay for the judge’s mistake”); United States v. 
Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. 567, 572 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (refusing to apply Leon to cure a staleness 
problem in the affidavit because the problem was not “due to any error on the part of the magistrate, 
but rather due to the negligence of the police officer applying for the warrant”). 
 305. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984). 
 306. Compare the Martin and Corrigan cases supra note 304.  Both involved affidavits that 
failed to include any statements as to the freshness of the evidence supporting probable cause.  
Martin, 297 F.3d at 1314–15; Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. at 568.  In both cases, the magistrates issued 
the warrants without noticing this deficiency.  Martin, 297 F.3d at 1316; Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. at 
571.  The Corrigan court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the omission of the information 
regarding staleness was the officer’s fault, not the magistrate’s fault.  Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. at 572.  
The Martin court admitted the evidence on the ground that the omission was the magistrate’s fault.  
Martin, 297 F.3d at 1320. 
 307. Perhaps Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), is an exception, as the Court 
observed that the officers in that case “took every step that could reasonably be expected of them.”  
Id. at 989. 
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of the third Leon exception, in which the officer’s affidavit contains his 
entire case for probable cause yet is still so insubstantial that a reasonable 
officer would never have submitted the warrant application for approval 
in the first place.  In such a case, both the magistrate and the officer have 
made serious errors in deciding whether the facts in the affidavit 
established probable cause.  Because we expect the magistrate to have 
greater expertise about the law of probable cause, her error seems greater 
than the officer’s.308  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court said in Malley that 
excluding evidence in these circumstances was appropriate and did not 
amount to punishing the officer for the magistrate’s error: when the 
officer’s warrant request “is outside the range of the professional 
competence expected of an officer,” he cannot “excuse his own default 
by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.”309  This 
passage suggests that Leon may require suppression even where the 
magistrate’s error is more culpable than the officer’s. 
For these reasons, the appropriate question is not about the proper 
allocation of blame between magistrate and officer.  Instead, it is whether 
(given the obvious fault of the magistrate) the officer’s error is one that 
merits deterrence through application of the exclusionary rule.  The 
answer to this question, as I shall explain below, depends both on the 
likelihood of changing police behavior through the threat of exclusion 
and on the effects such changes would have on the substantive values 
protected by the warrant requirement and by the Fourth Amendment 
itself.310 
B. Warrants Can Protect Privacy Even When Magistrates Do Not 
At the broadest level, the modern law of the Fourth Amendment is 
about striking the proper balance between the privacy rights of citizens 
and the legitimate needs of law enforcement.311  The warrant requirement 
                                                     
 308. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 346 n.9 (1986) (“It is a sound presumption that the 
magistrate is more qualified than the police officer to make a probable cause determination.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (“In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be 
expected to question the magistrate’s probable cause determination. . . .”). 
 309. Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9. 
 310. On my reading, then, Leon’s reference to the inappropriateness of “[p]enalizing the officer 
for the magistrate’s error,” 468 U.S. at 921, is not meant to make application of the good faith 
exception turn on the outcome of a magistrate-versus-officer “blame game.”  Instead, the passage 
simply makes the general point that exclusion serves no purpose where it would be unlikely to shape 
police conduct in appropriate ways. 
 311. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 5–7 (1991) (explaining that American courts regulate search and seizure by balancing the 
state’s interests in “effective law enforcement” and in “maintain[ing] the allegiance of its citizenry” 
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is important chiefly for its procedural value in insuring that this 
substantive balance is struck correctly.312  Warrants protect privacy in a 
variety of ways, both by preventing unjustified searches altogether and 
by constraining officers’ discretion in the execution of justified 
searches.313  Some of the protections are provided by the interposed 
judgment of the magistrate, some by the warrant application process, and 
some by the warrant itself. 
The most obvious function of the warrant requirement is to prevent 
“bad searches,” i.e., searches not based upon probable cause.  The classic 
exposition of this function was given by Justice Jackson in the 1948 case 
of Johnson v. United States.314  In that case, the government sought to 
justify a warrantless search of a hotel room by arguing, among other 
things, that the police officers clearly possessed sufficient grounds to 
justify issuance of a warrant at the time they searched the apartment.315  
In rejecting this contention, Justice Jackson wrote, 
 The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.  Any 
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the 
officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in 
                                                                                                                       
 
against the interests of its citizens in “avoiding unnecessary searches and seizures”); Silas J. 
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 19, 30 (1988).  A growing literature suggests that the aims of the “original” Fourth Amendment 
were much narrower, see generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999), but these historical arguments are well outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 312. For an argument that the Supreme Court’s warrant jurisprudence has emphasized procedure 
over substance, see Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 311, at 30–35. 
 313. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (describing the “two distinct 
constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement” as “eliminat[ing] altogether searches 
not based on probable cause” and insuring that even necessary searches “should be as limited as 
possible”).  In discussing the functions served by the warrant requirement, I will concentrate on the 
ways in which the requirement serves to safeguard the privacy of citizens (including criminal 
suspects).  The process also benefits the government in certain ways.  Most obviously, it provides an 
opportunity for police to correct shortcomings in their criminal investigations before it is too late.  
Professor Amar has argued that at the time of the Founding, warrants also aided peace officers by 
immunizing their actions from civil liability.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1178 (1991). 
 314. 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
 315. Id. at 12–13. 
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the discretion of police officers. . . .  When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a 
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement 
agent.316 
The key ideas here are straightforward.  First, privacy is sufficiently 
important that government intrusions should be prevented if possible 
rather than simply remedied after the fact.317  Second, “neutral and 
detached” magistrates are likely to be more hesitant to authorize 
intrusions than are police officers; i.e., they are more likely than police 
officers to strike the proper balance between the citizen’s right to privacy 
and the imperatives of law enforcement.318  A third central feature of the 
Court’s Warrant Clause jurisprudence follows from these points: the 
inferences supporting probable cause must be drawn by the magistrate 
rather than the officer.  If the magistrate simply ratifies the judgments of 
the police officer, the protections provided by the warrant process are 
illusory.  It is important to note that according to this classical 
justification for the warrant requirement, the critical element of the 
requirement’s protection is the magistrate’s independent, ex ante 
                                                     
 316. Id. at 13–14 (footnotes omitted). 
 317. As Professor Stuntz has pointed out, this part of the classical justification for the warrant 
requirement is not entirely convincing.  William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment 
Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 893 (1991).  Ex post sanctions like the exclusion of evidence also 
deter ex ante, and so they too can serve to prevent as well as to remedy privacy violations.  Id.  
Professor Slobogin, however, has argued that some type of ex ante review like the warrant procedure 
is necessary to effectively prevent privacy violations because (1) ex post sanctions cannot deter 
good-faith infractions and (2) ex post remedies like exclusion seem, as an empirical matter, to have 
relatively little effect on police conduct.  See Slobogin, supra note 311, at 9–12. 
 318. In addition to their character as “neutral and detached,” magistrates might also be thought 
more protective of privacy interests because their probable-cause judgments, unlike those of trial 
courts conducting suppression motions, are free from the subtle effects of hindsight bias.  This point 
has received considerable attention from Professor Stuntz, who argues that the Supreme Court’s 
warrant jurisprudence makes a great deal of sense if one assumes that the most important function 
served by the warrant requirement is to redress the problem of hindsight bias present in suppression 
hearings.  Stuntz, supra note 317, at 942.  As Stuntz aptly puts it, “[i]t must be much harder for a 
judge to decide that an officer had something less than probable cause to believe cocaine was in the 
trunk of a defendant’s car when the cocaine was in fact there.”  Id. at 912.  See also United States v. 
Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1987) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The advantage 
of hindsight distorts the reasonableness inquiry in fourth amendment cases.  Once we know that a 
search did turn up evidence of crime, we are more likely to view as well-founded suspicions which 
at the time would have appeared groundless, and arbitrary action of police as intuitive and 
discerning.”).  The Supreme Court occasionally has expressed a similar thought.  See United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976) (stating that warrants serve “to prevent hindsight from 
coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure”); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964) (stating that a warrantless arrest “bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective 
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-
the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar 
shortcomings of hindsight judgment”). 
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judgment that probable cause exists—not the warrant application 
procedure or the actual piece of paper called the warrant.319 
Though the centerpiece of the warrant requirement’s privacy 
protections is the interposed judgment of the neutral and detached 
magistrate, the warrant application process also generates protections of 
its own.  These protections may be effective in protecting citizen privacy 
even when the magistrate fails to do his job.  First, the warrant 
application process tends to prevent bad searches by raising the costs of 
conducting a search.  Police officers are less likely to go to the trouble of 
obtaining a warrant if they are not fairly confident that a search will be 
fruitful, and the discipline of making the case for a search to another 
person in writing may lead police to recognize gaps in their evidence that 
need filling in.320  Second, the warrant application process generates a 
valuable record for judicial review and ensures that there is no confusion 
between what was known to police before and after the search.321  
Numerous commentators have recast this last benefit of the warrant 
requirement in more cynical terms: warrants make it harder for police to 
circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by committing 
perjury.322 
The warrant requirement also serves to constrain police discretion in 
the execution of searches.  First, the textual requirement that warrants 
particularly describe the place to be searched and the items to be seized 
serves to prevent general searches and to control the discretion of 
executing officers by controlling the scope of authorized intrusions.323  
                                                     
 319. In making ex ante probable-cause determinations, the magistrate is, of course, constrained 
by the requirements for both probable cause and particularity: the magistrate must assure herself that 
there is probable cause to search this particular place for these particular items.  See United States v. 
Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he requirement of particularity backs up the 
requirement that warrants not issue except on probable cause by preventing the searching for and 
seizure of items that there is no probable cause to believe are either contraband or evidence of a 
crime.”). 
 320. See infra notes 343–59 and accompanying text. 
 321. See United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 757 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he applicant for the 
warrant is committing to a public record the information that is known before the search so that, after 
the search takes place, there is no confusion between the ex-post and ex-ante positions of the 
applicant.” (quoting S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 
57 (1980))). 
 322. See infra notes 331–42 and accompanying text. 
 323. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).  The particularity requirement actually 
serves as a check on general searches both by structuring the magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination and by constraining official discretion in the execution of the warrant.  As Judge 
Posner has explained, the particularity requirement backs up the probable-cause requirement in two 
steps: 
The police . . . officer who is seeking the warrant must submit to the judicial officer a 
precise description of what is sought to be seized, so that the judicial officer can 
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Second, warrants “assure[] the individual whose property is searched or 
seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, 
and the limits of his power to search.”324  These functions are primarily 
served by the warrant itself (i.e., the actual piece of paper); thus, some 
facial problems with a warrant may render it invalid even when the 
magistrate has made a proper probable-cause determination and the 
search has stayed within the bounds set by the magistrate.325 
Allowing suppression hearing testimony to cure probable-cause 
deficiencies in the affidavit does not implicate those functions of the 
warrant requirement that deal exclusively with the execution of 
warrants—namely, the control of official discretion in the execution of 
the search and the “assurance function.”  It affects only those functions 
aimed at reducing the likelihood of a search without probable cause.  As 
we have seen, there are several different ways in which the warrant 
process serves to prevent bad searches. 
The most important check against bad searches is the interposed 
judgment of the neutral and detached magistrate.  If I were writing on a 
                                                                                                                       
 
determine whether a valid law enforcement purpose would be served by the seizure of all 
items fitting the description.  The description is then written into . . . the warrant in order 
to make sure that the law enforcement officer who executes the warrant stays within the 
bounds set by the issuer. 
Stefonek, 179 F.3d at 1033. 
 324. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).  Courts have not been entirely clear about the nature and extent of this 
“assurance function,” as was evidenced by the Supreme Court’s decision in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551 (2004).  The warrant in Groh was invalid because it completely failed to particularize the 
things to be seized because of a clerical error by the affiant.  The officer argued that the purposes of 
the particularity requirement had been satisfied because a magistrate had found probable cause to 
search for all the items listed in the affidavit and the search had remained within the bounds intended 
by the magistrate.  Id. at 560–61.  The majority opinion rejected this argument partly on the ground 
that the warrant in the case totally failed to satisfy the assurance function, which the Court treated as 
an important purpose of the particularity requirement.  Id. at 561–62 & n.5.  In dissent, Justice 
Thomas belittled this argument, noting that “neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 requires an officer to serve the warrant on the searchee before the search.”  
Id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  In the Ninth Circuit panel opinion affirmed by Groh, Judge 
Kozinski suggested that the particularity requirement also serves to enable the search target to 
monitor the conduct of the search to ensure that it stays within the bounds set by the magistrate, and 
concluded that the warrant in question totally failed to serve this “monitoring” function.  Ramirez v. 
Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2002) aff’d sub nom., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551 (2004).  But cf. Stefonek, 179 F.3d at 1034–35 (rejecting the argument that the particularity 
requirement serves a monitoring function and instead suggesting that the assurance function of 
warrants is designed only “to head off breaches of the peace by dispelling any suggestion that the 
search is illegitimate”). 
 325. Again, Groh is a good example.  There, the Court held that a particularity defect on the face 
of the warrant rendered a search invalid even though the warrant application made it clear that the 
officers executed the search in accordance with the magistrate’s intentions and that probable cause 
supported the scope of the search the magistrate intended to authorize. 
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blank slate, I would ask how the various possible approaches to the use 
of suppression hearing testimony in the good-faith inquiry might affect 
the likelihood that magistrates will exercise the kind of judgment 
envisioned by Justice Jackson.  For example, one might reasonably 
wonder whether magistrates would relax their scrutiny of warrant 
applications if they knew any errors they failed to catch could later be 
remedied by suppression hearing testimony.  Whatever force this line of 
thought might have in the abstract, Leon renders it irrelevant by 
assuming that magistrates are not influenced by the prospect that 
evidence will be suppressed.326  In any event, the issue considered in this 
Article arises only when the magistrate has already failed to serve her 
proper function because she was willing to approve a search based on 
information so lacking in probable cause that reasonable officers should 
have recognized the error.  We are therefore limited to examining how 
the various approaches to the use of suppression hearing testimony might 
affect the other ways in which the warrant requirement serves to prevent 
bad searches: the protections created by the discipline of the warrant 
application process and the record it creates.  It is these functions of the 
warrant process that are most sharply implicated by the issue of whether 
suppression hearing testimony can be used to establish an officer’s good 
faith.  Evaluation of the various possible approaches to the issue should 
turn, then, on their effects on these functions.  I begin by examining each 
function in turn. 
1. How Warrants Help Curb Police Perjury 
Police perjury is, of course, an extremely serious problem because it 
undermines all the protections of the Fourth Amendment.327  Though it 
is, for obvious reasons, difficult to know the exact scope of the problem, 
there is wide agreement that the problem is real.328  Many scholars have 
                                                     
 326. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916–17 (1984).  The majority was unmoved by Justice 
Brennan’s arguments in dissent that magistrates would have less incentive to attend to the warrant 
process if they knew that their errors would usually have no consequences under Leon.  Id. at 956 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 327. See Stuntz, supra note 317, at 916 (“Where perjury is successful, no substantive standard 
constrains police decisions to search.  The only constraint left is the officer’s ability and willingness 
to concoct a good story.”). 
 328. See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 107 (1992) (survey 
suggesting that between twenty and fifty percent of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges 
believe perjury is commonplace at suppression hearings).  For further discussions of the problem of 
police perjury, see generally Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311 (1994); 
Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996); David 
N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999); Donald 
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made suggestions about how to reduce the frequency of police perjury;329 
one of the most common suggestions is increasing the scope of the 
warrant requirement.330 
To appreciate why warrants are commonly thought to reduce police 
perjury, consider the typical differences between judicial review of 
warrant and warrantless searches.  In the case of a warrantless search, the 
first judicial determination of probable cause comes in the context of a 
suppression hearing.331  As Professor Stuntz has explained, the dynamics 
of the suppression hearing tend to facilitate police perjury in several 
ways.332  In deciding the suppression motion in a warrantless search case, 
the trial court must decide (1) whether to believe the officer’s testimony 
about his grounds for conducting the search, and (2) whether that 
testimony, if believed, is sufficient to show that the officer had probable 
cause for the search.333  In deciding whether the police officer’s 
testimony about his basis for the search is believable, the court faces an 
enormous “credibility gap” between the police officer and the defendant 
who would challenge the officer’s testimony.  By definition, police have 
uncovered incriminating evidence that often indicates the defendant’s 
probable guilt.334  This means that the defendant has an overwhelming 
incentive to lie, and often his character has already been called into doubt 
by the evidence presented against him.335  This credibility gap tempts 
                                                                                                                       
 
A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1996); 
Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in 
Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1993); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury 
and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The 
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1016 (1987). 
 329. See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 328, at 491–502 (advocating more aggressive exploration of 
police credibility on cross examination); Dripps, supra note 328, at 693–94 (advocating use of 
polygraphy). 
 330. See Cloud, Dirty Little Secret, supra note 328, at 1347 (discussing how rigorous 
enforcement of the warrant requirement could limit police perjury); Stuntz, supra note 317, at 915 
(explaining how the warrant requirement makes perjury more difficult). 
 331. Sometimes, though rarely, the first judicial examination of probable cause for a warrantless 
search will arise in the context of an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  My 
discussion here focuses on the more usual context in which the forum of review is a suppression 
hearing. 
 332. Stuntz, supra note 317, at 914–15. 
 333. Obviously, other issues (e.g., consent) requiring credibility judgments can arise in 
suppression hearings.  Focusing on review of the officer’s probable-cause judgment best serves the 
purposes of this Article. 
 334. See Stuntz, supra note 317, at 912 (“One of the prerequisites for the defendant’s fourth 
amendment claim—the existence of suppressible evidence of crime—tends to suggest that the 
defendant deserves punishment, not relief.”). 
 335. Id. at 914.  As Stuntz points out, judges recognize that police officers may also have 
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police to lie by making it easy for them to do so effectively.336  In 
addition, a police officer at a suppression hearing may be especially 
willing to lie to save the fruits of a search because the officer’s 
suspicions (whatever their original basis) have turned out to be 
justified.337  Finally, judges may be especially reluctant to discredit an 
officer’s testimony when the cost may be the release of a guilty 
defendant.338 
In warrant searches, on the other hand, a judicial officer first rules on 
the propriety of a search before it takes place.  The ex ante character of 
the warrant process works to reduce the likelihood of police perjury in 
several ways.  First, and most significantly, the warrant requirement 
makes perjury more difficult by making it easier to detect.  Because the 
process of applying for a warrant forces officers to commit to a story 
before they know all the evidence that ultimately will bear on the case 
(both from the search itself and from other sources not yet identified), 
they have a harder time lying in a way that will ultimately prove 
credible.339  Second, warrants may make perjury harder because a 
magistrate ruling on a warrant application must judge the credibility of 
the officer’s story without knowing whether the requested search will 
actually prove fruitful.  In contrast, a judge evaluating police credibility 
at a suppression hearing is likely to be influenced by the credibility gap 
discussed above.340  Third, it may be the case that police are less willing 
to lie to a magistrate than in a suppression hearing because they do not 
yet know whether the target of the requested search is a criminal.  In 
other words, the motivation to lie may be greater when the cost of 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
motives to lie.  In the ordinary case, however, these motives seem significantly weaker than the 
defendant’s motives and hence the credibility gap remains.  Id. 
 336. Id. at 914–15. 
 337. Id. at 915 & n.75. 
 338. The idea that judges may be reluctant to enforce the exclusionary rule because its most 
visible beneficiaries are the guilty is commonplace in the scholarly literature.  See, e.g., Dorfman, 
supra note 328, at 470–73; Mertens & Wasserstrom, Deregulating the Police, supra note 8, at 449. 
 339. See Stuntz, supra note 317, at 915 (stating that the warrant requirement makes perjury more 
difficult “since the officer cannot so easily manufacture details consistent with a story he does not 
yet know”); see also Bradley, supra note 207, at 292 (stating that warrants “make it more difficult 
for the police to fabricate probable cause on the basis of what was found instead of what was 
actually known in advance”). 
 340. The point is admittedly speculative.  On the one hand, an implausible account from an 
officer is easier to discredit when the judge does not yet know that the cost of disbelief may be the 
loss of a conviction—especially when disapproving the warrant application may simply prompt the 
police to conduct a more thorough investigation.  On the other hand, the casual ex parte character of 
the warrant process may impart a pro-government bias to magisterial review of warrant applications.  
See Stuntz, supra note 317, at 891. 
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truthfulness is the release of the guilty rather than a refusal of permission 
to search the possibly guilty.341 
If warrants generally make police perjury more difficult, what does 
this imply about using suppression hearing testimony to establish the 
officer’s good faith?  Under the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit, the 
perjury protections of the warrant process would be fully operative 
because there would be no opportunity to supplement the probable-cause 
showing made to the magistrate with post hoc testimony supporting 
probable cause.  In contrast, allowing suppression hearing testimony to 
supplement the showing made to the magistrate might partially 
reintroduce the temptations to perjury that the warrant process ordinarily 
helps to curtail.342  The officer would have the advantage of being able to 
tailor his testimony to all the evidence, the advantage of the credibility 
gap and hindsight bias, and a strong motive to lie.  On the other hand, 
allowing suppression hearing testimony to cure probable-cause 
deficiencies would not completely eliminate the perjury-reducing effects 
of the warrant requirement.  Unlike the situation with a warrantless 
search, the officer who seeks to establish his good faith through 
suppression hearing testimony has already gone on record about the 
circumstances justifying the search in the warrant application.  This 
creates some constraints on post hoc tailoring of testimony that are not 
present in a warrantless search.  Still, it seems plausible to think that 
allowing suppression hearing testimony to cure probable-cause 
deficiencies in the affidavit would lessen the warrant requirement’s 
protections against perjury at least to some extent.  The difficult question 
is whether that price is worth paying. 
2. How the Warrant Application Process Deters Bad Searches 
As Donald Dripps has emphasized, the discipline of the warrant 
application process may operate to prevent bad searches even when 
                                                     
 341. Id. at 915 n.75. 
 342. Even courts taking a permissive attitude toward suppression hearing testimony retain some 
check on perjury.  In determining whether information never presented to the magistrate proves the 
officer’s good faith, the trial court must still decide whether the officer is being truthful about what 
she knew at the time of the warrant application.  If the trial judge disbelieves the officer’s post hoc 
testimony—which sometimes happens, see Orfield, Heater Factor, supra note 328, at 107–08 
(discussing survey evidence suggesting that when judges grant suppression motions, it is often 
because they disbelieve the officer’s story)—she will disregard it and the evidence will be 
suppressed.  This kind of perjury check, however, is present even in warrantless searches.  The 
warrant process is supposed to provide additional checks against perjury.  For my purposes, the 
relevant question is how much these additional checks would be undermined if suppression hearing 
testimony were allowed to establish an officer’s good faith under Leon. 
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magistrate review is cursory.343  As Dripps points out, the existing 
empirical studies on the warrant process indicate that warrant searches 
tend to uncover evidence of crime in the vast majority of cases.344  This 
fact suggests that the warrant process is genuinely effective in protecting 
citizen privacy. 
One possible explanation for the fruitfulness of warrant searches is 
that magistrates are doing a good job of screening out bad warrant 
requests and insisting that officers make a strong showing of probable 
cause in their warrant applications.  There are a number of reasons, 
however, to doubt this theory.  First, the casual, ex parte character of the 
warrant application process is ill-suited to produce searching reviews of 
warrant applications.345 Second, existing empirical evidence suggests that 
magistrate review of warrant applications is often superficial.  A 1985 
study by the National Center for State Courts found that magistrates 
spent a median time of two minutes and twelve seconds reviewing each 
warrant application.346  Frequently, the magistrate failed to ask the officer 
even a single question about the application.347  It also appears that, 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s claims in Leon,348 some magistrates do 
see themselves as part of law enforcement.349  Third, the case law records 
numerous instances in which magistrates have been disturbingly lax in 
their reviews of warrant applications.350  Finally, many magistrates lack 
                                                     
 343. Dripps, supra note 8, at 923–33. 
 344. Id. at 925 (citing NCSC Study, supra note 80, for the proposition that in six of seven cities 
studied, between seventy-four and eighty-nine percent of warrant searches discovered at least some 
of the evidence named in the warrant). 
 345. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 970 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that 
magistrate determinations of probable cause “partake[] of the unreliability inherent in any ex parte 
proceeding”). 
 346. See NCSC Study, supra note 80, at 26–27 (reporting that magistrates spent more than five 
minutes reviewing warrant applications in only eleven percent of the cases and rejected only eight 
percent of the applications presented). 
 347. Id. at 26.  In addition, many of the questions magistrates did ask sought information already 
contained in the warrant application.  Id. at 49.  Professor Duke has suggested this “implies that the 
magistrate asked the question as a substitute for reading the application.”  Steven Duke, Making 
Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1408 (1986).  Duke also points out that, if anything, the data from 
the NCSC Study present an unrealistically favorable portrait of magisterial review because the 
magistrates at the study site knew they were being observed.  Id. at 1408 n.26. 
 348. 468 U.S. at 917 (emphasizing that magistrates are not “adjuncts to the law enforcement 
team” and therefore “have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions”). 
 349. See  NCSC Study, supra note 80, at xi (reporting finding in survey of Virginia magistrates 
that 11.4% of interviewed magistrates thought that they should generally grant warrant requests 
because “‘police have the best knowledge of the facts of the case’” (quoting NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
STATE COURTS, VIRGINIA ORGANIZATION STUDY 16 (1979))); id. at 47, 95 (reporting anecdotal 
evidence that some magistrates see their role as one of assisting the police). 
 350. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1312, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Leon despite issuing judge’s admission that he did not inquire about the possible staleness of the 
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legal training and so are reluctant to second guess police officers’ 
probable-cause judgments, especially when those judgments have been 
pre-screened by prosecuting attorneys.351  It is hardly surprising, then, 
that some commentators have described the “‘rubber stamp’ quality of 
magistrate review of warrant applications” as an “open scandal.”352  
While the empirical data is too sparse to be conclusive, there is surely 
reason to doubt whether magistrates are responsible for the apparent 
effectiveness of the warrant process in insuring that searches are 
productive. 
An alternative explanation, promoted most vigorously by Professor 
Dripps, is that the costs of the warrant application process lead police to 
screen warrant searches for probable cause more rigorously than they 
screen warrantless searches.353  Because police must often go to 
considerable time and trouble to obtain a warrant,354 they will not try to 
                                                                                                                       
 
information supporting probable cause because he had signed warrants for the affiant for years and 
therefore “‘wouldn’t expect him to bring me a stale warrant’”); United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 
773, 777 (8th Cir. 1992) (suppressing evidence where magistrate signed the warrant without reading 
it); United States v. Breckenridge, 782 F.2d 1317, 1321–22 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Leon even 
though the magistrate failed to read the supporting affidavit because it appeared to the officers that 
the magistrate was acting in a “neutral and detached” manner). 
 351. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1183–87 (discussing the required qualifications for 
magistrates).  In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350–52 (1972), the Supreme Court 
rejected a constitutional challenge to an ordinance permitting non-lawyer municipal court clerks to 
issue certain arrest warrants.  For a particularly colorful account of magistrates’ limitations, see State 
v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762, 777–78 (W. Va. 1986) (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that it is unfair to hold state magistrates to the standards of federal magistrates because 
their levels of education, training, and pay are so much lower). 
 352. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 311, at 34. 
 353. See Dripps, supra note 8, at 923–33 (“What we know about search warrants strongly 
suggests that [the costs of obtaining warrants], and not the exclusionary rule, explain the surprising 
success of the warrant process.”). 
 354. According to the NCSC Study, supra note 80, at 19, 66–68, officers view the time and 
hassle involved in the warrant process as a significant disincentive.  As one officer put it, “‘search 
warrants are double the time, sometimes triple the time that you take on arrest warrants, and arrest 
warrants are long enough.  Arrest warrants, you figure half a day.’”  Id. at 19.  Courts report the 
average time required to get a warrant as between two and four hours.  Sklansky, supra note 101, at 
1252 & n.69 (collecting cases).  The perceived hassle of getting a warrant may, of course, lead 
police to rely on exceptions to the warrant requirement (e.g., exceptions for consent and exigent 
circumstances).  See NCSC Study, supra note 80, at 19 (quoting officer’s claim that because of the 
hassle of obtaining a warrant, the officer tried in the first instance to “‘work some other method’” 
such as obtaining consent to search).  Yet when a warrant is the only legal route, as it often is when 
police seek to search a suspect’s residence, the costs of the warrant process work to significantly 
deter police from undertaking speculative searches. 
 Although allowing telephonic warrants might reduce the time and difficulty of obtaining a 
warrant, so far relatively few jurisdictions have approved such a procedure.  See Sklansky, supra 
note 101, at 1249–59.  Whether telephonic warrants are, on the whole, a good thing depends on the 
quality of the magistrate’s review.  To the extent magistrates can be trusted to perform a searching 
ex ante review, telephonic warrants probably increase citizen privacy by increasing the number of 
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do so unless they have a relatively high degree of certainty that the 
search will be fruitful.355  This means that even if magistrate review is 
usually cursory, the warrant process can still protect privacy by leading 
police to discipline themselves.356 
Dripps’s explanation for the high success rate of warrant searches 
emphasizes the mundane realities of the search warrant application 
process: filling out paperwork, waiting for an available magistrate, etc.  
These “queuing costs” may be an important part of the protection 
provided by the warrant requirement because any obstacles that increase 
the costs of searching make it somewhat less likely that police will 
search on an inadequate basis.  In addition to these queuing costs, 
however, the process of preparing a warrant application also imposes on 
police officers the valuable discipline of having to sit down and write out 
precisely why they believe they have probable cause to search.357  
Perhaps the effort to justify a search to a neutral third party causes police 
to exercise greater care in their own probable-cause judgments.358 
                                                                                                                       
 
searches that will be vetted by the warrant process.  To the extent that magistrate review is 
perfunctory and the primary protection of the warrant process is self-imposed, telephonic warrants 
may reduce citizen privacy by lowering the costs of the warrant process.  For further discussion of 
telephonic warrants, see generally Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using 
Magistrates, Incentives, and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 293 (1996); Justin H. Smith, Note, Press One for Warrant: 
Reinventing the Fourth Amendment’s Search Warrant Requirement Through Electronic Procedures, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1591 (2002). 
 355. The statement in the text oversimplifies to some degree.  In investigations of certain 
crimes—e.g., the murder of a fellow police officer—the perceived importance of gathering evidence 
is so great that police may be willing to incur the costs of the warrant process even when the 
probability of discovering evidence is relatively low.  See Dripps, supra note 8, at 925–26 n.18.  
Such cases are relatively rare, however, and can be seen as exceptions that prove the rule. 
 356. For this reason, Professor Dripps’s assessment of Leon was less dire than most other 
reactions at the time.  Compare id. at 928 (suggesting that “Leon probably will not have much 
deleterious impact on police willingness to seek dubious warrants” because “[a]bsent a strong 
expectation of success, the police will not undertake the cost”) with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (memorably remarking that in light of the Leon decision, 
“[i]t now appears that the Court’s victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete”). 
 357. See Bradley, supra note 207, at 292 (describing as “the most important aspect of the 
warrant” the fact “that it forces the police to stop, think, write down their evidence, and submit it to 
someone else for approval”); Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1182 (stating that the NCSC Study found 
that “going through the process of filling out a warrant application, and thinking through the factors 
upon which an assessment of probable cause will be based, forces the police to take the probable 
cause requirement, and thus the right to privacy, more seriously”); Christopher Slobogin, An 
Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory Approaches to Police 
Regulation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 437 (2001) (citing the NCSC Study in support of the claim 
that research “firmly suggest[s]” that “warrants raise police officers’ ‘standard of care’ when they 
decide whether to conduct a search”). 
 358. Privacy is further enhanced when pre-screening by a prosecutor is a standard part of the 
warrant application process.  See Dripps, supra note 8, at 930 (explaining how pre-screening 
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In sum, both the queuing costs of the warrant process and the 
discipline of filling out the warrant application may protect privacy by 
leading police to constrain themselves.  This self-restraint may help to 
protect citizen privacy to some degree even when the magistrate does not 
live up to the job description Justice Jackson envisioned.359  It follows 
that even in cases where the magistrate has issued a warrant based on an 
affidavit falling far short of probable cause, we still need to ask how 
allowing suppression hearing testimony to cure probable-cause 
deficiencies will affect the Fourth Amendment protections that officers 
impose on themselves through the warrant application process. 
C. Framing the Possible Rules for the Use of Suppression Hearing 
Testimony to Establish Good Faith 
To briefly summarize the argument so far, the proper question to ask 
in assessing the officer’s good faith under Leon is whether the officer 
could have entertained an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant 
was properly issued.  This way of posing the question makes it clear that 
the officer has an obligation to assure himself that the magistrate has 
properly performed her role, an obligation that requires the officer to 
look at the process from the magistrate’s point of view.  Deciding 
whether a magistrate acted properly in issuing a warrant requires, among 
other things, that the officer ask himself whether the magistrate’s 
probable-cause determination was reasonable in light of the materials 
presented to her.  This means that information not presented to the 
magistrate can only be relevant to the officer’s good faith if the officer 
actually believed that he told the magistrate all he knew.  In other words, 
suppression hearing testimony can be relevant to the good-faith question 
only if the officer made a mistake about what he put in front of the 
magistrate.  The real question, then, is whether this kind of mistake can 
ever be regarded as objectively reasonable under Leon.  I have suggested 
that we should evaluate the possible answers to this question by 
examining their potential effects on the two privacy-protection functions 
the warrant process still serves even when the magistrate has failed to 
properly perform her role: checking police perjury and encouraging 
                                                                                                                       
 
procedures improve the reliability of warrants); NCSC Study, supra note 80, at 20–21 (noting that 
prosecutorial pre-screening of warrant applications is one benefit of the warrant process). 
 359. There is no doubt some interdependence here.  If officers think that magistrate scrutiny of 
warrant applications will be cursory and that magistrate decisions are essentially unreviewable, they 
will not feel a great deal of pressure to convincingly articulate their grounds for finding probable 
cause in their warrant applications. 
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greater self-restraint by officers.  (For ease of exposition, I shall refer to 
these two aspects of the analysis as the “perjury variable” and the 
“discipline of the warrant process” variable.)  These are the protections 
that might be lost if courts allow suppression hearing testimony to 
establish the officer’s good faith. 
As I noted above, anything less than a bright-line rule against the use 
of suppression hearing testimony in the good-faith inquiry threatens to 
lessen these protections to some degree.  It might seem, then, that my 
analysis points inexorably toward the ultimate embrace of the Ninth 
Circuit view.  But matters are not so simple as that.  For one thing, Leon 
counsels against bright-line rules in this area, insisting that suppression 
where the officer has obtained a warrant should be ordered only on a 
case-by-case basis.360  More significantly, there are law enforcement 
costs on the other side of the ledger that must be considered as well.  If 
the point of the exclusionary rule is to protect privacy by changing police 
behavior, one must also consider that any bright-line rule will sometimes 
result in the exclusion of evidence when neither perjury prevention nor 
care in the warrant process are implicated.  A closer look, then, is 
required. 
There are three possible positions with respect to both the perjury 
variable and the discipline of the warrant process variable.  With respect 
to the perjury variable, the first approach would adopt a bright-line rule 
against using suppression hearing testimony to rehabilitate deficient 
affidavits.  A second, permissive approach would allow the use of 
suppression hearing testimony so long as the government could convince 
the court that the testimony was truthful by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  A third approach would allow the use of suppression hearing 
testimony subject to some heightened proof standard, such as clear and 
convincing evidence.  The possible approaches to the discipline in the 
warrant process variable are distinguished by their different answers to 
the question of what counts as a reasonable mistake in the warrant 
application process.  Under the first approach, there would be no such 
thing as a reasonable mistake and police officers would essentially be 
required to achieve perfection in the warrant application process.  A 
second approach would say that any inadvertent mistake counted as 
reasonable.  A third approach would impose a duty of reasonable care in 
the warrant process while recognizing the possibility of objectively 
reasonable mistakes that need not result in the suppression of evidence. 
                                                     
 360. See Leon, 486 U.S. at 918  (stating that suppression of evidence secured under the authority 
of a warrant “should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in 
which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule”). 
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Putting together the options for both variables suggests the following 
five possible rules: 
 (1) Suppression hearing testimony can be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith if the omission from the affidavit was 
inadvertent and the prosecution can prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the information was known to the affiant at the 
time of the warrant application.361 
 (2) Suppression hearing testimony can be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith if the omission from the affidavit was 
inadvertent and the prosecution can prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the information was known to the 
affiant at the time of the warrant application.362 
 (3) Suppression hearing testimony can be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith if the omission resulted from a reasonable 
mistake and the prosecution can prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information was known to the affiant at the 
time of the warrant application.363 
 (4) Suppression hearing testimony can be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith if the omission resulted from a reasonable 
mistake and the prosecution can prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the information was known to the affiant at the 
time of the warrant application.364 
 (5) Suppression hearing testimony can never be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith.365 
It will, I hope, be apparent that option (1) is essentially a 
reconstructed366 version of the Eighth Circuit view, while option (5) is 
essentially the Ninth Circuit view.  While the Eighth Circuit takes a 
                                                     
 361. In other words, Leon would apply to all but Type I cases so long as the trial court believes 
the suppression hearing testimony. 
 362. In other words, Leon would apply to all but Type I cases so long as the truthfulness of the 
suppression hearing testimony is proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
 363. In other words, Leon would apply only in Type III and IV cases so long as the trial court 
believes the suppression hearing testimony. 
 364. In other words, Leon would apply only in Type III and IV cases so long as the truthfulness 
of the suppression hearing testimony is proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
 365. In other words, Leon would never apply in any case where the materials presented to the 
magistrate were insufficient to support reasonable reliance by the officer. 
 366. I say “reconstructed” because some of the language in cases adopting the Eighth Circuit 
view implies that information not presented to the magistrate can always be used to establish good 
faith.  For reasons explained earlier, see supra note 204 and accompanying text, I doubt that any 
court would go so far in practice. 
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minimalist approach to both variables, the Ninth Circuit takes a 
maximalist approach.  I believe that the fourth option is the most 
appropriate approach within the framework created by Leon.  Courts 
should allow the use of suppression hearing testimony to rehabilitate a 
deficient affidavit under Leon only if the omission resulted from a 
reasonable mistake in preparing the warrant application and the officer’s 
knowledge at the time of the warrant application is proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.  In explaining my reasons for this position, I shall 
begin with discussion of the discipline of the warrant process variable 
and then move on to discuss remaining questions about perjury.367 
D. A Duty of Reasonable Care in the Warrant Application Process 
The options here are (1) regarding all mistakes in the warrant 
application process as unreasonable, (2) regarding all inadvertent errors 
as reasonable, and (3) distinguishing between reasonable and 
unreasonable mistakes.  In arguing for the third, middle path, the 
challenge is to counter objections from both sides. 
1. Why There Must Be Some Duty of Care 
The Eighth Circuit approach takes the position that so long as the 
suppression hearing testimony is truthful and the officer actually had 
probable cause for the search at the time of the warrant application, there 
                                                     
 367. The options described above leave out one possibility that some might find attractive.  
Whereas the critical line in my position is that between Type II and Type III cases, one might instead 
attempt to draw the critical line between Type III minor omission cases and Type IV pure 
transmission error cases.  This approach would distinguish those cases where the officer’s error was 
insufficient attention to all the elements of probable cause from those where the only error was in the 
mechanical process of filling out forms.  It might be thought that errors in the process of thinking 
critically about whether the evidence amounts to probable cause are more culpable than pure 
transmission errors, and also more likely to be prevented by increased training.  I see two problems 
with this approach.  First, I find it difficult to regard the officer errors in cases like Procopio as much 
more culpable or preventable than those in pure transmission error cases.  Second, there will often be 
no evidence beyond the officer’s post hoc testimony that courts could use to draw the line between 
Type III and Type IV cases.  Courts should not be asked to administer a line that turns on the 
difference between post hoc testimony stating, “I thought about the staleness issue but forgot to put 
my conclusions in the affidavit,” and post hoc testimony stating, “I assumed the evidence was not 
stale, but never really thought about the basis for my conclusion.”  The only administrable line 
between Type III and Type IV cases would require that the transmission error be proved by 
“objective circumstances” (e.g., the initial arrest warrant application in Corrigan) rather “the 
officer’s post hoc testimony as to his state of mind.”  People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1160 n.4 
(Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Dubofsky, J., concurring).  That line, though administrable, would be barely 
distinguishable in practice from the Ninth Circuit view because “objective circumstances” proving 
transmission error will seldom exist. 
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is no point in suppressing evidence.368  In such a case, the officer has 
done an adequate investigation and has secured a warrant by submitting 
an affidavit that exceeded the bare-bones standard.  By hypothesis, the 
officer’s only shortcoming is that he should have been more careful in 
preparing the warrant application.  The Eighth Circuit position asks why 
we should care that the officer did a poor job of filling out forms, and 
implies that the question has no answer.  This position has intuitive 
appeal for a number of reasons. 
First, mistakes—even fairly significant mistakes—in filling out the 
warrant application do not seem like the sort of police misconduct the 
exclusionary rule was meant to deter.  Though the Court has allowed for 
the possibility that negligent police errors might still warrant 
suppression,369 the errors in some cases (e.g., Corrigan370 and 
Procopio371) seem so innocuous that it is difficult to muster any moral 
indignation about them. 
Second, some errors in the warrant application process are likely 
ineliminable by even the most rigorous training programs.  As Justice 
Kennedy pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Groh, “[w]e all tend 
toward myopia when looking for our own errors.  Every lawyer and 
every judge can recite examples of documents that they wrote, checked, 
and double checked, but that still contained glaring errors.  Law 
enforcement officers are no different.”372  Can one really imagine, for 
example, that the officer in Corrigan would have remembered to address 
staleness in the search-warrant application if he had been trained more 
comprehensively in Fourth Amendment requirements?373  Because Leon 
teaches that suppression is only appropriate when it will have some 
effect on the conduct of individual police officers or their departments,374 
suppression makes no sense in the case of ineliminable errors because 
the costs of exclusion would necessarily trump the deterrence benefits. 
Third, inadvertent omissions in the warrant application process do 
not seem to threaten substantive Fourth Amendment rights so long as the 
                                                     
 368. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Eighth Circuit approach). 
 369. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 (2004) (rejecting officer’s argument that merely 
negligent police errors should automatically be entitled to qualified immunity).  Because the 
standards for qualified immunity and the good faith exception are the same, Malley v. Briggs, 475 
U.S. 335, 344 (1986), Groh means negligent police errors can warrant suppression. 
 370. United States v. Corrigan, 809 F. Supp 567 (M.D. Tenn 1992). 
 371. United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 372. Groh, 540 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See also Alschuler, supra note 19, at 345 
(observing that “the prospect of exclusion seems very unlikely to reduce the chance that an official 
would carelessly overlook the critical language of a warrant when he sought to alter it”). 
 373. For discussion of the facts of  Corrigan, see supra notes 293–301 and accompanying text. 
 374. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). 
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police officer really had probable cause for the search.  The person 
searched would seem to be no worse off than if the police had used 
greater care in putting together the warrant application.  Nor can the 
search target complain about the loss of any procedural rights because 
the officer, after all, did use the proper channels by applying for the 
warrant in the first place.  Indeed, strict application of the exclusionary 
rule in an inadvertent omission case threatens to penalize the officer for 
the ex parte character of the warrant process.  If it were possible to test 
the warrant application by an adversarial process before the search, the 
application’s shortcomings would presumably be identified and the 
officer could fill in the gaps.  Informed, skeptical questioning by the 
magistrate is supposed to substitute for the adversarial process, but that 
sort of questioning occurs all too seldom.  In sum, the distinctive feature 
of cases where the officer omits information supporting probable cause 
from the warrant application is that the officer’s error is of a sort that is 
made possible by the warrant requirement and would not exist without it.  
Where the error could have been corrected through vigilant scrutiny of 
the affidavit and warrant by the magistrate, suppressing the evidence 
appears to penalize the officer for the ex parte character of the process.  
From this point of view, it is understandable that some courts are 
tempted to lay all blame at the feet of the magistrate. 
Nonetheless, there are reasons for imposing (at the very least) some 
duty of reasonable care in the warrant application process.  As we have 
already seen, the warrant application process works to protect privacy by 
leading officers to police themselves.  The costs of obtaining a warrant 
and the discipline of having to articulate in writing one’s basis for a 
search likely cut off many bad searches before the officer ever gets to the 
magistrate.375  This, as Professor Dripps has explained, is a plausible 
explanation for the high success rate of warrant searches.376  A rule 
forgiving any inadvertent omission works to undermine this protection 
by telling officers that the application process does not matter.   
While it is true that some types of errors in the warrant application 
process are probably ineliminable, not all are.  Indeed, the distinction 
between Type II cases (like the Eighth Circuit’s Martin case and 
Carpenter) and Type III cases is principally one between errors in the 
application process that can be influenced by training and those that 
cannot.  Where an officer fails altogether to address some critical 
element of the probable-cause showing, such as the requirement of a 
                                                     
 375. See Dripps, supra note 8, at 923–33. 
 376. Id. 
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nexus between the place to be searched and criminal activity, the officer 
has not approached the task of demonstrating probable cause with 
sufficient seriousness and thus has compromised one of the protections 
of the warrant process.  A mistake in the warrant process that reflects a 
cavalier approach should not count as objectively reasonable even if the 
officer actually had probable cause for the search at the time of the 
warrant application.  Thus suppression is still appropriate in Type II 
cases.  This means that there are cases in which courts should suppress 
evidence because of an officer’s carelessness in the warrant application 
process even though they are convinced that the officer actually had 
probable cause for the search at the time of the warrant application.  
Courts would not relish this prospect, especially in “heater” cases,377 but 
the alternative would significantly undermine the integrity of the warrant 
process by telling police officers that a warrant is nothing more than a 
piece of paper.  The Eighth Circuit-style rule of excusing all inadvertent 
omissions from the warrant application exacerbates the “lack of acoustic 
separation” problem discussed in Part II.378  To the extent officers hear 
the message that ordinary carelessness has no consequences, the self-
imposed protections of the warrant process emphasized by Dripps wither 
away.   
Once it is recognized that there must be some duty of reasonable care 
in the warrant application process and that not all mistakes count as 
reasonable, the obvious question is where and how to draw the line 
between the reasonable and the unreasonable mistakes.  I return to that 
question below, but I first address a challenge to my position that comes 
from the opposite side.  Why, it may be asked, should the law recognize 
the existence of objectively reasonable mistakes in the warrant 
application process?  Why should an officer’s failure to recognize a gap 
between her information supporting probable cause and her warrant 
application ever count as reasonable? 
                                                     
 377. A “heater case” is one involving a great deal of public or departmental pressure to find the 
criminal and secure a conviction.  See Orfield, Heater Factor, supra note 328, at 116–17.  The 
murder of a police officer or public figure is a paradigmatic heater case.  According to Orfield’s 
Chicago field study, both officers and judges agree that judicial commitment to Fourth Amendment 
values sometimes wavers in heater cases.  Id. at 117–19. 
 378. See supra notes 87–107 and accompanying text. 
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2. Why Perfection is the Wrong Standard for Police Officers Even if it 
is the Right Standard for Police Clerks 
The Ninth Circuit approach would answer these questions by saying 
that officers cannot make reasonable mistakes about the contents of their 
warrant applications.  In other words, a reasonably well-trained officer 
would always manage to tell the magistrate everything that she knew and 
would scrutinize the warrant application carefully enough to recognize 
any gaps and fill them in.  At first glance, this argument might seem a bit 
strange.  We naturally resonate with Justice Kennedy’s observation that 
even the most careful among us will not detect every error.379  Further, 
the existing law of probable cause and good faith seems already to 
incorporate the notion of reasonable mistake.  An officer can have 
probable cause for a search even though she is reasonably mistaken 
about one of the factual assumptions justifying the search,380 and Leon 
allows both magistrates and police officers to make reasonable mistakes 
about whether a given set of facts satisfies the legal concept of probable 
cause.381  Why, then, should we expect an officer to be perfect when it 
comes to filling out and/or proofreading warrant applications?  
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to recognize objectively 
reasonable mistakes in the warrant application process cannot be so 
easily dismissed. 
First of all, there are circumstances in which the law defines the 
level of reasonable care as perfection.  For example, Professor Grady’s 
work calls attention to the “no-forgetting” rule in tort law, which holds 
that the reasonable person always remembers to take cost-justified 
precautions.382  Prevailing tort doctrine thus teaches that “if it is 
reasonable on a single occasion to check a dial or look for a train, it is 
reasonable on all occasions to do so.”383  According to Grady, this no-
forgetting rule is problematic because it ignores some of the costs of 
careful behavior.384  In economic terms, the costs of using “nondurable 
                                                     
 379. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 568 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 380. See Alschuler, supra note 19 at 331–32 (explaining that the concept of probable cause 
already makes allowance for reasonable-factual mistakes by law enforcement officers).  But cf. 
supra note 219 (acknowledging that the analogy between reasonable mistakes in the probable-cause 
context and reasonable mistakes in the warrant application is not perfect). 
 381. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
 382. Mark Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the 
Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 293, 302–10 (1988). 
 383. Id. at 306. 
 384. Id. 
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precautions”385 such as remembering to signal and check the blind spot 
before changing lanes include both “precaution costs” (the burdens of 
looking over the shoulder and turning on the signal) and “compliance 
costs” (the burdens of remembering and noticing to signal and check the 
blind spot).386  Because remembering to use a precaution, like anything 
else, has a cost, Grady argues that the economically rational rate of 
compliance will be something less than one hundred percent and that the 
no-forgetting rule creates a pocket of strict liability within negligence 
law.387  Stripped of the economic trappings, the point is that even though 
human beings do not seem capable of perfect attentiveness, the law 
nonetheless demands perfection.  That sounds unfair, but the rule may be 
justified because too little attentiveness poses undue risks of harm to 
others and there is no way courts can reliably decide which individual 
episodes of inattentiveness were reasonable and which were not.  As 
Grady explains, 
If courts allowed forgetfulness as a defense, everyone would maintain 
that he forgot.  It requires much less information for courts to see 
whether a signal was given on a particular occasion than it does for 
them to assess whether someone had maintained the optimal rate of 
signals over a representative period of time.388 
Though drawing detailed analogies between the compliance errors 
discussed by Grady and errors made by police in warrant applications is 
not my purpose here, the analogy from tort law suggests that it is not 
unprecedented for the law to set the level of reasonable mistake for some 
kinds of errors at zero.  In addition, one rationale for the no-forgetting 
rule in tort law would also support a no-forgetting rule in the law of the 
good faith exception.  It is just as hard to imagine courts accepting 
compliance-rate arguments—“even though I forgot to address the nexus 
requirement in this affidavit, this is the first time I’ve ever forgotten”—in 
the good-faith context as in the negligence context. 
In addition, Fourth Amendment law sometimes does seem to expect 
perfection in mundane clerical tasks like filling out and reviewing 
warrants, affidavits, police records, and the like.  If a magistrate makes 
                                                     
 385. Nondurable precautions must be repeated frequently in order to be effective, whereas 
durable precautions (e.g., a safety guard on a piece of machinery) can promote safety on an ongoing 
basis.  Grady suggests that the economic approach to negligence analysis inspired by Judge Hand’s 
opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), applies more readily to 
durable than to nondurable precautions. 
 386. Grady, supra note 382, at 302. 
 387. Id. at 306–7. 
 388. Id. at 307. 
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an error in preparing or proofreading a warrant, we of course say that the 
magistrate erred and that the warrant was invalid even though the 
evidence will probably be admitted under Leon anyway.  Other pockets 
of strict liability in Fourth Amendment law have more bite.  Consider 
errors by police clerks in maintaining records of outstanding arrest 
warrants.  Although Arizona v. Evans389 held that such errors by court 
clerks can be excused under the good faith exception, most courts have 
refused to apply Leon to similar clerical errors by law enforcement 
personnel.390  And this is true although even the most conscientious 
police clerks will occasionally make a clerical error in updating police 
records.  The law holds them to a standard of perfection, and presumably 
does so for reasons similar to those that justify tort law’s no-forgetting 
rule.  Because there is no way to tell whether a police clerk’s error rate is 
optimal or not, it may be impossible as a practical matter to achieve the 
correct amount of deterrence.  The choice is one of overdeterrence/strict 
liability or underdeterrence; and because the consequences of 
underdeterrence (i.e., unjustified arrests, etc.) are significant, 
overdeterrence seems the better course.  It seems puzzling to say that 
Fourth Amendment law should hold police clerks to a higher standard in 
clerical tasks than police officers, for there is no reason why clerks 
should be more proficient in these tasks than police officers.  When one 
adds to these considerations the fact that a bright-line rule requiring 
perfection in the warrant application process preserves all the perjury-
reducing benefits of the warrant process, the case for adopting the Ninth 
Circuit approach seems fairly strong. 
These arguments, however, ultimately fail to show that every error in 
the warrant application process should be punished with suppression.  
The real question under Leon is not simply whether the reasonable police 
officer is better than the reasonable police clerk at clerical functions.  
The real question is whether there is anything to be gained by 
suppression, and that depends on the likelihood that suppression will 
influence the relevant actors and that changes in their behavior will affect 
substantive Fourth Amendment values.  I can illustrate the point by 
considering how courts have treated clerical errors by magistrates and 
clerks under Leon and Evans. 
When a magistrate issues a search warrant that is insufficiently 
particular or is unsupported by probable cause, citizen privacy is at 
                                                     
 389. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 390. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
TAYLOR FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:58 AM 
236 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
risk.391  No matter how egregious the magistrate’s error, however, 
suppression usually will be inappropriate in such a case because the 
Supreme Court has decreed that magistrates cannot be influenced by the 
prospect of suppression.392  Suppression of evidence obtained because of 
the magistrate’s faulty review is appropriate only when it will affect 
police officers or other officials who are part of the law enforcement 
team.  The same analysis applies to the court clerks in Evans—their 
mistakes in maintaining up-to-date arrest warrant records certainly put 
the privacy of citizens at risk, but the Court refused to suppress anyway 
because the clerks, not being adjuncts of law enforcement, would not be 
influenced to be more careful by the prospect of exclusion. 
In contrast, mistakes made by police clerks pose a more complicated 
case.  Police clerks, as “adjuncts of law enforcement,” can generally be 
influenced by the prospect of suppression.  In addition, their mistakes in 
maintaining law enforcement records put substantive privacy rights at 
risk.393  Both these points suggest that evidence should be suppressed 
when the Fourth Amendment is violated through police reliance on 
records created by police clerks.  A complication arises, however, 
because some types of clerical errors by police clerks (e.g., data entry 
errors) cannot be completely deterred.394  If the incentives created by 
suppression cannot induce perfect compliance, then at some point the 
application of the exclusionary rule penalizes law enforcement without 
any corresponding increase in privacy.  This creates a Fourth 
Amendment analogue to the pocket of strict liability within negligence 
doctrine discussed by Grady. 
What are the implications of this analysis for police officer errors in 
filling out warrant applications?  We know, of course, that as a general 
matter police officers are influenced by the prospect of exclusion—that 
is a fundamental assumption of Leon.  We also know that ordinarily 
                                                     
 391. There may be some situations where magistrate error does not threaten substantive privacy 
rights.  Perhaps Groh and Sheppard are such cases, for in those cases the magistrate’s errors were 
“harmless” to the search targets because the searches would have been carried out in exactly the 
same manner if the magistrates had done their jobs properly.  Cf. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 344–
45 (suggesting that the Court might have used harmless error analysis to justify the result in 
Sheppard). 
 392. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (stating that the exclusion of evidence 
cannot be expected to have a significant deterrent effect on judges or magistrates). 
 393. Distinguishing so sharply between court clerks and police clerks seems odd, but it is a 
natural byproduct of Leon’s tendency to lump various government officials into the categories of 
“deterrables” and “nondeterrables.”  That tendency is regrettable, see Alschuler, supra note 19, at 
351–57, but understanding it is essential to understanding Leon. 
 394. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 109–11 (1970) (explaining that there are 
limits to the effectiveness of deterrence because individuals cannot control all their acts). 
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suppression is appropriate when an officer errs by submitting a warrant 
application so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable 
officer would rely upon it.  In the ordinary case where the application 
contains all the information supporting probable cause gathered by the 
officer, suppression is appropriate because the submission of an affidavit 
unworthy of reliance will result in an unjustified search if the magistrate 
errs by issuing the warrant.  The situation looks different, however, if we 
assume that the officer actually had probable cause for the search and 
erred only in the process of filling out the warrant application.  Now 
errors by the magistrate will not result in searches unsupported by 
probable cause.395  Do these police clerical errors warrant application of 
the exclusionary rule? 
As in my prior discussion of the argument that all inadvertent 
mistakes in the warrant application should be excused, it is necessary 
here to distinguish different sorts of errors in the warrant application 
process.  In a Type II case like the Eighth Circuit’s Martin or Carpenter, 
the error is one that reflects carelessness on the part of the officer and can 
therefore be effectively deterred.  Fourth Amendment law should do all it 
can to encourage police officers to think carefully about whether the 
facts uncovered in their investigations add up to probable cause and to 
encourage their departments to train them to do so.  Even if the officer 
actually has probable cause for a particular search, deterring carelessness 
in the application process will reduce the number of bad searches over 
the long haul.396  In a Type III or IV case, on the other hand, the error 
may be one that even the most rigorous training programs would not 
eliminate.  If the error cannot be deterred and the officer actually has 
probable cause for the search, a rule requiring suppression seems to serve 
little Fourth Amendment purpose.  For these reasons, I conclude that 
courts need not suppress evidence in every case where error in the 
warrant application process renders the affidavit too scanty to support 
                                                     
 395. If the affidavit presented to the magistrate does not establish probable cause and the 
magistrate approves it, the warrant would be invalidly issued and there would be a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  The violation is peculiar, though, in that it is hard to see how the target of the 
search is harmed.  If the officer had filled out the application properly and/or the magistrate had done 
her job properly, the same search still would have taken place.  Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 
38–39, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 02-811), available at 2003 WL 22659269 
(suggesting that damages in the case could only be nominal because the same search would have 
taken place if the officer had properly filled out the warrant application). 
 396. The point here is structurally similar to the one the Court made in Agnello v. United States, 
269 U.S. 20 (1925).  There, the Court held that an officer’s failure to obtain a warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment and merited exclusion of the evidence even though it was undisputed that the 
officer had possessed probable cause for the search.  Id. at 33–35.  Exclusion was necessary to deter 
end runs of the warrant process because that process will reduce the number of bad searches over 
time, even if the search in the instant case was supported by probable cause. 
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reasonable reliance.  Instead, courts should treat officers as having a duty 
to exercise reasonable care in the warrant application process, and should 
suppress evidence only where the officer’s mistake is unreasonable.  This 
seems preferable to the all-or-nothing approaches taken by the Eighth 
and Ninth circuit views. 
3. Selective Transmission and the Meaning of “Reasonable Mistake” 
The tricky part, of course, is drawing the line between reasonable 
and unreasonable errors in the warrant application process.  If courts 
interpret the idea of reasonable error too broadly, all the difficulties 
caused by the breakdown of acoustic separation come back to the fore.  If 
officers begin to behave as though they have some comfortable margin 
for error in filling out the warrant application, the privacy protections 
imposed by the discipline of the warrant process are compromised and 
we are back on the slippery slope toward the problems generated by the 
Eighth Circuit view.  The notion of reasonable error only makes sense in 
cases where the officer’s error is of the sort that cannot be eliminated by 
training and would be just as likely to arise in a world that followed a 
bright-line rule like the Ninth Circuit’s.  In other words, the notion of 
reasonable error should be interpreted by courts in accordance with a 
strategy of “selective transmission”—narrowly enough that no officer 
would be comfortable relaxing his efforts in preparing the warrant 
application because of the prospect that reasonable errors would be 
forgiven.  Whenever an error might have been encouraged by the 
possibility of forgiveness under the good faith exception, no forgiveness 
should be forthcoming.397 
If interpreted along the lines suggested here, a rule allowing 
suppression hearing testimony to correct reasonable mistakes in the 
warrant application process makes sense on several levels.  First, it 
would reduce the strict liability component of Fourth Amendment law by 
removing penalties for unavoidable error without undermining the 
protections provided by the costs and discipline of the warrant 
application process.  Second, it would be consistent with the way the 
courts have treated “implicit reliance” cases like Procopio.  These cases 
uniformly (if inexplicitly) allow suppression hearing testimony to cure 
minor omissions from the affidavit and are very difficult to square with 
the hard-line approach taken by courts adopting the Ninth Circuit view.  
                                                     
 397. Again, Professor Dan-Cohen’s remark that a defense like duress “melt[s] away as soon as 
one relies upon [it]” is instructive.  Dan-Cohen, supra note 6, at 671. 
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Third, the rule would have the additional benefit of flatly ruling out the 
possibility of suppression hearing perjury in those cases where the risk of 
perjury is greatest: Type I and Type II cases where the gaps in the 
affidavit to be filled by suppression testimony are larger. 
E. What About Perjury? 
I have argued that, if properly developed and interpreted, a rule 
allowing suppression hearing testimony to cure reasonable mistakes in 
the warrant application process would recognize the limits of deterrence 
without undermining the privacy protections created by the discipline of 
the warrant application process.  That dispenses with one argument for 
the Ninth Circuit view.  What, though, of the warrant application 
process’s role in preventing perjury?  Do concerns about perjury 
prevention provide an alternative justification for a bright-line rule 
forbidding the use of suppression hearing testimony to establish the 
officer’s good faith? 
Perhaps the strongest argument for the Ninth Circuit approach is that 
anything short of a bright-line prohibition against the use of suppression 
hearing testimony to establish good faith threatens to rob the warrant 
process of at least some of its effects in curtailing police perjury.  The 
weakness of the Ninth Circuit’s rule is that, like any bright-line rule, it 
can potentially sweep much broader than its justification.  In this context, 
the point is especially troubling because some of the reported cases 
appear to involve little or no risk of police perjury.  In Corrigan, for 
example, the arrest warrant application made it clear that the officer 
knew the information was fresh at the time of his application for the 
search warrant and simply made a transmission error in filling out the 
second application.398  In Procopio, the facts of the case virtually 
eliminated the possibility that the officers lied in explaining how they 
knew that the suspect lived in the apartment to be searched.399  It seems, 
then, that on at least some occasions a bright-line rule would result in 
suppression even where there is little reason to doubt that police were 
being completely truthful. 
                                                     
 398. See United States v. Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. 567, 569 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (stating that the 
officer gave the date of an incriminating conversation with the defendant when applying for the 
arrest warrant, but not when applying for the search warrant). 
 399. See United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the officers 
discovered the correct address for the challenged search warrant while executing arrest and search 
warrants at the defendant’s building). 
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Whether this cost is worth paying depends on how good a job 
warrants actually do in reducing police perjury.  More precisely, it 
depends on whether the reduction in perjury from a bright-line rule 
would be outweighed by the number of cases in which evidence would 
be suppressed even though the police actually had probable cause.  This 
is, in principle, an empirical question, but we lack the data to answer it 
empirically and probably always will.  Having no choice but to engage in 
armchair speculation,400 I suggest that here the cost-benefit analysis 
probably speaks against a bright-line rule because there are significant 
limits on the extent to which the warrant application process can prevent 
perjury.401  If police are willing to lie, the lying can be displaced into 
other areas.402  For example, officers who find the warrant requirement 
too onerous can resort to consent searches—a prospect that is all too 
inviting because the Supreme Court has made the consent standard so 
easy to satisfy.403  If the defendant disputes the consensual nature of the 
search, the issue will be litigated in a suppression hearing where the 
officer will enjoy the full advantages of the credibility gap discussed by 
Professor Stuntz.404  The Court’s relatively permissive approach to 
confidential informants also limits the warrant requirement’s ability to 
curtail police perjury.  A police officer who wishes to beat the warrant 
requirement through perjury will not try to do so by leaving a gap in his 
affidavit and then trying to plug the gap with suppression hearing 
testimony.  Instead, he will lie up front—most likely by concocting a 
“reliable and confidential” informant.  As Stuntz has pointed out, there is 
                                                     
 400. Cf. Stuntz, supra note 317, at 935 (noting that arguments about warrants and police perjury 
involve “guesswork” and are “necessarily speculative”). 
 401. See id. at 937–41 (describing the difficulties and complications of using the warrant 
requirement to prevent police perjury). 
 402. See id. at 938 (“If the law prevents perjury in cases of one type but not in cases of another, a 
dishonest officer can simply re-describe the case, changing his story to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities the law gives him.”).  Professor Stuntz discusses the most well-known example of this 
phenomenon: one study found a substantial increase in the number of “dropsy cases” (i.e., cases 
where an officer claimed that a suspect dropped narcotics evidence while fleeing police, making 
police possession of the evidence the result of a legal, plain-view seizure) after the Supreme Court 
extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  Stuntz, supra 
note 317, at 937–38 & n.149 (discussing Barlow, Patterns of Arrest for Misdemeanor Narcotics 
Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960–62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 555–60, 570 (1968)). 
 403. See William Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1823 (1998) 
(stating that the Supreme Court’s approach to consent searches “resolves into a kind of ‘Jeopardy’ 
rule: If the officer approaches the suspect and puts the command to empty his pockets in the form of 
a question, the resulting search is consensual”).  For a recent discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on consent searches, see generally Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! 
Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. 
REV. 399 (2004). 
 404. Stunz, supra note 317, at 914–15. 
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no way that the warrant process can seriously check perjury unless the 
Court becomes more restrictive in its approach to confidential 
informants.  Such a change of heart is unlikely because the use of 
informants is so critical to narcotics enforcement.405 
These general points are still more telling in the present context.  The 
question at this point in my analysis is not about the potential for perjury 
at suppression hearings in general, but about the potential for perjury in 
cases where the gaps to be filled by suppression hearing testimony result 
from reasonable mistakes in the warrant application process.  I have 
argued that the reasonable-mistake standard should be hard for the 
prosecution to meet because courts should interpret as reasonable only 
those mistakes that cannot realistically be eliminated by better training.  
If the standard is not met, the risk of perjury would be nonexistent 
because the trial court would refuse to entertain testimony that sought to 
remedy unreasonable errors in the warrant application.  Where an 
omission from the affidavit is reasonable, the gap in the affidavit will be 
small and the officer’s suppression hearing testimony will be 
significantly constrained by the information included in the warrant 
application.  These points suggest that the risk of perjury if suppression 
hearing testimony were allowed to correct reasonable mistakes in the 
warrant application would be quite manageable.  I conclude that perjury 
concerns are not sufficient to justify a bright-line prohibition against the 
use of suppression hearing testimony to establish the officer’s good faith. 
If a bright-line rule is unnecessary, the remaining question with 
respect to the perjury variable is whether courts should impose some 
heightened standard of proof when evaluating suppression hearing 
testimony offered to establish an affiant’s good faith.  There are 
legitimate concerns that even in cases where the affidavit’s deficiencies 
are small enough to look like the result of a reasonable mistake, the 
credibility gap and hindsight bias problems endemic to suppression 
hearings might sway courts to credit perjured testimony.  Given that 
anything short of a bright-line rule contains some potential for abuse, a 
heightened proof standard such as clear and convincing evidence seems a 
modest and sensible step.406  Such a standard would remind courts to 
                                                     
 405. Id. at 938–41.  Stuntz observes that this is one of the many ways in which the “War on 
Drugs” has influenced the law of criminal procedure. 
 406. See id. at 912 n.69 (observing that burden of proof rules are one common way of dealing 
with hindsight bias).  Professor Sherwin has discussed an analogous issue in considering proposals 
to excuse non-compliance with will formalities (e.g., a rule that the will must be signed by two 
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other) if there is clear and convincing evidence 
of testamentary intent.  Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The 
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453 
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guard against the risk of perjury created by allowing suppression hearing 
testimony to rehabilitate warrants.  Where the officer’s story seems 
doubtful, courts should refuse to credit the testimony and should 
suppress the evidence. 
F. Rules Versus Standards: An Objection and Response 
I have argued, then, that suppression hearing testimony about 
information omitted from the warrant application can be used to establish 
an officer’s good faith if the omission resulted from a reasonable mistake 
and the prosecution can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
omitted information was known to the officer at the time of the warrant 
application.  This approach imposes a duty to use reasonable care in 
filling out the warrant application, but regards some mistakes in the 
application process as reasonable because they cannot realistically be 
eliminated by greater police training.  I have argued that if suitably 
interpreted, this recognition of reasonable mistakes in the warrant 
application process will neither encourage laxity in the preparation of 
warrant applications nor pose unmanageable risks of perjury. 
Most criminal procedure scholars will, I suspect, readily accept my 
conclusion that an approach like that of the Eighth Circuit must be 
rejected because it tends to undermine the self-imposed discipline of the 
warrant process while creating unduly great risks of police perjury.  They 
will likely be reluctant, however, to join me in rejecting the Ninth 
Circuit’s bright-line ban on proving good faith through suppression 
hearing testimony.  One possible ground of such reluctance is an 
argument that we ought to hold tenaciously to any rule that helps prevent 
police perjury because the problem is a very serious one and the judicial 
means of controlling it are so limited.  I certainly share the concerns 
                                                                                                                       
 
(2002).  Sherwin explains that “[a] judicial power to dispense with formality requirements, in 
comparison with the traditional rule of strict enforcement, increases decisional accuracy.  Combining 
this power with a clear and convincing evidence standard diminishes its accuracy, but the higher 
standard of proof minimizes danger to the functions of the traditional formality requirements.”  Id. at 
464.  One can view my proposed rule in a similar light.  I relax the “warrant formality” requiring that 
all information supporting probable cause be included in the affidavit (or otherwise presented to the 
magistrate) in the service of decisional accuracy, i.e., outcomes that more closely track the relevant 
policies.  The relaxation of the formality rule threatens to reduce the rule’s effectiveness in curbing 
perjury, but the heightened proof standard of clear and convincing evidence helps to minimize this 
danger.  Sherwin ultimately concludes that this sort of compromise does not work well in the context 
of wills, and she suggests that it may also be unstable in other contexts.  Id. at 466, 475–76.  I see no 
reason, however, why the coupling of a “dispensation rule” allowing consideration of information 
omitted from the affidavit through reasonable mistake and a heightened proof standard would be 
unstable in the context of the good-faith inquiry. 
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behind this argument, but I have already tried to explain why my 
proposed solution should not pose unmanageable risks of police perjury.  
At another level, however, the reluctance may be rooted in a view that 
the advantages of having a bright-line rule in the context of suppression 
hearings more than compensate for its inaccuracies in some cases.  
Someone influenced by the work of Frederick Schauer407 or Larry 
Alexander and Emily Sherwin408 might raise the following objection: 
 In essence, your argument is that the Ninth Circuit rule would sweep 
too broadly and thus result in the suppression of evidence in cases 
where suppression would neither increase the level of care in the 
warrant process nor prevent perjury.  It is natural enough to say that 
excluding evidence in these cases would just be “mindless formalism” 
and that a more tailored rule like the one you propose would track the 
underlying policies more accurately.409  What you are leaving out, 
though, is that this kind of gap between a rule’s scope of application 
and its underlying rationale is an inevitable consequence of having a 
“serious rule” at all.  It is the essence of any serious rule to be 
“entrenched against its background justification” so that the rule will 
apply even in circumstances where the underlying purposes of the rule 
are not served, 410 and the Ninth Circuit rule is a serious rule.  When we 
                                                     
 407. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz eds., Clarendon Press, 1991); 
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
 408. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (Duke University Press, 2001); Alexander & Sherwin, supra 
note 106. 
 409. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES ix–x (2003) 
(explaining that his intention in the book is to defend “the morality of decision by categories and by 
generalizations” against what he describes as our contemporary “resistance to generalization” and 
“sympathy for the particular”). 
 410. Here the objector is drawing on the largely consistent accounts of rule-based decision 
making developed by Schauer and by Alexander and Sherwin in the works cited supra notes 407–08.  
Alexander and Sherwin use the phrase “serious rules” to denote legal norms that are especially 
effective in settling disagreements and guiding conduct precisely because they are “opaque to the 
moral principles they are supposed to effectuate.”  ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, RULE OF RULES, supra 
note 408, at 30.  Similarly, Schauer speaks of “real rules” as entrenched against their background 
generalizations: “it is exactly a rule’s rigidity, even in the face of applications that would ill serve its 
purpose, that renders it a rule.”  Schauer, Formalism, supra note 407, at 535.  While I cannot do 
justice to the richness of their accounts in the context of this Article, the objection set out in the text 
can be more fully appreciated in the light of a brief account of the distinctive characteristics of 
“serious rules.”  A brief discussion will also help to avoid potential confusion about terminology. 
 While the term “rule” has many meanings and, in the context of articles like this one, is often 
used as a general term for any sort of legal norm, Alexander and Sherwin helpfully differentiate 
“serious rules” from “rules of thumb,” principles, and standards.  ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, RULE OF 
RULES, supra note 408, at 26–32.  Rules of thumb (their example is “As a rule, you should drive 
slowly rather than drive fast”) offer defeasible advice about what to do—“they can be heeded or 
ignored but never ‘obeyed’ or ‘violated.’”  Id. at 27.  In contrast, a serious rule can be obeyed or 
violated because it “purports to state a prescription applicable to every case that falls within the 
rule’s factual predicate or hypothesis.”  Id.  In contrast to (moral) principles, serious rules are posited 
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confine our attention to any particular case where application of a rule 
seems harsh (e.g., Corrigan), replacing the rule with a standard like 
“reasonable mistake” will always seem to increase decisional accuracy 
because standards are more responsive to background policies.411  But 
despite their inevitable inaccuracy in particular cases, rules can 
sometimes decrease the overall rate of error over time.412  Serious rules, 
as Schauer says, are about the allocation of decision-making 
authority413—and use of a rule can be justified precisely because it is 
undesirable to give decision makers the power to weigh a rule’s 
application in a particular case against its background purposes.414 
 Now consider the application of these ideas to the question of 
                                                                                                                       
 
norms that come into existence at a particular place and time.  Id.  Finally, a serious rule is 
distinguished from a standard by its greater determinateness, which in turn is a function of the rule’s 
being “opaque to the moral principles [it] is supposed to effectuate.”  Id. at 30.  A standard, in 
contrast, is a posited norm that “contain[s] vague or controversial moral or evaluative terms” in its 
formulation and hence is “transparent to background moral principles and requires particularistic 
decision-making.”  Id. at 29–30.  The rule/standard distinction is, of course, a familiar one that has 
generated a vast literature.  Some influential discussions include Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules 
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 411. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, RULE OF RULES, supra note 408, at 34–35 (explaining that 
serious rules are inherently imperfect because they are necessarily both over- and under-inclusive 
relative to background moral principles); see also Schauer, Formalism, supra note 407, at 542 (“A 
decisionmaker can never exceed the optimal result based on all relevant factors.  Thus, a rule-bound 
decisionmaker, precluded from taking into account certain features of the present case, can never do 
better but can do worse than a decisionmaker seeking the optimal result for a case through a rule-free 
decision.”). 
 412. In Alexander and Sherwin’s account, “serious rules” are interesting and important because 
their relative determinacy enables them to fulfill “the moral functions that the rules are meant to 
serve: coordination, expertise, and efficiency.”  ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, RULE OF RULES, supra 
note 408, at 30.  Attempts to directly apply moral principles to particular cases lead to “the 
controversy and uncertainty that results in lack of coordination, costly deliberation, and mistaken 
(inexpert) conclusions.”  Id.  Serious rules can eliminate these problems to the extent that it is easier 
for decisionmakers to apply the rule correctly and consistently in particular situations than it is for 
them to apply the moral principles underlying the rule.  Id. at 31.  Alexander and Sherwin provide a 
helpful example of how a serious rule can improve decision-making accuracy over time despite its 
inherent imperfections: 
[S]uppose Lex [the fictional lawgiver used throughout THE RULE OF RULES] knows that 
frequent strong tides make swimming dangerous at a certain site.  In a world of perfect 
reasoners, no rule would be necessary because all people would correctly judge whether 
and when they should swim.  In fact, most people lack the information necessary for 
accurate judgment: some may understand the tides well enough to know when it is safe to 
swim, and others may be strong enough to resist the tides; but too many will err and swim 
when they should not.  As a result, considerable public and private resources will be 
devoted to rescuing hapless swimmers.  As long as Lex’s information is superior to that 
of most of his subjects, and as long as it is not practical to identify the experts among 
them, the best course is for Lex to enact a serious rule, “No swimming.” 
Id. at 55 
 413. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 407, at 540–44. 
 414. See id. 
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whether suppression hearing testimony can be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith.  The Ninth Circuit approach functions as a serious 
rule disabling judges from making case-by-case decisions about 
whether the testimony might be perjured and whether the evidence 
supporting probable cause was omitted from the warrant application 
because of a reasonable mistake.  No doubt judges applying this rule 
will get some cases “wrong”415 in light of the underlying policies—the 
rule will result in the suppression of evidence in some cases where 
suppression would serve no Fourth Amendment purpose.416  But surely 
judges authorized to make case-by-case decisions will make a lot of 
mistakes in the other direction by construing reasonable mistake too 
generously and crediting perjured testimony despite the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.  This is not to impugn the integrity or 
intelligence of judges, but rather to call attention to the dynamics 
peculiar to the suppression hearing.  As you described earlier, Professor 
Stuntz has explained the various ways in which suppression hearings 
make perjury easier.417  And if a court believes an officer’s testimony 
that he omitted information from the warrant application through an 
innocent mistake, it will undoubtedly be reluctant to rule that the 
mistake was unreasonable enough to warrant suppression.  Possible 
systemic effects in undermining the police commitment to the warrant 
process would likely seem less pressing than the immediate prospect of 
a criminal going free because the constable has blundered in preparing 
his affidavit.418  Do not these considerations suggest that, in the long 
run, the Ninth Circuit rule will improve decisional accuracy and will 
better promote the underlying Fourth Amendment policies than the 
more flexible standard you propose? 
This objection is a powerful one; indeed, I think it is the strongest 
argument for rejecting my proposed view in favor of the Ninth Circuit 
alternative.  While I am convinced that my approach is superior to that 
taken by the Eighth Circuit, this argument suggests that the choice 
between my position and the Ninth Circuit’s is a close one.  Still, I have 
three points to make in response. 
To begin, I think that both my imagined objector and I must 
acknowledge that the fate of the objection chiefly depends on empirical 
                                                     
 415. Obviously, I do not mean that their decisions would be wrong, all things considered.  If a 
serious rule is justified, the decisions would be correct, all things considered.  They would be 
“wrong” only in the sense that they would diverge from the choices that would be made by a perfect 
particularistic decision maker. 
 416. More precisely, it would serve no Fourth Amendment purpose cognizable under Leon.  
Suppressing evidence when the affidavit is woefully lacking in probable cause might be valuable as 
a way of encouraging magistrates to scrutinize affidavits more closely, but (as has already been 
discussed at length) that purpose does not count under Leon. 
 417. See supra notes 331–42 and accompanying text. 
 418. Here, of course, the objector is paraphrasing Justice Cardozo’s famous quip about the 
exclusionary rule.  See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (“The criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered.”). 
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predictions about the behavior of judges.  Such predictions are hard to 
make in a principled way.  According to the objection, the principal 
justification for a bright-line rule against proving good faith with 
suppression hearing testimony is that it will reduce the rate of error over 
time. In this context, we know that judges applying the Ninth Circuit rule 
sometimes will reach the wrong result by excluding evidence in cases 
where it ought to be admitted.  On the other hand, we know that judges 
operating under my proposed standard will err by admitting evidence that 
should be excluded.  The question of whether the Ninth Circuit rule is 
justified ultimately depends on which set of errors would be more 
frequent,419 and this is something we simply do not know.420  I have 
made the case that if judges appreciate the relevant policies, they can 
allow suppression hearing testimony to establish good faith on a case-by-
case basis without compromising the protections of the warrant 
application process.  One might reasonably consider that assessment too 
optimistic, but only experience under my proposed standard could prove 
it so.  If courts adopted my approach but proved unwilling or unable to 
apply it narrowly, I might reconsider my position and advocate adoption 
of the Ninth Circuit rule.421 
A second point I wish to make quite briefly is that adoption of the 
Ninth Circuit’s bright-line rule is in some tension with Leon’s insistence 
that suppression in warrant cases should be ordered “only on a case-by-
case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule.”422  While hardly dispositive, the 
passage suggests that Leon envisions a regime of standards rather than 
rules—a regime where the norms governing application of the 
exclusionary rule are meant to be transparent to the background purposes 
of the rule. 
                                                     
 419. Alexander and Sherwin put the general point well: “the function of a rule is to require 
uniform conduct when this is the best course of action for most of those who are subject to the rule.  
If, among the sum of actions governed by the rule, more harm would result from mistaken judgment 
than from compliance with the rule, the rule is justified.”  ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, RULE OF RULES, 
supra note 408, at 55. 
 420. Schauer explains that genuine rules always restrict decision-making authority.  Whether this 
is a liability or an asset depends on how well the decision makers are likely to do; the problem, as 
Schauer notes, is predicting the behavior of the relevant decision-makers.  Schauer, Formalism, 
supra note 407, at 543–44. 
 421. In this respect, my attitude is similar to that expressed by Justice Blackmun in his Leon 
concurrence.  Justice Blackmun argued that the correctness of Leon ultimately depended on a 
defeasible empirical prediction that suspending the exclusionary rule for most warrant searches 
would have no significant effect on police compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  He insisted that 
the Court should reconsider Leon if experience proved that prediction false.  United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 927–28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 422. Id. at 918 (majority opinion). 
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This second point suggests a third, which is far more important.  The 
objection being considered suggests that the Ninth Circuit rule would 
reduce judicial error in the long run by disabling judges from making 
case-by-case, policy-sensitive judgments about whether suppression 
hearing testimony establishes the affiant’s good faith.  The worry is that 
without a firm rule, too many judges will exercise their discretion to 
favor law enforcement interests at the expense of Fourth Amendment 
protections.  It may be unrealistic, though, to think that a bright-line rule 
against proving good faith through suppression hearing testimony could 
really cabin judicial discretion in the way the objection envisions.  The 
problem is that, if generally adopted, the Ninth Circuit rule would be one 
serious rule awash in a sea of standards.  As just noted, Leon explicitly 
invites courts to decide cases by referring directly to the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule, and the governing norms for the review of a 
magistrate’s probable-cause determination leave considerable room for 
discretion.  Specifically, a court that is bound by a bright-line rule 
barring the use of suppression hearing testimony to prove good faith but 
believes suppression would not serve the purposes behind the 
exclusionary rule will generally423 still have the option of saying that the 
affidavit actually provided the magistrate with a “‘substantial basis 
for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed”424 or that it at least 
contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to justify good-faith 
reliance.425  In other words, the Ninth Circuit rule might serve not to 
reduce judicial error, but to channel it into other areas where it might do 
even more harm to the integrity of the warrant process. 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Carpenter426 
provides an instructive example.  There, an initial panel opinion relied on 
material omitted from the warrant application in applying the good faith 
exception.427  This proved controversial, and when the case was reheard 
en banc a majority of the court ducked the question of whether 
information omitted from the affidavit could be used to establish the 
officer’s good faith.428  Instead, the en banc court held that the affidavit, 
                                                     
 423. I say generally because, in any given jurisdiction, particular precedents might foreclose this 
maneuver.  In most instances, the fact-specific character of probable-cause determinations makes it 
relatively easy for courts to distinguish unfavorable precedents. 
 424. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 271 (1960)). 
 425. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
 426. 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 851 (2004).  See also supra 
notes 283–90 and accompanying text (discussing Carpenter). 
 427. Id. at 594. 
 428. Id. at 593. 
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scanty as it was, actually contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to 
support reasonable reliance.429  From the standpoint of preserving the 
protections of the warrant process, this result is entirely perverse.  By 
watering down the third Leon exception in this way, the en banc opinion 
conveyed far more strongly than the panel opinion the message that 
anything signed by a magistrate is immune from meaningful judicial 
review.430  Matters would have been even worse had the court ruled that 
the affidavit had provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for 
finding probable cause, for that holding would not even have instructed 
the magistrate to be more critical in reviewing future warrant 
applications.   
The lesson here, I submit, is that a bright-line rule flatly prohibiting 
the use of suppression hearing testimony to prove good faith would not 
prevent courts from making the sorts of errors that arise from the use of 
standards instead of serious rules.  Instead, courts would find other ways 
of admitting evidence where exclusion seems not to serve the purposes 
of the exclusionary rule.  If that is so, the objection significantly 
overstates its case that the Ninth Circuit’s serious rule will protect the 
integrity of the warrant process more effectively than my proposed 
standard.  The intuition that officers should not be penalized for 
reasonable mistakes in the warrant application process is a strong one 
that courts are likely to acknowledge in one way or another.  Indeed, we 
have already seen evidence of this in Procopio and related cases, where 
courts seem to be implicitly employing an approach similar to the one I 
propose.  It will be best if courts are allowed to openly acknowledge 
what they are doing and to self-consciously consider the risks that come 
with allowing suppression hearing testimony to prove good faith. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In his Leon dissent, Justice Brennan predicted that the good faith 
                                                     
 429. Id. at 597. 
 430. In my earlier discussion, I classified Carpenter as a Type II case.  Applying my proposed 
standard to its facts, I would hold that the omissions in the warrant application were unreasonable 
and that the evidence should have been excluded.  Given the actual result in the case, I strongly 
suspect that the judges who voted with the majority also would have admitted the evidence under my 
standard by finding that the officers had made a reasonable mistake in the warrant application.  If I 
am right, the example illustrates both the objection’s concerns and my response to them.  As the 
objection contends, courts may be tempted to dilute my standard in ways that undermine the 
integrity of the warrant process.  My response is that courts who believe that suppression is 
unwarranted can reach the same result in other ways even if they follow the Ninth Circuit approach, 
and that these alternative routes may be even worse. 
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exception would “undermine the integrity of the warrant process.”431  
Using the terminology of Professor Dan-Cohen’s “acoustic separation” 
model, the concern was that the Leon decision rule would undermine 
police commitment to Fourth Amendment conduct rules.  Most cases that 
fall within the third Leon exception seem to confirm Justice Brennan’s 
dire predictions.  When the face of an affidavit is so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause that no reasonable officer would have submitted it to a 
magistrate, the officer who did submit it would seem to have already lost 
all regard for the integrity of the warrant process.  Nonetheless, I have 
tried to show in this Article that there are cases where the usual inference 
is unjustified—cases where officers are able to offer eminently 
believable testimony suggesting that the shortcomings in their warrant 
applications were the result of objectively reasonable mistakes.  
Suppressing evidence in these cases serves no Fourth Amendment 
purpose, and leads to an undesirable pocket of strict liability within 
Fourth Amendment law.  However exaggerated the Supreme Court’s 
notions of the costs of the exclusionary rule may be, those costs look 
rather high in cases where suppression seems to bring no benefits.  
Allowing limited use of suppression hearing testimony to prove good 
faith under Leon would address concerns about strict liability and 
overdeterrence, but raises hard questions about whether courts can apply 
the Leon decision rule on the basis of suppression hearing testimony 
without contributing to slippage in Fourth Amendment conduct rules.  
Prior to Leon, officers prepared their warrant applications with the 
understanding that probable cause would be judged solely on the basis of 
information presented to the magistrate and that omissions could result in 
the loss of valuable evidence.432  That rule sent a strong message that 
preparing the warrant application was serious business.  If courts allow 
suppression hearing testimony to cure some kinds of mistakes in the 
warrant application process, will this lead officers to reduce their levels 
of care in applying for warrants?  Will officers take advantage of judicial 
leniency by perjuring themselves to save threatened prosecutions? 
The answers to these questions depend, I think, on how courts 
approach the use of suppression hearing testimony to establish good 
faith.  If courts follow the Eighth Circuit’s lead by routinely looking 
beyond the affidavit in the good-faith inquiry, officers are sure to get the 
message that the warrant application is a mere formality.  I have argued, 
however, that suppression testimony can be used to establish the officer’s 
                                                     
 431. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 958 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 432. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971). 
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good faith without undermining the integrity of the warrant process if 
two conditions are met: First, the omission of the information must be 
the product of a reasonable mistake in the warrant application process.  
Second, the prosecution’s claims about the omitted information must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Again, the key to the ultimate 
workability of my proposal is that courts must interpret the notion of 
reasonable mistake narrowly, using a strategy of selective transmission to 
minimize the conduct side effects of a more permissive decision rule.  To 
the extent that an officer’s mistake could realistically be affected by 
training, it should not be regarded as objectively reasonable.  This 
approach is faithful to the spirit of Leon in recognizing the limits of 
deterrence while preserving the privacy protections the warrant 
requirement can still provide even when magistrates fail to perform their 
constitutional roles.  
